Inspector John Bonfield met Mr. Simonson, a witness in this case, at the police station on the night of the Haymarket riot. The man was introduced to him by Capt. Ward as a member of the firm of J. V. Farwell & Co.
“We three stood together outside of the railing. Mr. Simonson opened the conversation by remarking to me that he understood that the horses belonging to the Police Department were getting used up with the constant work they had, and that either Mr. Farwell or the firm—I understood him to say Mr. Farwell—that their horses were at our service in case we needed any horses. I told him that our teams had stood the work so far very well, but that if the troubles continued for any length of time we would likely need assistance and would call upon him if occasion demanded it, thanking him for his offer. He then spoke about the trouble at McCormick’s and on Centre Avenue and Eighteenth Street that afternoon, and said the police ought to have dispersed those crowds; not to have allowed them to collect. I did not, in the course of that conversation, tell him that I would like to get a crowd of 3,000 without any women and children, and in that case would make short work of them, or anything to that effect.”
The most important part of the work done by the State at this phase of the proceedings was the strong indorsement of Harry W. Gilmer’s veracity which was produced before the jury. To the credibility of this witness, and to their acquaintance with, and respect for him, the following persons testified: Judge Tuthill of the Superior Court, Chas. A. Dibble, John Steele, Michael Smith, Benjamin F. Knowles, Chester C. Cole, ex-Judge of the Supreme Court of Iowa, Edward R. Mason, Clerk of the U. S. Circuit Court at Des Moines, Samuel Merrill, President of the Citizens’ National Bank of Des Moines, Canute R. Matson, Sheriff of Cook County, Sylvanus Edinburn, W. P. Hardy, John L. Manning, an attorney, and many others. Many of these witnesses had known Gilmer in Iowa for many years; others were old acquaintances of his in Chicago; all of them swore that he was worthy of belief.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
Opening of the Argument—Mr. Walker’s Speech—The Law of the Case—Was there a Conspiracy?—The Caliber of the Bullets—Tightening the Chain—A Propaganda on the Witness-stand—The Eight-hour Movement—“One Single Bomb”—The Cry of the Revolutionist—Avoiding the Mouse-trap—Parsons and the Murder—Studying “Revolutionary War”—Lingg and his Bomb Factory—The Alibi Idea.
THE evidence being now all in, Francis W. Walker, Assistant State’s Attorney, on the morning of August 11th, began his address to the jury. Although his argument was an exceedingly lengthy one, he held his audience and the jury to the closest attention from the first word to the last. Mr. Walker began by an examination of the law, defining what is meant by the term “reasonable doubt,” which he believed would be one of the arguments used by the defense. Following this he read the statutes showing what murder is, and what an accessory, under the laws of Illinois. Under the statute, as he proved, an accessory is to be held as a principal. Following this he reviewed at some length Mr. Salomon’s statement, in that gentleman’s opening speech, that the prisoners had been guilty, if they were guilty at all, of no crime more serious than conspiracy. Mr. Walker held that the fact that murder had followed the conspiracy proved the conspirators murderers. His logic was clear, cogent and unanswerable. Its effect could be seen in the gloomy attention which the doomed Anarchists paid to his fatal chain of reasoning.
Leaving the authorities to one side, Mr. Walker addressed himself to the facts made manifest by the evidence. He said:
“We start out first upon the analysis of the facts of this case in this way: Was there an unlawful combination, a conspiracy, to overthrow the systems of this Government upon the 1st day of May, 1886? Was the bomb thrown on the 4th of May in pursuance of the common design? Are these defendants members of that conspiracy? When those questions are answered in the affirmative the guilt of each and every one of these defendants of murder is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. But, if we go further than that, the argument would embrace the topic: Was there a murder committed at the Haymarket? Did the defendants aid, abet and assist the commission of that act? Or, if they were not present aiding, abetting and assisting, had they advised, encouraged, aided and abetted the perpetration of the crime? Under either aspect of this case, the defendants are guilty of murder with malice aforethought.