Anarchy and Anarchists / A History of the Red Terror and the Social Revolution in America and Europe; Communism, Socialism, and Nihilism in Doctrine and in Deed; The Chicago Haymarket Conspiracy and the Detection and Trial of the Conspirators

by Michael J. Schaack

“The court instructs the jury that whoever is guilty of murder shall suffer the penalty of death or imprisonment in the penitentiary for his natural life, or for a term not less than fourteen years. If the accused or any of them are found guilty by the jury, the jury shall fix the punishment by their verdict.

“The court instructs the jury that, while it is provided by the Constitution of the State of Illinois that every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, he is, by the Constitution, held responsible under the laws for the abuse of liberty so given. Freedom of speech is limited by the laws of the land, to the extent, among other limitations, that no man is allowed to advise the committing of any crime against the person or property of another; and the statute provides: An accessory is he who stands by and aids, abets and assists, or who, not being present, aiding, abetting or assisting, hath advised, encouraged, aided or abetted the perpetration of the crime. He who thus aids, abets, assists, advises or encourages, shall be considered as principal, and punished accordingly.

“Every such accessory, when the crime is committed within or without this State by his aid or procurement in this State, may be indicted and convicted at the same time as the principal, or before or after his conviction, whether the principal is convicted or amenable to justice or not, and punished as principal.

“The court further instructs the jury, as a matter of law, that if they believe from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants, or any of them, conspired and agreed together, or with others, to overthrow the law by force, or to unlawfully resist the officers of the law, and if they further believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that, in pursuance of such conspiracy and in furtherance of the common object, a bomb was thrown by a member of such conspiracy at the time, and that Mathias J. Degan was killed, then such of the defendants that the jury believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have been parties to such conspiracy, are guilty of murder, whether present at the killing or not, and whether the identity of the person throwing the bomb be established or not.

“If the jury believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was in existence in this county and State a conspiracy to overthrow the existing order of society, and to bring about social revolution by force, or to destroy the legal authorities of this city, county or State by force, and that the defendants, or any of them, were parties to such conspiracy, and that Degan was killed in the manner described in the indictment, that he was killed by a bomb, and that the bomb was thrown by a party to the conspiracy, and in furtherance of the objects of the conspiracy, then any of the defendants who were members of such conspiracy at that time are in this case guilty of murder, and that, too, although the jury may further believe from the evidence that the time and place for the bringing about of such revolution, or the destruction of such authorities, had not been definitely, agreed upon by the conspirators, but was left to them and the exigencies of time, or to the judgment of any of the co-conspirators.”

“If these defendants, or any two or more of them, conspired together with or not with any other person or persons to excite the people or classes of the people of this city to sedition, tumult and riot, to use deadly weapons against and take the lives of other persons, as a means to carry their designs and purposes into effect, and in pursuance of such conspiracy, and in furtherance of its objects, any of the persons so conspiring publicly, by print or speech, advised or encouraged the commission of murder without designating time, place or occasion at which it should be done, and in pursuance of, and induced by such advice or encouragement, murder was committed, then all of such conspirators are guilty of such murder, whether the person who perpetrated such murder can be identified or not. If such murder was committed in pursuance of such advice or encouragement, and was induced thereby, it does not matter what change, if any, in the order or condition of society, or what, if any, advantage to themselves or others the conspirators proposed as the result of their conspiracy, nor does it matter whether such advice and encouragement had been frequent and long continued or not, except in determining whether the perpetrator was or was not acting in pursuance of such advice or encouragement, and was or was not induced thereby to commit the murder. If there was such conspiracy as in this instruction is recited, such advice or encouragement was given, and murder committed in pursuance of and induced thereby, then all such conspirators are guilty of murder. Nor does it matter, if there was such a conspiracy, how impracticable or impossible of success its end and aims were, nor how foolish or ill-arranged were the plans for its execution, except as bearing upon the question whether there was or was not such conspiracy.

“The court instructs the jury that a conspiracy may be established by circumstantial evidence the same as any other fact, and that such evidence is legal and competent for that purpose. So also whether an act which was committed was done by a member of the conspiracy, may be established by circumstantial evidence, whether the identity of the individual who committed the act be established or not; and also whether an act done was in pursuance of the common design may be ascertained by the same class of evidence, and if the jury believe from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants or any of them conspired and agreed together or with others to overthrow the law by force, or destroy the legal authorities of this city, county or State by force, and that in furtherance of the common design, and by a member of such conspiracy, Mathias J. Degan was killed, then these defendants, if any, whom the jury believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, were parties to such conspiracy, are guilty of the murder of Mathias J. Degan, whether the identity of the individual doing the killing be established or not, or whether such defendants were present at the time of the killing or not.

“The jury are instructed, as a matter of law, that all who take part in the conspiracy after it is formed, and while it is in execution, and all who with knowledge of the facts concur in the plan originally formed, and aid in executing them, are fellow-conspirators. Their concurrence without proof of an agreement to concur is conclusive against them. They commit the offense when they become parties to the transaction or further the original plan with knowledge of the conspiracy.