To find the answers to these questions the court went into an exhaustive review of all the evidence in the case, covering the same ground which has been gone over in the previous chapters of this book.
First the bomb with which the murder had been done was considered. It had been proven to be round; to have a projecting fuse; to be of composite manufacture; to contain tin and lead, with traces of antimony, iron and zinc; to have upon it a small iron nut. All these characteristics were found in the bombs which Louis Lingg manufactured, and for these and other reasons the court held that the jury was warranted in believing that the bomb which killed Degan had been made by Lingg.
The purposes of the conspiracy were next inquired into, and the articles in the Alarm, the platform of the Internationale and similar incendiary and dangerous language from many sources are quoted in full in the opinion. The organization of the Anarchists was also inquired into, and the divisions into groups, the make-up of the Lehr and Wehr Verein and like matters stated. The court declared this to be an “illegal conspiracy.”
The damning array of evidence against the assassins was brought together relentlessly and completely. The speeches of the defendants were sifted, their teachings examined, and there could be left in no mind a doubt that these men had advised murder and arson, and that they were guilty technically as well as morally. The opinion of the court was a masterly presentation of the facts, and the conclusions drawn from them settled once for all both the law and the equity of this celebrated case. It was evident that there was law enough in America to protect society.
That the Haymarket murders were the legitimate and expected result of the teachings of the ring-leaders of the conspiracy was conclusively shown with a ruthless logic that left no hope for pardon, nor for interference with the law’s stern course.
Lingg’s case, and the case of Spies, of Engel, of Fischer, of Parsons, of Neebe, of Fielden were taken up separately, examined with a care that might be described as almost microscopic, and in each case there was no flaw in the record—no reason why these men should not pay the penalty for their crime.
The concluding part of the opinion is so important from a legal standpoint, and at the same time of such general interest, that I will quote it entire:
“If the defendants, as a means of bringing about the social revolution and as a part of the larger conspiracy to effect such revolution, also conspired to excite classes of workingmen in Chicago into sedition, tumult and riot and to the use of deadly weapons and the taking of human life, and, for the purpose of producing such tumult, riot, use of weapons and taking of life, advised and encouraged such classes by newspaper articles and speeches to murder the authorities of the city, and a murder of a policeman resulted from such advice and encouragement, then defendants are responsible therefor.
“It is a familiar doctrine of the law, in criminal cases, that, if a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the prisoner is entertained, the jury have no discretion, but must acquit. The twelfth and thirteenth instructions for the prosecution are objected to as not correctly stating to the jury the meaning of ‘reasonable doubt.’ The twelfth instruction is an exact copy, verbatim et literatim, of the sixth instruction in Miller et. al. vs. The People, 39 Ill. 457, which we approved in that case, and which since that case we have indorsed as correct in at least three cases, to-wit: May vs. The People, 60 Ill. 119, Connaghan vs. The People, 88 id. 460, and Dunn vs. The People, 109 id. 635.
“The portion of the thirteenth instruction which plaintiffs in error complain of is that which is contained in the following words: ‘You are not at liberty to disbelieve as jurors if from the evidence you believe as men.’ This expression has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as having been properly used in an instruction given to the jury by a trial judge, and we are inclined to follow the ruling there laid down. That court said in Nevling vs. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. St. 322: ‘The learned judge then proceeded to say that the doubt must be a reasonable one, and that jurymen could not doubt as jurymen what they believed as men. In all this there was no error. It is the familiar language found in the textbooks and decisions which treat of the subject.’