It is clear today, as it was to those actually on the frontier at the time, that with both parties determined to possess the Northwest war in earnest between the red men and the white was inevitable. When once the issue was fairly joined the ultimate outcome could hardly remain a matter of doubt, yet the government entered upon the war with extreme reluctance, and only after a flood of appeals from the frontier for protection had been poured upon it.[264] Several causes operated to produce this hesitation. The new government, feeble and lacking in resources, dreaded the expense. The hostile tribes were more numerous and formidable than any combination the red race had ever yet brought into the field against the white. They gathered in bodies so large as fairly to deserve the name of armies, and fought pitched battles with American armies as large as those commanded by Washington at Trenton or by Greene at Eutaw Springs.[265] Finally the government was actuated by an honest desire to promote the welfare of the Indians and to discharge scrupulously all of its treaty obligations toward them.[266]
[264] Roosevelt, op. cit., IV, 9, 18, 27 et passim.
[265] Ibid., IV, 17-18.
[266] Ibid., 9, 17; see, also, documents pertaining to the establishment by the government of Indian trading houses, in American State Papers, Indian Affairs, Vols. I and II, passim.
In 1790 the hovering war cloud burst. The Indians forced the issue by intercepting and plundering the boats conveying settlers down the Ohio, the main avenue of travel into the western country. In July St. Clair, the governor of the Northwest Territory, called upon the state of Kentucky for troops, authorized the raising of the militia of the western counties of Pennsylvania and Virginia, and set his own forces in motion. The main expedition was sent from Fort Washington against the Miamis, under command of General Harmar.[267] In October he set out with fourteen hundred men for the hostile villages. Rumor going in advance multiplied the numbers of his little army, so that the Indians made no attempt at resistance. The towns at the junction of the St. Mary's and St. Joseph rivers were found deserted and were destroyed. At this point Harmar divided his force, sending out detachments in various directions. These were severely handled, though they inflicted perhaps an equal loss upon the Indians. The whole body shortly made a disorderly retreat, and the campaign was ended. No great disaster had been suffered, but the army had lost two hundred men and the net result had been a "mortifying failure."
[267] For Harmar's expedition see Winsor, op. cit., 417-20; Roosevelt, op. cit., 111, 304-10.
That the Indians were not cowed by Harmar was shown by the prompt renewal of their marauding expeditions. Early in the year 1791 they raided the New England settlements near Marietta, killing a dozen persons and carrying half as many more into captivity.[268] This is but typical of further raids which continued throughout the winter. Meanwhile the Americans were preparing another expedition. Washington asked and received permission from Congress to raise three thousand troops to be placed under St. Clair's command. To protect the frontier while this army was being made ready, bodies of rangers composed of the more capable and daring bordermen were employed.[269] Moving in small parties and fighting the Indian in his own fashion, they performed much effective service. In addition to this measure the Kentuckians were authorized to conduct two raids upon the enemy. Each expedition consisted of several hundred mounted volunteers under experienced leaders. Each succeeded in harrying a number of villages, with almost no loss to the raiders themselves.
[268] Roosevelt, op. cit., IV, 19-20.
[269] Ibid., 28-30.
The gathering-place for St. Clair's expedition was, as in the case of Harmar, Fort Washington. According to the plan adopted he was to have here three thousand effective troops by July 10, 1791. But not until July 15 did the first regiment of three hundred men arrive, and it was October before he could count two thousand effective men.[270] From beginning to end, this first great military enterprise of the new government was woefully mismanaged. The supplies provided were poor, the commissary department was both inefficient and corrupt, the commander was sick and incapable, and the troops themselves were "wretched stuff."[271] Aside from two small regiments of infantry, the army was composed of six months' levies, and of militia enrolled for this particular campaign. In its desire to economize Congress had fixed the net pay of the soldiers at two dollars and ten cents a month. The judgment passed by one who observed the force that "men who are to be purchased from prisons, wheelbarrows, and brothels at two dollars a month will never answer for fighting Indians" was amply justified by the sequel.[272]