[537] Adams, op. cit., VI, 110; Dawson, Harrison, 236.
[538] American State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 781.
The nation entered upon the war in June, 1812, with a large portion of its best citizens and one entire section of the country bitterly opposed to the measure. Apathy and opposition combined with the incompetence of the administration at Washington to produce a state of unpreparedness which, in view of the seriousness of the situation, seems today incredible. Congress voted men for the army, but there was little disposition on the part of the country to supply them. The money that was no less essential to the conduct of a war not even Congress was willing to vote, except to a ludicrously inadequate degree.[539] Great Britain had stood undaunted for years between Napoleon and the realization of his ambition of European if not of world supremacy. Through generations of warfare her people had become habituated to devoting their treasure to this end, and had developed a strong military tradition. Both government and army had been brought to the greatest possible state of efficiency for the conduct of war by the experience gained in the two decades of practically constant warfare which the French Revolutionary era had opened. That the greater part of this schooling had been gained in combat with Napoleon, the greatest military genius of modern times, did not detract from its value. On the sea the power of England was superior to that of all the rest of the world combined.
[539] On this whole subject see Adams, op. cit., Vol. VI, passim; Babcock, Rise of American Nationality, chaps, iv and v.
The contrast presented by the United States in 1812 in all that pertained to military affairs could hardly have been more striking. That the Americans were brave and potentially capable of making good soldiers does not, of course, admit of question. But this is equally true of the members of the mob which flees in terror before a detachment of regulars one-tenth as numerous as itself. The lack of a well-trained army was less serious, however, than was the absence of a disposition to submit to the labors and discipline necessary to create one. Of capable military leaders we had none. Yet this, while deplorable enough, was not so serious, probably, as was the contempt which all Americans outside the army itself evinced for regular military training and experience. Even after the bitter lessons taught us on land by the War of 1812, a sixteen-year-old runaway boy could convince as intelligent a man as Calhoun that he had a greater claim to preferment in the army than had the graduate of West Point.[540] And in the early stages of our next war with a civilized nation the President of the United States deliberately determined to appoint all of the officers of a newly created regiment from civil life, on the double ground that since he could not promote all of the officers of the existing army he would not promote any of them, and that it was "generally expected that they should be selected from citizens."[541]
[540] Andrews, Biographical Sketch of James Watson Webb, 5-7.
[541] Diary of James K. Polk, I, 412. The same contempt for trained military leaders, and preference for political appointees, was manifested during the early years of the Civil War.
On the sea we opposed sixteen ships,[542] excellent enough for their class, to the eight hundred odd of England. Their showing in the ensuing war is worthy of all praise. Yet it was probably as genuinely a matter of surprise to the Americans as it was to the British themselves. The glamor which resulted from the success of the Americans in a number of single-ship duels has blinded the eyes of later generations to the facts that during the greater part of the war the British vessels maintained a close blockade of the American coast, insulting our sea ports with impunity, and that the navy committed blunders almost as serious as those of the army on land.
[542] Adams, op. cit., VI, 362. This statement omits from consideration the gunboats of Jefferson's mosquito fleet.
The army, when war was declared, was partly in the field and partly on paper.[543] The former portion consisted of ten old regiments with ranks partly filled, scattered in numerous garrisons from New England to New Orleans. The latter consisted of thirteen new regiments which had been authorized by Congress in January, but although recruiting began in March, only four thousand men had been secured by the middle of June. Shortly after the declaration of war Congress fixed the regular establishment at thirty-two regiments with a strength of thirty-six thousand seven hundred men, yet at this time, including the four thousand new recruits, there were but ten thousand men under arms. In February the raising of fifty thousand volunteers for one year was authorized, and in April the President was given power to call out one hundred thousand state militia. But in June less than one-twelfth of the volunteers had been enrolled, and whether the states would heed the call upon them for militia, or whether the militia when raised would serve beyond the frontier, no one yet knew.