During the heat of this attack a heavy cross fire was brought to bear on the position I occupied, and Corporal Frank Mayer, of the 3d Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, in command of my escort, was shot through the leg, and my Adjt. General, Capt. Ed. R. Kerstetter, was shot through his coat, grazing his back. The regiments all behaved splendidly again, and the 58th Indiana won immortal honors. Lieut. Blackford, of that regiment, was shot dead, and several of the officers, including Capts. Downey and Alexander, badly wounded. Estep's battery was compelled to retire from the position assigned to it after firing a half dozen rounds, but it did terrible execution while there. The 6th and 26th Ohio did noble service, as did the 97th, but their own immediate commanders will no doubt allude to them more particularly. Thus ended the third assault upon our position. I should have remarked that the 100th Illinois, the other regiment composing my brigade, which was in reserve during the first engagement described above, had, under instruction of Col. Hazen, moved to the front on the left of the railroad, and taken up a position at right angles with the railroad, where they fought splendidly in all the actions that took place on the left of the road. There was no formidable attack made upon them, though they were almost constantly under fire of greater or less severity, particularly from shot and shell, and suffered quite severely in killed and wounded. Lieut. Morrison Worthington, of that regiment, was killed while gallantly sustaining his men, and six other commissioned officers, including Major Hammond, were wounded. Their operations being to the left of the railroad, in a wood, did not come so immediately under my personal observation, but their conduct, from Col. Bartleson down, was such as leaves nothing to be desired. The 58th Indiana having now been over three hours in action, and the 26th Ohio about four hours, were exhausted and very near out of ammunition. I therefore relieved the 58th Indiana with the 40th Indiana from Col. Wagner's brigade, and the 26th Ohio was relieved by the 23d Kentucky. There was now not more than an hour of the day left, and though the enemy was constantly maneuvering in our front, no formidable attack was made upon us, except with artillery. The enemy having been three several times repulsed in their attack on that position, seemed satisfied to keep at a respectful distance, and the sun set upon us, masters of the situation. We had sustained ourselves and held the only portion of the original line of battle that was held throughout by any portion of our army. To have lost this position would have been to lose everything, as our left would then have been turned also, and utter rout or capture inevitable.
During the evening of the 31st, I was officially notified that in consequence of the indisposition of Gen. Wood, and a wound received by him during the forenoon of that day, he was relieved of the command of the division, and that the same would devolve upon myself. I therefore turned over the command of the brigade to Col. Geo. P. Buell, of the 58th Indiana, and assumed command of the division. All of which is respectfully submitted.
Milo S. Hascall, Brig. Gen. Vols., Com's Brigade.
Ed. R. Kerstetter, Capt. & A.A.G. (Official.)
After the battle was over, during the evening, Colonel Harker's brigade that had gone to the assistance of the right, returned to where we had been in action during the day, and thus the division was once more together, and on this ground we did the best we could towards getting something to eat, and prepared to bivouac on the same ground for the night. About eleven o'clock that night, I was visited by Capt. John Mendenhall, Chief of Artillery on Gen. Crittenden's staff, and who belonged to the Regular Army of the United States, and a gentleman of first-class intelligence, and purity of character, and informed that since the cessation of hostilities for the night, a council of war had been held at Gen. Rosecrans' headquarters, by himself and his Grand Division Commanders, and that a general retreat to Nashville had been decided upon, and that all except Gen. Crittenden concurred in the advisability of such movement, and he was overruled by the others, and that in pursuance of such determination, I was forthwith to send all the transportation of my division, except one wagon for each brigade, to the rear, and when the transportation was all under way, this was to be followed by a general retreat of our army to Nashville. Mendenhall said that Crittenden was very much incensed at the proposition for retreat; said his army was in position and on hand, and that if he were overruled and if a retreat was decided upon, that he would cross the river and retreat by way of Gallatin to Nashville. However, the retreat was decided upon, and the baggage had been sent to the rear as above directed, and we were laying on our arms awaiting the further order to retreat, when a very singular circumstance caused Rosecrans to change his mind, and conclude to fight it out where we were. A large number of our straggling, demoralized detachments in the rear of our army, being hungry and thirsty, had concluded to disobey orders, and make fire and try and get something to eat. One party would make a fire, another would go there to get a fire brand to start another, and when this became general along our rear, Rosecrans concluded the enemy had got in our rear, and were forming line of battle by torch lights, and hence withdrew the order for a general retreat. After this, about one o'clock, I was informed also by Capt. Mendenhall, that the retreat had been given up, and that I was ordered to fall back with my division about half a mile, and take up a position that would there be assigned me. Accordingly I did so, and in the morning found myself occupying a position with no advantages for offensive or defensive operations, and very much exposed to the enemy's fire, with no chance for returning it with any effect. The enemy were occupying the position I had fallen back from, and at that point concentrated a large number of pieces of artillery, with which, about nine o'clock in the morning, they opened upon us a tremendous artillery fire, under the cover of which I supposed their infantry would charge upon us, but for some strange reason or other, they did not do so. Desultory firing afterwards, was kept up during the day, until about three o'clock in the afternoon. In the meantime we had sent a division across the river to the left, which was occupying the high ground near where the enemy's right was resting originally. About three o'clock Breckenridge's troops, of the rebel army, fell furiously upon this division, and drove them rapidly from their position, on account of their superior numbers. At this juncture Crittenden ordered Mendenhall to concentrate his artillery on the bank of the river to our front and left, which he promptly did, and ordered me, with my division, to promptly cross the river in support of the division already there in retreat. Upon our arrival on the other side of the river, the furious fire from Mendenhall's artillery had checked the rebel advance, and the division over there turned upon their assailants, and with the assistance of my division, drove Breckenridge back to the position he had occupied before making the assault. The latter part of these operations were carried on in the darkness, and we slept upon our arms, amidst the dead and wounded. It had been raining hard all the night, and the river was rising very rapidly, so much so that if we had remained there until morning, there would have been danger that the river would become impassable, and the divisions been left there by themselves in the presence of the whole rebel army. Accordingly, about two o'clock at night, we were ordered to recross the river, and take up positions where we had been during the previous day. We arrived back there between that time and morning, thoroughly wet through, and completely jaded out, having had no sleep, and but little to eat during the previous forty-eight hours. Both armies continued after this during the third day, to occupy the positions they had on that morning. It was cold, wet, and very disagreeable weather; both armies were completely tired out, and seemed content to do nothing more than to engage in some desultory firing, and watch each other closely. On the morning of the fourth day, January 3, or rather, during the forenoon of that day, the stragglers from the right, during the first day's battle, who had not stopped in their flight until they reached Nashville, began to return in large numbers, in companies, and even regiments, and Bragg, observing this, concluded we were receiving large bodies of reinforcements from the north, and therefore concluded to fall back and give up the contest. He accordingly did so, and on the fourth day, January 4, he took possession of Murfreesboro without the firing of a gun. Thus ended the great battle of Stone River. We had not made a single attack during the whole time; were badly beaten and well nigh driven from the field the first day, and only saved from an ignominious retreat upon Nashville by the ridiculous misconception on the part of Rosecrans, already alluded to on the first night after the battle commenced. As it was, we lost all our transportation, by sending it to the rear, that night, preparatory for the retreat, the whole having been burned by the rebels at Lavergne, notwithstanding we were supposed to have some cavalry in our rear, under Gen. Stanley. Where it was at the time our transportation was being burned by the rebel cavalry, I have never heard.
Finally our fugitives from the first day's battle began to return, thereupon Bragg became very much frightened and beat a retreat, and we thus gained Murfreesboro. After this reports were written up to praise the men it had been determined upon in advance to promote, and these identical men that I had predicted would be favored, were promoted; one of them, St. Claire Morton, from Captain to Brigadier-General, while others, upon whom rested the heat and burden of the day, and who saved the army from utter annihilation, were not only not promoted, but in many instances not even mentioned. It was, for instance, Sheridan's fate to be early driven from the field, whether from his fault or not, it is not necessary to inquire. Enough for this occasion that it was so, and the facts of his subsequent career no more justify what was done for him on this occasion, than would the subsequent illustrious career of Gen. Grant justify his promotion for the terrible blunders committed by him concerning the most unfortunate battle of Shiloh.
In what I have said in this paper in regard to the Catholic Church, I do not wish to be understood as having any desire to say anything against that church, but simply to condemn the idea of making membership in that, or any other particular church, a necessary concomitant to advancement, either in a military or civil capacity, under our government. Farther, in all that I have said nothing has been said in malice towards any officer or person, but simply that that criticism so necessary to the establishment of right and justice in regard to the late war may be freely indulged in, whether it affect the highest officer, or the lowest private that offered his life in defense of his country. It will be seen that my estimate of the fitness of Gen. Rosecrans to command an army was not enhanced by his career during and preceding the battle of Stone River. When disaster came to the right, he should have given his attention personally to that, and lent the magic of his personal presence to rallying the fleeing troops from that division, in place of going to the extreme left himself—instead of by a staff officer—for ordering the movement of troops in that direction. When the whole affair was over, and quiet restored, I made an application to be transferred to another army on account of want of confidence in him as the commander of an army in the field. This I supposed would cause my arrest, and give an opportunity for me to demonstrate the great cause that existed for my apprehensions, but instead of doing this, he returned my application endorsed that he could not spare the services of so useful an officer as myself, and that there would be no forward movement of the army for six months, and detailed me to proceed to Indianapolis, Ind., to superintend the work of returning deserters from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Just before my leaving Murfreesboro for Indianapolis we saw Bragg's telegraphic account to Richmond, of the first day's proceedings. It was as follows: "This morning, under cover of the darkness, we attacked the enemy on his extreme right, and have routed him from every portion of his line except upon his extreme left, where he has successfully resisted us." As I left there was a proposition started in Crittenden's command to raise money to present Bragg a sword for making the above truthful statement of the first days operations. While at Indianapolis, I was, at the request of Gen. Burnside, transferred by the War Department, to the army of the Ohio and given the command of a division in that army. The next that we heard of Gen. Rosecrans was at the battle of Chickamauga, and that was the last we heard of him in a military way, and all can now see how much cause there was for the apprehensions I entertained. This was not the first instance that great unfitness achieved high rank in our armies and it was quite common for great merit to be entirely unrewarded, and indeed entirely unknown. But time is a great healer, and let us hope that honest merit will in the end get its recognition, trusting in the truthfulness of the idea that
"Ever the world goes round and round,
And ever the truth comes uppermost,
And justice shall be done."