Auction of To-day

by Milton C. Work

It is unquestionably true that, with great strength, the game will be won nine times out of ten with the No-trump declaration, but in every such case it is absolutely "cinched" by the Heart or Royal call.

It is further argued that, when the combined hands are not quite so strong, a game is more frequently won with the Trump declaration, as the small Trumps are sure to take tricks, but the long suit may not be established in the No-trumper.

The believers in taking a chance, however, view the situation from the opposite standpoint. Their argument is that the game requires one more trick, when a Trump is declared, but does not count as much, that the original declarer may be weak in the suit named, yet strong in all the others, and therefore, with a good hand, it is wiser to leave the No-trump alone.

It is possible that the question is one rather of the temperament of the player than of card judgment. It is susceptible of almost mathematical deduction that five or more cards of a long suit are of greater trick-taking value when that suit is the Trump than when No-trump is being played, and it does not require any argument to substantiate the proposition that the slight difference in the score, between the total in the trick and honor columns netted from a game made without a Trump and a game made with Royals or Hearts, is so infinitesimal as not to be worthy of consideration. Nevertheless, players possessed of a certain temperament will, for example, refuse to overbid a partner's No-trump with Ace, King, Ten, and two small Spades, King of Hearts, and Ace of Diamonds, on the ground that the hand is too strong, although the No-trump bid may have been thoroughly justified by such a holding as Ace, Queen, Knave, of Hearts; King, Queen, Knave, of Diamonds; and Queen, Knave, of Spades. In that event it is practically sure the adversaries will open the Club suit and save the game before the Declarer has a chance to win a trick. This and similar situations occur with sufficient frequency to make them well worthy of consideration, and when such a hand fails to make game, it certainly seems to be a perfect example of what might be termed "useless sacrifice."

In spite of all this, however, probably as long as the game lasts, in the large proportion of hands in which the taking-out does not make any difference, the Declarer will say, "With such strength you should have let my No-trump alone"; or the Dummy will learnedly explain, "I was too strong to take you out."

It would be in the interest of scientific play, if, except when all suits are stopped, the theory, "Too strong to take the partner out of the No-trump," had never been conceived, and would never again be advanced.

The same comment applies with equal force to the remark so often heard, "Partner, I was too weak to take you out."

This generally emanates from a Third Hand who has a five- or six-card suit in a trickless hand. He does not stop to realize that his hand will not aid his partner's No-trump to the extent of a single trick, but that in a Trump declaration, it will almost certainly take two tricks. The Trump bid only increases the commitment by one, so it is obviously a saving and advantageous play. Furthermore, it prevents the adversaries from running a long suit. It, also, in Clubs and Diamonds, is a real danger signal, and, in the probable event of a bid by the Fourth Hand, warns the partner away from two No-trumps.

The advocates of the weakness take-out realize that in exceptional instances the play may result most unfortunately. When the Dealer has called a border-line No-trump, without any strength in the suit named by the Third Hand, and one of the adversaries has great length and strength in that suit, a heavy loss is bound to ensue, which may be increased 100 by the advance of the bid from one to two. This case is, indeed, rare, and when it does turn up the chances are that the Declarer will escape a double, as the holder of the big Trumps will fear the Dealer may be able to come to the rescue if he point out the danger by doubling the suit call.

The fact, however, that a play at times works badly is not a sufficient argument against its use, if in the majority of cases it prove advantageous, and that is unquestionably true of the weakness take-out.