"It is probably the first time that to 'withdraw,' or retire from a place, has been imagined to intend its destruction. If, at the formation of the treaty, the demolition of the posts had been intended, it would assuredly have been expressed."[41]
When the Spaniards had really decided to surrender the district, no further mention was made of this subject, showing that, notwithstanding their treaty with the Indians, they considered the demolition of the forts of no consequence whatever.
IV. EXPECTATION OF AN ATTACK UPON LOUISIANA BY A BRITISH FORCE FROM CANADA.
Suspicion to this effect, though based upon reports more or less vague, had been expressed by the Spanish Minister as early as the February preceding; and had been reiterated by him from time to time,[42] until at the expiration of three months, it had developed into a pretext for delaying the execution of the treaty. In fact, the Baron de Carondelet asserted in a proclamation of May 24, that further delay in surveying the boundary line and in evacuating the forts was then occasioned only by the imperious necessity of securing Lower Louisiana, in case the British should become masters of the Illinois country[43] and that such apprehensions had caused him to put the post at Walnut Hills "in a respectable but provisional state of defence."[44] Secretary Pickering not only considered these suspicions groundless, but contended further that,
"If the posts of the Natchez and Walnut Hills 'are the only bulwarks of Lower Louisiana, to stop the course of the British,' as the Baron alerts and if, therefore, Spain is justifiable in holding them, she may retain them, without any limitation of time, for her security in any future war, as well as in that which now exists."[45]
Before the appearance of the Baron's proclamation containing this reason for delay, the Spanish Minister had been informed that the Secretary of State saw no reasons for such suspicions and the British Minister had been notified that the Government of the United States would suffer neither British nor Spanish troops to march through its territory for the purpose of hostility of one against the other.[46] The Spanish Minister replied[47], however, that he knew to a certainty that the English had made a proposition to General Clarke of Georgia in order to secure his influence in that State in a proposed attack against Florida. At the request of Mr. Pickering, this report was investigated by the District Attorney of Georgia. He replied that he could not find any one who knew of the matter or who entertained a belief of the report; and that from General Clark's known violent antipathies to the English and other circumstances, he doubted the truthfulness of it altogether.[48]
When the attention of Mr. Liston, the British Minister, was directed to the subject, he pointedly denied that his government either had intended or was then intending to invade Louisiana.[49] A few days later, however, he admitted that a plan for attacking the Floridas and other Spanish possessions adjoining the United States had been submitted to him by other persons, whom he declined to name, but stated it was discountenanced by him because its success depended upon a violation of the neutrality of the United States and an enlistment of the Indians. According to this plan, the expedition was to be undertaken by a British sea force, which would be joined by such volunteers of the United States as would join the king's standard when raised on Spanish soil.[50]
The noted conspiracy of Senator Blount of Tennessee then came to light[51] and precipitated a spirited discussion between the Spanish Minister and Mr. Pickering. The former contended that the plot had been revealed and that no one any longer doubted that the expedition was to have taken place,[52] while the latter maintained that there could have been no connection between Blount's scheme and either the expedition from Canada,[53] or the project attributed to General Clarke.[54] The Secretary argued in support of his position that Blount's expedition was to have been formed in one of the states south of the River Ohio; that it was destined against the Floridas, and perhaps Lower Louisiana; that Blount himself expected to be at the head of it; that it was not to be undertaken but in conjunction with a British force; and that "on the proposal of the expedition to the British Government, it was totally rejected."[55] He maintained further that the suspicion of a British invasion from Canada was groundless for the following reasons:—(1) Preparations for such an expedition would have attracted attention and rendered satisfactory proofs attainable; (2) the troops of the United States, stationed along the Canadian border, were in position to protect the frontier, as well as to get information of any warlike preparations and communicate the same to the Secretary of War, yet no such communications had been made; (3) the British did not have on the lakes a force adequate to such an enterprise; (4) the routes suggested for such a campaign would have interposed great difficulties for the transportation of troops, equipage, provisions, etc., even if they could have been taken without violating the territory of the United States; and (5) the British Minister, after inquiring of the Governor General of Canada and of "the British Secretary of State," denied that his Government either had intended or was then intending such an expedition.[56]