Reminiscences of the King of Roumania

by Mite Kremnitz

"... I cannot form an opinion of the internal conditions of Roumania, nor of the means at the disposal of your Highness for conquering the prevailing difficulties and establishing your government on a secure footing.

"I must assume that the impediments, due to the character and previous history of the nation, almost prohibit an orderly existence for the State, since the noble intentions and the pure ideals which animate your Highness have hitherto failed to create institutions which would assist the execution of your plans. Your Highness alone can judge whether any hope still exists that these institutions may yet be created....

"No matter what the causes are, nor how many misunderstandings and misrepresentations have contributed to the result, it is certain that the distrust of the Porte has not been allayed, and that it is still unconvinced that the union of the Principalities under the rule of your Highness is not dangerous to its suzerainty. Nor is it confident that the conditions, which might force your Highness to abdicate, will be more disquieting to the peace of the East than the present situation.

"The English Government has never taken an interest in the Danube Principalities nor in the fortunes of your Highness personally, and the attitude of its representatives abroad does not at present appear to inspire confidence. Although I do not positively pre-suppose a hostile feeling in London, it may be accepted as certain that on this question England's policy will not greatly differ from that of the Sultan.

"At this moment France, of course, need not be taken into consideration, except so far as there is a possibility of her opposing your Highness by intrigues and secret agitation in the hope of doing Prussia some ill-turn or injury....

"I have for a long time cherished the hope that your Highness would find effectual support in St. Petersburg, and have therefore always recommended cordial relations with Russia. Even now I do not doubt the personal views of his Majesty the Czar, who, I am sure, retains the best and most friendly wishes for your person. But I have been regretfully forced to recognise, especially of late, that this personal good-will is out-weighed by the traditional conception of Russian policy, which is opposed to the union of the Principalities. The fact that your Highness must expect no support from Russia, not even in diplomacy, is in accordance with this traditional policy, whilst the hostile attitude towards your Highness in Vienna appears to me to lack any logical explanation, considered from the standpoint of Austro-Hungarian policy.

"It is only natural that your Highness should look to the illustrious Head of your house, to Prussia and Germany. Your Highness is well aware of the views with which his Majesty the King regards your person, but you know also that the present military situation renders it impossible for Germany to intervene effectually in Eastern affairs under the circumstances we have been considering.

"On reviewing all these considerations I can only arrive at the conclusion that your Highness cannot expect any outside assistance, but rather ill-will, and that your decisions must be based solely upon the means of support which are still left to you in your own country. If you expect a crisis, for the defeat of which you consider the better elements of the country insufficient, it appears to be a duty to yourself and to your house that your every decision should be really independent and voluntary, and should not seem to be forced upon you by foreign force; and the high and noble motives which guide your Highness should stand prominently forth.

"It pains me to be able to give no other counsel to your Highness and to offer you no better hopes. But I know that your patriotic sympathy and hearty joy at the successes of our German army, and at the glory which surrounds the revered head of our King, will not be affected even by the painful experience your Highness has endured, and I conclude with the hope that your wishes for an honourable and safe peace may soon be fulfilled."

The letter addressed to the Sultan, which had been delayed until an answer was received from the British Ambassador, was eventually forwarded by the Prince with a voluntary explanation of the delay. Ali Pacha in reply expressed the concern with which the Sultan had heard of the critical situation of affairs in the Principalities.

At the same time Prince Charles was informed from a trustworthy source that in Constantinople, as well as in other places, his position was considered untenable. "The Government of Prince Charles is universally recognised to have had its day, and the representatives of the Powers here are more occupied in considering what may happen after the departure of the Prince than in any scheme for prolonging his rule. Sir H. Elliott goes furthest of all, and already speaks of commissaries who must be sent to the Principalities, and whose departure he wishes to take place at once...." The same writer, Count Keyserling, also adjured the Prince to hope for no outside aid. "The only choice, therefore, lies between the continuance of the present régime, to which even your Highness's worst foe could not advise you, and a separation from a country and a nation which, oblivious of the fact that their Prince has shown an almost superhuman devotion to his duties, have sinned a thousand times against the person of their ruler, whom they themselves elected, and to whom they took the oath of allegiance and obedience.

"The Grand Vizier asked me in a very significant manner: 'Do you think that, after Prince Charles's experience, another Prince of a reigning house could be found for Roumania?'—and then answered his own question: 'Except, perhaps, Prince Napoleon, I can think of no one; and we desire to have nothing at all to do with him—as little as with a republic.'"

Prince Charles replied to Count Bismarck's letter on January 27, 1871, thanking him for the sympathy he had shown for the ruler of Roumania, if not for the country itself, and assuring him of the heartfelt interest and joy with which the recent military events in France inspired him. He continued: "The situation here is serious; for the present I can avail myself of the Party intrigues to maintain my position as long as I consider it suitable and advisable. I have to act like a ship's captain, who must remain at his post day and night during a storm. The waves now sweep my ship to the skies, now dash it down to the depths, but as surely as God is my helper I will not let it be wrecked! To-day the crew would willingly throw me overboard, but a few of them still possess sufficient intelligence to know that I alone can steer them safely into port.

"I will not lose sight of two points; I intend to bring my name clean and unspotted out of this turmoil, but I will not heartlessly and without a conscience leave le déluge après moi. This refers, above all, to the finances, the desertion of which might be fraught with grave danger both at home and abroad."

The letter already referred to, in which Prince Charles set forth the reasons which led him to think of abdicating, was published in the columns of the Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, and created the greatest excitement in Roumania. A discussion in the Chamber upon the authenticity of this document took place on February 11, 1871, when a Deputy, N. Blaramberg, declared that either the letter was a forgery, or that the Prince was about to abdicate and leave Roumania to the tender mercies of its enemies. "A Prince who quits his country in its hour of danger may be compared to a deserter or a traitor to the State!"

The President of the Ministry was unable to deny the authenticity of the document, but assured the Chamber that the views contained in it, if they were ever actually current, prevailed no longer. Cogalniceanu then proposed the following counter-resolution: "The Chamber, deeply moved by the explanations communicated by the Ministry, expresses its devotion to the Throne and Dynasty, guaranteed by the Constitution, and proceeds to the order of the day with every confidence in the future of the country, and in the firm resolve to adhere to the Constitution."

An infinitely more loyal tone prevailed in the Senate, where the contents of Prince Charles's letter were also discussed. A resolution was carried with only four dissentients to the effect that the chief duty of the Senate lay in supporting the Sovereign whom the nation had so enthusiastically elevated to the throne, and that the consolidation of the dynasty was indissolubly bound up with the peace, existence, and political development of the country.

The reports of the Roumanian agents abroad showed that, though the Powers were unwilling to take any steps to support Prince Charles, they were, nevertheless, anxious that his abdication should be deferred for the present. The separation of the two Principalities, each under a native ruler, would be acceptable to Russia, Austria, and England, provided no anarchical interregnum took place. The Sublime Porte, accordingly, was anxious that the Prince should remain at his post, until the question of his successors was definitely settled. As the great German Chancellor remarked, it appeared that the uncertain possibilities of a catastrophe on the Lower Danube, coupled with the fear of further complications, had resulted in a sort of repentance on the part of the Powers for the intrigues against the consolidation of the Roumanian State. Austria in particular now saw clearly that the mistrust with which Roumania had always been regarded under Prince Charles, owing to the fear that she was merely a tool in the hands of Prussia, was utterly unfounded.