From Prince Charles Anthony, January 22nd, 1877.
"On looking back over recent events the conviction is borne in upon me that the fear which the Russian Colossus inspires in Europe, coupled with the natural differences in the interests of the Powers, have been the causes of the pitiful end of the Congresses which started with such a flourish of trumpets. Had Europe been united and less timorous, it might have intervened and begun those Conferences at the time of the Servian War, instead of a whole year later. Turkey could hardly have resisted if a pressure of all the Powers had been applied at that time even without Russia, and she would have conceded more than she can now afford to do after her unquestionable successes in the Servian War and the complete change in her interior economy. So much is certain after a long and anxious period that the Conferences have resulted in a fiasco, and that this fiasco has materially raised and strengthened the morale and authority of the Porte.... Roumania will be most deeply affected by such a war, as the Russian base of operations can only be Roumania; there is no other at her disposal. Resistance to Russia is out of the question; you must therefore endeavour to reap the greatest possible benefits from this impossibility. The material advantages develop spontaneously, for the acquisition of money and the increased value of all country produce will assume enormous dimensions; the political benefits are, however, more difficult to formulate. The permission to march through Roumanian territory, and the establishment there of all that an army on an active footing requires, is already half a declaration of war from Roumania to Turkey. The latter, however, must recognise that Roumania cannot prevent the entry of two or three hundred thousand Russians; the only question that remains is whether Roumania will co-operate with the advance of the Russian army and cross the Danube. I should consider this most unwise, for in doing so Roumania will place herself between two stools. If the Turks preserve their proverbial powers of resistance, and so protract the war to an indefinite and costly length, we have no guarantee that the Russians would not conclude peace with the Turks in one way or another and abandon Roumania, who would then be overwhelmed by Turkish malevolence.
"It is more than probable that both sides will soon become exhausted in a localised war; the only question is, which of the two will give in first. Russia's eyes will always be fixed on her own interests, never on those of Roumania; and, since there is no such thing as gratitude in politics, I recommend you to exercise the utmost caution.
"Europe will not interest itself in a defeated and fallen Roumania—it will only have regard for a free country which is not tied down by treaties. Prudence and moderation are therefore necessary at so critical a period, which will either prove to be a wholesome era of transition for your country, or will bear the seeds of its annihilation."
The efforts of the Russian diplomats in Constantinople now appeared to be confined to delaying the advance of the Russian army until a more favourable season of the year should have arrived. Prince Charles Anthony thus sketched the possible results of the coming war in a letter to his son dated March 1, 1877:
"Russia will hardly gain great triumphs—a few military successes may be achieved, but certainly none of any political importance. The army and the Slav element must content themselves with a small modicum of glory, whilst the Czar Alexander may think himself lucky in returning to peaceful and normal circumstances, and in having mastered a movement which is of the greatest danger to Russia. The only tangible result of the whole Russian initiative will, perhaps, be that the suzerainty of the Porte over Roumania is transferred to Russia.
"Roumania would thereby be supported by a stronger and more stable Power, with, perhaps, more freedom at home and abroad, but would certainly not achieve her longed-for recognition as an independent and equal State.
"The forms of the suzerainty would perhaps be more equable and more pleasant, but the dependence, though tolerable, would always be felt.
"This would merely be an exchange of rôles. Europe would then admire Russia's moderation, and would doubtless concede every demand made along the lines I have suggested. The sacrifice of Roumania would thus be a message of peace, on which would hinge the return to the universal entente."
A final attempt to settle the Eastern Question by means of the London Protocol met with as little success as the efforts of the Conference; and the Russo-Roumanian Convention was signed on April 16, 1877, by Baron Stuart on behalf of the Czar, and M. Cogalniceanu on behalf of Prince Charles. The following were the chief articles of the Convention:
(1) The Russian army to be granted a free passage through Roumania, the Russian Government paying all expenses connected therewith.
(2) The Government of the Czar pledges itself to maintain and protect the actual integrity and political rights of Roumania.