It was not until 6 o'clock on the 17th of June that the advance guard of the French army arrived on the plains of Waterloo,—a delay being occasioned by unfortunate occurrences upon the road,—otherwise the forces would have gained the spot by 3 o'clock in the day. The circumstance appeared to disconcert the Emperor extremely, who, pointing to the sun, exclaimed with much emphasis, "What would I not give, to be this day possessed of the power of Joshua, and enabled to retard thy march for two hours!"
The Duke of Wellington, on being made aware of Blucher's march on Wavre, and in adherence to the common plan of campaign, had given orders for falling back from Quatre-Bras. He had before now been heard to say, that if it ever were his business to defend Brussels, he would choose to give battle on the field of Waterloo, in advance of the forest of Soignies; and he now retired thither, in the confidence of being joined there in the morning by Blucher. The English at last reached the destined field, over roads covered with deep mud, and in the face of considerable rain. The troops, although somewhat discouraged by the command to retreat, were enthusiastic when they heard of their leader's purpose, and having taken up their allotted stations, bivouacked for the night assured of a battle on the morrow—the 18th of June.
From a Painting by Hte. Bellange
Napoleon on the Heights at Ligny
Arrangements having been effected early in the evening, Wellington now, it appears, according to Lockhart, although the statement is not fully substantiated, rode across the country to Blucher to inform him personally that he had thus far effected the plan agreed on, and to express his hope to be supported on the morrow by two Prussian divisions. Blucher replied that he would reserve a single corps to hold Grouchy at bay as well as they could, and march himself, with the rest of his army upon Waterloo. Wellington then returned to his post.
The cross-roads at Mont St. Jean were in an almost impassable condition and the rain continued to fall in torrents. Wellington was before the village of Mont St. Jean, about a mile and a half in advance of the small town of Waterloo, on a rising ground, having a gentle and regular declivity before it,—beyond this a plain of about a mile in breadth,—and then the opposite heights of La Belle Alliance, on which the French were expected to form their line. The Duke had 76,700 men in all; of whom about 30,000 were English. He formed his first line of the troops on which he could most surely rely,—the greater part of the British infantry, with the troops of Brunswick and Nassau, and three corps of Hanoverians and Belgians. Behind this the ground sinks and then rises again. The second line, formed in the rear of the first, was composed of the troops whose spirit and discipline were more doubtful—or who had suffered most in the action at Quatre-Bras; and behind all these was placed the cavalry. The position crossed the two highways from Nivelles and Charleroi to Brussels, nearly where they unite. These roads gave every facility for movement from front to rear during the action; and two country roads running behind, and parallel with the first and second lines, favored movements from wing to wing. The chateau and gardens of Hougomont, and the farm-house and inclosures of La Haye Sainte, about 1,500 yards apart, on the slope of the declivity, were strongly occupied and formed the important out-works of defense. The opening of the country road leading directly from Wavre to Mont St. Jean, through the wood of Ohain, was guarded by the British left, while those running further in advance might be expected to bring the first of the Prussians on the right flank of the French, during their expected attack. The British front extended in all over about a mile, with the strong outposts of Hougomont (situated near the centre of the right) and La Haye (which was in front of the centre) and in the rear the village of Mont St. Jean with the reserve force stationed there,—further back, the town of Waterloo (which has given its name to the battle because it was thence that the English general dated his dispatches)—and the forest of Soignies, as positions to retire upon, to make a stand or cover a retreat. A more advantageous ground for receiving an attack could not easily be obtained in any open country, not previously fortified. It was, therefore, sufficiently evident that the Duke of Wellington had availed himself of all these means of defense, by a circumspect and masterly disposition of his forces.
It was Wellington's design to hold Napoleon at bay until the Prussian advance should enable him to charge the French with superior numbers, while it was Napoleon's wish to beat the Anglo-Belgian army, or at least to divide it, as well as to cut off its communications, ere Blucher could arrive on the field.
Napoleon hoped to turn the left wing of the Duke's army, it being the weakest, and divide it from the right wing because he should thus intercept its junction with the Prussians by the road from Wavre,—and because he was in constant expectation of being joined himself by Grouchy from that side. Having effected this separation of the wings, and made a vigorous attack on both wings to distract the attention, it was his design to fall suddenly on the centre, break it, and rout all its component parts in detail. The Duke considered it his business to defeat, if possible, all these attempts; not to venture a general attack in return, but to hold his defensive position in the most cautious and determined manner until the arrival of Blucher.