Military Career of Napoleon the Great / An Account of the Remarkable Campaigns of the "Man of Destiny"; Authentic Anecdotes of the Battlefield as Told by the Famous Marshals and Generals of the First Empire

by Montgomery B. Gibbs

This was the commander's first address to the army, and the words of encouragement which he gave them shot martial enthusiasm through their veins like electric fire. Under the incompetent management of Scherer the army, which had obtained some success against the Austrian general, De Vins, had been without glory, although their battalions were headed by valiant officers whose leader had neglected to improve his good fortune. The French soldiers were thirsting for a commander capable of leading them on to fame and glory, the conquest of Italy, therefore, seemed reserved for General Bonaparte.

Napoleon's system of tactics, although then unknown even to his officers, were a fixity with him. They appear to have been grounded on the principle that "the commander will be victorious who assembles the greatest number of forces upon the same point at the same moment, notwithstanding an inferiority of numbers to the enemy when the general force is computed on both sides." He eminently possessed the power of calculation and combination necessary to exercise these decisive manoeuvres.

Napoleon's career of victory began, as it continued, in defiance of the established rules of warfare, and what distinguished him above all his contemporaries was his ability to convert the most unfavorable circumstances into the means of success. He perceived that the time was come for turning a new leaf in the history of war. With such numbers of troops as the impoverished Republic could afford him, he soon saw that no considerable advantages could be obtained against the vast and highly-disciplined armies of Austria and her allies unless the established rules of etiquette and strategy were abandoned. It was only by such rapidity of motion as should utterly surprise the superior numbers of his adversaries that he could hope to concentrate the entire energy of a small force, such as he commanded, upon some point of a much greater force, and thus defeat them. He knew he would have to deal with veteran soldiers and experienced generals—men who had learned the art of war before he was born. He therefore resolved that every movement should be made with celerity, and every blow be leveled where it was least expected.

To effect such rapid marches as he had determined upon, it was necessary that the soldiery should make up their minds to consider tents and baggage as idle luxuries; and that instead of a long and complicated chain of reserves and stores, they should dare to rely wholly for the means of sustenance on the countries into which their venturesome leader might conduct them.

The objects of Napoleon's expedition were to compel the king of Sardinia, who maintained a powerful army in the field, to abandon the alliance of Austria; to compel Austria to concentrate her forces in her Italian provinces, thus obliging her to withdraw them from the bank of the Rhine where they had long hovered. It was hoped, also, to humble the power of the Vatican and break the prestige of its Jesuitical diplomacy forever. He had as yet achieved no fame in the field and not a general in Europe would have blamed him if he had only succeeded in holding the territory of Nice and Savoy, which France had already won.

Napoleon's plan of reaching the fair regions of Italy differed from that of all former conquerors; they had uniformly penetrated the Alps at some point of access in that mighty range of mountains; he judged that the same end might be accomplished more easily by advancing along the narrow strip of comparatively level country that intervenes between those enormous barriers and the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, and forcing a passage at the point where the last or southern extremity of the Alps melt, as it were, into the first and lowest of the Appenine range.

No sooner did he begin to concentrate his troops towards this region than Beaulieu, the Austrian general, took measures for protecting Genoa and the entrance of Italy with a powerful, disciplined and well-appointed army. He posted himself with one column at Voltri, a town on the sea some ten miles west of Genoa; D'Argenteau, with another column occupied the heights of Montenotte, while the Sardinians, led by General Colli, formed the right of the line at Ceva. This disposition was made in compliance with the old system of tactics; but it was powerless before new strategy. The French could not advance towards Genoa but by confronting some one of the three armies and these Beaulieu supposed were too strongly posted to be dislodged.

On the morning of the 12th of April, 1796, when D'Argenteau advanced from Montenotte to attack the column of Rampon, he found that by skillful manoeuvres during the night Napoleon had completely surrounded him—a man who had fancied there was nothing new to be done in warfare.

On the previous day the Austrians had driven in all the outposts of the French and appeared before the redoubt of Montenotte. This redoubt, the last of the intrenchments, was defended by 1,500 men commanded by Rampon who made his soldiers take an oath, during the heat of the attack, to defend it or perish in the intrenchments, to the last man. The repeated assaults of the French were without avail, their advancement was checked and they were kept the whole night at the distance of a pistol shot, 400 men being killed by the fire of their musketry alone.