Bennigsen was now placed in supreme command of the Russian forces, amounting to 90,000 men, and he at once resolved not to wait for Napoleon's onset, but chose rather to anticipate him, wisely concluding that his enemy's desire of desisting from active operation, as evinced by cantoning his troops in winter quarters, ought to be a signal to the Russians to again take the field. Thus the French Emperor found himself forced into a winter campaign, and he at once issued general orders for drawing out his forces for the purpose of concentrating them at Willenberg, in the rear of the Russians, who were then stationed at Mohringen. The duration of the winter quarters, in which the French troops had been placed, lasted no longer than the weather would permit. The army reposed almost the whole of the month of December, and towards the beginning of January 1807, movements on both sides seemed to indicate more serious operations. It appeared the Russians had adopted a vast plan of defense. Their generals seemed to have regained confidence, on seeing Napoleon stop amidst the advantages he had acquired, and imputed that to fear which arose in him from motives of prudence. They could not imagine what other reason he could possibly have for going into cantonments upon the Vistula.
Napoleon now proposed to force his enemies eastward towards the Vistula, as at Jena he had compelled the Prussians to fight with their rear turned to the Rhine. Bernadotte had orders to engage the attention of Bennigsen upon the right, and detain him in his present situation; or rather, if possible, to induce him to advance eastward so as to facilitate the operations he meditated.
The Russian commander learned Bonaparte's intention from an intercepted dispatch, and changed his purpose of advancing on Ney and Bernadotte. Marches and counter-marches took place, through a country at all times difficult, and now covered with snow. Bennigsen was aware that it was to his advantage to protract the campaign in this manner, as he was near his reinforcements, and the French were distant from theirs:—every loss therefore telling more in proportion to the enemy than to his own army.
Notwithstanding this apparent advantage, the distress of the Russian army was so extreme from the lack of suitable provisions that it induced General Bennigsen, against his judgment, to give battle at all risks, and for this purpose to concentrate his forces at Preuss-Eylau, which was decided upon as the field which he proposed to contest with Napoleon.
It had been the intention to maintain the town itself which Bennigsen had entered on the 7th of February, and a body of troops had been left for that purpose; but in the confusion attending the movement of so large an army, the orders had been misunderstood, and the division designed for this service evacuated the place as soon as the rear-guard had passed through it. A Russian division was hastily ordered to re-occupy the town; but they found the French already in possession, and although they dislodged them, they were themselves driven out in turn by another division of French to whom Napoleon had promised unusual rewards. A third division of Russians now advanced, Bennigsen being desirous of protracting the contest for the town until the arrival of his heavy artillery which joined him by a different route. When it came up he would have discontinued the struggle for Eylau but it was impossible to control the ardor of the Russian columns who persevered in advancing, with drums beating, rushed into the town and surprised the French in the act of sacking it,—putting many of them to death by the bayonet.
From a Painting by F. Gerard
Battle of Austerlitz
Another division of the French now advanced under cover of the hillocks and broken ground which skirt the village, threw their fire upon the streets and the Russians once more retreated with considerable loss. The town was now once more and finally occupied by the French. Night fell and the combat ceased only to be renewed with increased fury the next day.
The Russians occupied a space of uneven ground, about two miles in length and a mile in depth, with the village of Serpallen on their left. In the front of their army lay the town of Preuss-Eylau, situated in a hollow and in possession of the French. The latter occupied Eylau with their left, while their centre and right lay parallel to the Russians, upon a chain of heights which commanded, in a great measure, the ground possessed by the enemy. The French also expected to be reinforced by Ney's division which had not yet come up, and which was destined to form on the extreme left. The space between the hostile armies was open and flat, covered with snow and intersected with frozen lakes. The soldiers could trace each other's positions by the pale glimmer of watch lights upon the snow.