I: “That can be seen from Poschinger’s book, which I am now reading and making extracts from.”
He: “Yes, but he does not say that I also wrote numerous letters to the King from Frankfurt,[9] and that I came no less than thirteen times in one year to Berlin to see him.”
I: “It looks almost as if already at Frankfurt you had been his Minister for Foreign Affairs—at least Manteuffel drew his inspiration from you in the principal questions.”
He: “Yes, the late King discussed all great questions with me, and Manteuffel put up with it.”
I mentioned that the extracts which I was making from the documents contained in Poschinger’s book were intended in the main for the chapter on “Bismarck and Austria,” in which I proposed to embody what I had personally gathered in 1870, as, for instance, Prince Luitpold’s abortive letter to the Emperor Francis Joseph.
He: “Certainly! But as long ago as 1866 I made an attempt to come to an understanding with them. I suppose I have already told you the Gablentz story?”
I: “No, but you have told me others from that period, as, for instance, how the King wanted to annex portions of Saxony, Bavaria and Bohemia, and how you persuaded him not to do so.”
He: “Well, it occurred in this way. Just after the first shot had been fired (in reality it must have been about a fortnight before) I sent Gablentz, the brother of the general, to the Emperor at Vienna with proposals for peace on a dualistic basis. I instructed him to point out that we had seven or eight hundred thousand men under arms, while they also had a great number. It would therefore be better for us both to come to an agreement, and making a change of front towards the West, unite our forces in attacking France, recapture Alsace, and turn Strassburg into a federal fortress. The French were weak as compared with us. There might be no just cause for war, but we could plead with the other Powers that France had also acted unjustly in taking Alsace and Strassburg, whence she had continually menaced South Germany ever since. If we were to bring these as a gift to the Germans they would accept our dualism. They, the Austrians, should rule in the South and have command of the seventh and eighth army corps, while we should have command of the ninth and tenth and the federal command in chief in the North.... Dualism is a very ancient institution, as old as the Ingævones and Istævones, Guelphs and Ghibellines.”
I observed: “Already under the Othos, indeed as long ago as Charlemagne with his Franks, and the Saxons.” “High German and Low German,” I said. “With a Celtic fringe below and a Slavonic fringe above.”
“Well,” he continued, “Gablentz submitted his proposal to the Emperor, who seemed not disinclined to entertain it, but declared he must first hear the views of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mensdorff, you know. He, however, was a weak-minded mediocrity, unequal to ideas of that calibre, and he said he must first take counsel with the Ministers. They were in favour of war with us. The Minister of Finance said he believed they would beat us—and he must first of all get a war indemnity of five hundred millions out of us, or a good opportunity for declaring the insolvency of the State. The Minister of War was not displeased with my suggestion, but in his opinion we ought to have our own fight out first, and then we could come to an understanding and fall upon the French together. So Gablentz returned without having effected his purpose, and a day or two afterwards the King and myself started for the seat of war.”