I: “It is a pity that the representatives of the people, as they call themselves—the representatives of the cliques—were not excluded by the Constitution from all interference in military and foreign affairs. It should only have been allowed in exceptional cases, and on the special invitation of the Government. Such a provision had been unfortunately omitted from the North German Constitution.” He said that was not quite the case, but it was true that at that time mistakes had been made, as he was ill at the beginning, and the “Ministry of War,” which was jealous of the “Military Cabinet,” introduced various unpractical provisions. He then explained to me the present legal position, much as he had already done in the Reichstag, reading and commenting upon the paragraphs in the Constitution which affected this question, beginning with § 60. He concluded with the words: “Things may again develop into a conflict, if the three Powers which have equal authority cannot come to an understanding in the hour of danger. Our first and greatest necessity is a strong and steadfast army, as that secures our external freedom, our existence, our possessions against the foes that threaten us from without. Of course we could defend these without the present Constitution, and could certainly do so more successfully without a Reichstag like the last one, which was much less an expression of our unity than of our divisions and Particularism and which was little else than a hindrance in the defence of our most important interests. I could immediately secure the sanction of the Emperor to a change in this respect, and that of the Federal Governments also. But that must wait yet awhile—until we see how these and perhaps the next elections turn out. If no better Reichstag is elected, when the compromise, i.e., the septennate, has run out, the first thing will be to put into force the provision which allows the Emperor to call out contingents proportionate to the population, the only restriction arising from financial considerations. He has always the right to raise as many soldiers as he considers necessary, and of course the expense thus incurred must be voted.—But what I wanted to say to you is this. I have used reassuring language in the Reichstag with regard to the present attitude of Russia towards us. But many considerations had to be passed over in silence to which it would not have served my purpose to give utterance, but which may be indicated in the press—cautiously. There, I was speaking not only to the members of the Reichstag and the German public, but also to foreign countries, and to a particular quarter where I wished to let it be seen that I trusted to their insight, good will and love of peace, and where such confidence is appreciated—the Emperor Alexander—especially when it comes from a quarter in which he himself may and really does repose unlimited confidence. That is quite true. The Emperor and Giers now anticipate no danger for Russia from Germany, and consequently do not think of attacking us; and so far as the immediate future is concerned they will in all probability not adopt a hostile attitude towards us, if things remain as they now are in Germany and Russia. At the same time a change may occur in the situation. There is, in addition to the Emperor, a kind of public opinion, parties that must be reckoned with even now, and which in a war between Germany and France would exercise all the greater influence on the decisions of the Crown, in that their views and demands would appear to coincide with the real interests of Russia. There you have the pan-Slavists, with their hatred of the Germans and their leaning towards France. And then there are the Poles and the Liberal Russians, who desire a war with us in the hope that it would result in the defeat of Russia and secure their ultimate aim, namely, independence for the Poles and a Constitution for the others. In case of a conflict between Germany and France, these parties would exert a stronger pressure in exalted regions than they have ever been able to do up to the present, through their newspapers, and their allies in the army, in the Ministries, and in Court circles. Even the possibility of their efforts ultimately affecting the judgment and love of peace prevailing there—as did actually occur under the late Emperor, before the last Russo-Turkish war—would force us to send an army of observation of at least 100,000 men to our eastern frontier to watch the 200,000 soldiers stationed by Russia in her western provinces, thus considerably weakening our available forces against France. Moreover, supposing that, in spite of this, we were victorious, public opinion in St. Petersburg and Moscow, and ultimately the Government under its pressure, would scarcely suffer us to turn our victory to sufficiently good account in order to thoroughly weaken France for the next thirty or forty years, as that would be a strengthening of the German Empire which might arouse serious apprehension in Russia. Finally, it may be regarded as well-nigh certain that while we were engaged in the west the Russians would attack Austria, as her armaments, even more than ours, require strengthening—a duty which she has hitherto with culpable levity neglected—and in the long run we should doubtless be obliged to come to her assistance. Of course I could not say all that, and even in the press it must be very cautiously dealt with.”
I observed: “I do not know whether I am right, but I fear a war with Russia less from any apprehension of defeat, than because, in case of victory, I do not see what we could take to compensate us for the great sacrifices incurred.”
He: “Certainly, and for the great number of troops we should lose. That keeps me from a war with France also. In that case, too, it is a question of ‘Was kannst Du, armer Teufel, geben?’ (Thou, poor devil, what canst thou give?)”
I: “In the long run the milliards were also no blessing, at least not for our manufacturers, as they led to over-production. It was merely the bankers who benefited, and of these only the big ones.” From this we came to speak of the Stock Exchange and the present fall of prices, whereupon he remarked: “Bleichröder told me recently that he too has mobilised his forces, and at the right moment, some time ago.”
I mentioned having read in the Boersenzeitung that, according to a small South German newspaper, the Emperor had been much incensed at the rejection of the Army Bill, and had spoken in the presence of Bismarck and the Crown Prince of a step which, if carried into effect, would have aroused the deepest regret. People thought that this referred to his abdication. But who could have circulated and made public the account of such an incident? He said: “The only element of truth in the story is that he was very angry with the Opposition. There was no question of abdicating. But he might very well be induced to agree to a step which would put an end to all the difficulties that the Reichstag can raise in military matters.” He then spoke once more of the Opposition parties, and their mendacity and fictions; as that he (Bismarck) wants to abolish or to restrict universal suffrage, and with the assistance of an accommodating Parliament, to introduce tobacco and spirit monopolies, and what not besides, even to the revival of serfdom. “That is only credited by the stupid voters. They themselves, Richter and his apostles, do not for a moment imagine that anything of the kind is intended. It is a mere electioneering dodge of a gross and audacious description, according to Goethe’s recipe: ‘Willst Du sie betrügen, so mach es nur nicht fein.’ And it is the same with that lying rascal Windthorst, and his priestly followers. At one moment liberty is threatened, and then the Church, and all this merely to hide the fact that he will not let the Empire have peace, and wants to pave the way for the return of the Guelphs to Hanover. The whole crowd are hypocrites, and wear masks, and in all this Parliamentary mummery I am the only one who shows his face. They are Particularists one and all, in spite of their professions. The German Liberals are Particularists for their party, and the others are territorial Particularists. They are all striving for disintegration and dissolution. But when all is said and done, a Prussian King of to-day can, if they don’t want him, renounce the Empire and exist for himself alone.”
I asked: “How do you stand with the old gentleman at present?”
He: “With the Pope? Excellently, and in this question, too. He also trusts me and has reason to believe in my fair play. I told him I was prepared to go still further, meaning that I should even be pleased to see a Papal Nuncio in Berlin. But the King will not have it. He thinks in that case he would have to become a Catholic in his old age. The Ministers are also against it, but without reason. I am not afraid of it. On the contrary, things would go better. At present, Windthorst is the Nuncio, the Father of Lies. We know now exactly how he carries on with Rome. We have letters of his in our hands. A real Nuncio could not lie in that fashion to us and to the Pope, who is well disposed and reasonable. He would be an ecclesiastical diplomatist, whose aims would be purely ecclesiastical, and who would not wish to lose credit with the Government and render himself impossible. He would have to carry out the instructions of his superiors in Rome—not at Gmunden—and those instructions would be imbued with a peace-loving spirit and would be favourable to the maintenance of the Empire—as may now be seen from the desire expressed by the Pope that the Centre party should vote for the Army Bill.”
I: “What I was really thinking of was the Emperor and your relations to him.”
He: “I have also been on the best of terms with him for a long time past. Apart from the question of the Nunciature we are in perfect agreement upon all points. The Crown Prince, too, is at present everything I could wish him to be, she is likewise thoroughly well disposed towards me.”
I: “Mr. Gladstone’s admirer? Why, that is most satisfactory.”