“This is a tissue of mistakes and contradictions. In the first place there is no foundation whatever for the statement that Manteuffel wished to get rid of me, and that he was the head of the Austrian party. It was rather Schleinitz who held that position, and who afterwards was in frequent intercourse with the Austrians, his salon indeed being their rendezvous. Manteuffel was by no means a partisan of Austria, but on the contrary a Prussian officer of ardent Royalist patriotism. But in that case one would have thought that if the Opposition in the Diet had been imbued with Prussian patriotism, if they had desired to see the dualism in Germany put an end to and the German idea realised through Prussia, they ought to have supported me with all their might, knowing as they did that I had exactly the same object in view. And that would also have been wise from their Liberal standpoint, since it was of course known that a victory over Austria would drive the Conservatives from power. Finally, there was no reason to apprehend my overthrow by the Austrophil Conservatives, as, according to Unruh himself, it was known that I possessed the confidence of the King, who, it was indeed said, had himself called me his spiritual doctor. The Opposition, however, instead of acting on such considerations, adopted a diametrically opposite course. They acted in an unpractical, illogical, impolitic way, and against their own interests, blinded by their stupid animosity and pettifogging dogmatism. It was necessary for the Liberals, if they desired to pursue a practical policy, to win for their cause—which could not be promoted without driving Austria out of the Confederation—the support of the King of Prussia, who had scruples as to a conflict with Austria, scruples which were encouraged by a section of his entourage. King William should have been gradually convinced of the necessity of breaking with the Vienna policy, and of attempting to give Prussia alone the leading position in Germany. I pursued this end, and Parliament should have done the same. Instead of doing so, however, they flew in the face of the King by refusing him the means for the reorganisation of the army, and they therefore lacked the necessary leverage for promoting their own views. There they were, floating in the air, with nothing to sustain them but the wind of their own speeches and self-conceit which deluded them into a belief in their own importance.
“Finally, Unruh says here (page 19) that I aggravated the struggle over the Military Bills into a constitutional conflict, that I assumed an aggressive attitude towards the Opposition, and endeavoured in almost every speech to incense them by jibes and sneers, all this for the sole purpose of maintaining myself in power and office against the Austrophil Court party; and, on page 20, he repeats the same charge in the following words: ‘I am still of opinion that Bismarck used and took advantage of the conflict to maintain and strengthen his position.’ Now that is a gross slander, such as would render a man liable to prosecution—a falsehood arising from the same blindness as another on page 16, according to which the great men of the National Union regarded me merely as the representative of reaction. I desired no reaction, then as little as now, when I am again charged with doing so. Had I desired it I could have had it. Unruh and his colleagues would not have been able to prevent it, and ‘The People’ who elected them, could have done nothing. But it was not the people. The determined attitude I adopted towards the Opposition in Parliament was just as little due to the love of power, or to the desire to strengthen my ministerial position. It was rather due to my innate Royalism, which has always been a leading feature in my character. It was this which made me hold fast to my position. In doing so I was guided by my sense of duty towards my King, who, in the circumstances then obtaining, could not have found another Minister. I remember saying to him, ‘No one shall have it in his power to say that your Majesty cannot find a servant so long as there is one nobleman of the Altmark still surviving.’ Otherwise, at that time, it was, honestly speaking, no pleasure to be a Minister. A Legation in Paris, or even in Frankfurt, would have been much pleasanter. There one had a good salary with little work, little responsibility, and little worry, and was not attacked and reviled on all hands. The provocation and the sarcastic speeches in Parliament, of which Unruh complains, were not intended to prolong or aggravate the conflict, but were an exercise of the jus talionis. I am stated on page 17 to have often been most offensive. There is no denying that. But even when my expressions were offensive, they were not nearly so offensive as the language used against me and other members of the Government by speakers in the House. They were much coarser and more malicious than I ever was, indeed actually abusive and threatening, speaking of ‘a Ministry of tight-rope dancers,’ of ‘the reactionary brand of Cain,’ and other unflattering epithets. I was not the man to submit to that sort of thing. It was not in my nature to turn the left cheek to the smiter. On the contrary, I defended myself and paid them back in their own coin. Then, in addition to that, there was my contempt for the doctrine of popular sovereignty, and my disgust at the Byzantine veneration paid to it by the Opposition. That was an abomination to me, and revolted me even more than their venom.
“The passage here on page 22, as to the motives of my attitude on the question of the payment of members in the North German Diet is amusing, and indeed ludicrous. Unruh says: ‘At that time I was still in favour of payment, but said to Bennigsen I did not believe that Bismarck would give way; perhaps it was entirely out of his power to do so. It seemed to me as if he had entered into binding engagements with the Upper House, which he expected later on to swallow universal suffrage, when the several States had given their necessary approval to the North German Constitution.’ With the Upper House! A body which always stood apart from active politics, and had no influence of any importance. An absurd idea!
“On page 24 he recalls a remark made by Loewe, that one of the chief defects of the German Constitution is that it was made after my own heart. Now, that is a mere phrase which no amount of reiteration in party newspapers and speeches during the last few years has brought any nearer to truth.
“On page 25 he says: ‘As far back as 1867 it must have become clear to every person of insight that there was no possibility of Parliamentary government under Bismarck. An essential condition of such government is that in certain circumstances there should be a change of ministers and parties capable of furnishing and supporting a Cabinet.’ This is quite true. ‘Parties capable of furnishing and supporting a Cabinet’—where were they to be found during the past two decades? I have seen none, neither one with a majority nor one with a positive programme. And, least of all, in the Liberal camp. All their manifestoes and speeches have consisted merely of fault-finding criticism and negation. They have never brought forward anything positive. They have only a thirst for office, ambition and envy, but not the power which is essential to productive government.
“On the same page he says: ‘Almost all parties, in so far as they are not hostile to German unity, consider the Imperial Chancellor to be absolutely indispensable.’ And yet from 1877 onwards I have been subjected to the most bitter hostility even from the National Liberals, and before and during the last elections the Progressist party gave out the watchword ‘Away with Bismarck!’
“The statement which immediately follows is also a mere hackneyed phrase: ‘A party which has no principles of its own, but only aims at securing a majority for the Government, affords no reliable support in critical and dangerous times.’ One would like to know why. Does the Opposition with its Liberalism perhaps offer such support, with its untrustworthiness, its suspiciousness, and vacillation, its huckstering and knuckling down, and its petty criticism and dogmatism?
“On page 29 it is represented as a matter of indifference whether the idea of a Zollverein Parliament was originated by me or by Delbrück. I take it that this ought not to be a matter of indifference to Unruh, who claims to provide materials for future historians. The idea did not come from Delbrück, but from me. As can be seen from Hesekiel’s book, I mooted it as far back as the time when I was in St. Petersburg, and embodied it in the treaties of 1866, which secured its fulfilment.[2] But he, as a Liberal and a member of the learned classes, must of course get the credit of having first originated it, not a Junker. I do not wish to say anything against Delbrück’s ability and merit, but it would never have occurred to him that the Zollverein could be turned to account in that way, for although he had a great deal of talent, he had no political instinct.
“On page 30 Unruh states: ‘During the debate on the Tobacco Taxation Bill, when Bismarck had declared a monopoly to be his ideal, Bennigsen informed me that he had broken off the negotiations into which he had entered with Bismarck in the autumn for joining the Ministry, and had told him that he could not commit himself to the monopoly.’ That is not true, or at least only half true. This is how the matter stood. In 1877 Eulenburg wished to retire. I offered his post to Bennigsen. He demanded that Forckenbeck and Stauffenberg should also be appointed Ministers, but there were no posts vacant for them. In the meantime Eulenburg hit upon another idea. He went to the King and incited him against me for having had anything to do with Bennigsen. His Most Gracious was offended, and in a brutal letter forbade me to treat any further with Bennigsen. Several months passed, during which time it transpired in the press that Lasker also counted upon a seat in the Cabinet. Bennigsen came to me subsequently in the Reichstag, an unusual thing for him to do, and inquired about the tobacco monopoly. I replied that I was in favour of it and would try to carry it, whereupon Bennigsen declared that he could not support the measure, and withdrew from the negotiations. Out of politeness I forbore to tell him that he was no longer in my mind, as I had been forbidden to think of him.
“Further on Unruh says: ‘From that time forward there was an obvious change in the attitude of the Imperial Chancellor towards the National Liberals.’ That is incorrect. The contrary is the case. From that time forward the National Liberals treated me with mingled coolness and hostility, withdrawing their support in the Diet and attacking me in their newspapers—chiefly in the National Zeitung, which is the most mendacious of them all, full of hypocrisy and trickery.