Further, the Secretary of State handed me a telegram from Berlin to the Chancellor, which was returned by the latter with comments. I was to get these circulated in the non-official journals. The telegram was to the effect that Grammont had stated, in reply to an interpellation by Cochery, that Prim had offered the Spanish throne to the Hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern, (Remark: “He can do nothing of the kind. Only the Cortes,”) and that the Prince had accepted it. (Remark: “He will only declare himself after he has been elected.”) The Spanish people has not yet, however, expressed its wishes. (Remark: “That is the main point.”) The French Government do not recognise the negotiations in question. (Remark: “There are no negotiations excepting those between Spain and the eventual candidates for the throne.”) Grammont therefore begged that the discussion might be postponed, as it was purposeless for the moment. (Remark: “Very.”) The French Government would maintain the neutral attitude which they had observed up to the present, but would not permit a foreign Power to place a Prince upon the Spanish throne, (“Hardly any power entertains such an intention, except perhaps France,”) and endanger the honour and dignity of France. They trusted to the wisdom of the Germans, (Remark: “Has nothing to do with it,”) and to the friendship of the Spanish people. (Remark: “That is the main point.”) Should they be deceived in their hopes they would do their duty without hesitation or weakness. (Remark: “We also.”)
Bucher sent me a whole packet of sketches for articles:—
1. “If Spain records her decision to establish a government which shall be peaceful, and tolerant in religious matters, and which may be expected to be friendly to Germany, who is also devoted to peace, can it be in our interest to prevent the execution of that resolve, and for that purpose to take measures of doubtful legality? Shall we, because of a threat of war made in pursuit of an arbitrary and dynastic object, take steps to frustrate a reorganisation of Spanish affairs advantageous to Germany? Is it not rather an act of insolent presumption on the part of France to address such a demand to Germany? Obviously France lacks either the courage or the means to enforce her views at Madrid; and it appears from Grammont’s speech of the 4th of July that in her anger at what has happened in Spain she is prepared to throw herself upon Germany in a blind fit of rage. That speech is to a certain extent a declaration of war against the person of the Prince of Hohenzollern, in case he should decide to accept the offer of the Spanish people. France demands that Prussia shall undertake the office of policeman in case a German Prince who has attained his majority shows a disposition to meet the wishes of the Spaniards. For a North German Government to interfere with a citizen who should wish to exercise his right to emigrate and adopt the Spanish nationality would raise a very questionable point of law from a constitutional standpoint. Even if such a power existed, the dignity of Germany would demand that it should only be applied in her own interests. The calm consideration of those interests is not in the least affected by the warlike threats of a neighbouring State, which, instead of arguments, appeals to its 400,000 soldiers. If France lays claim in this manner to the guardianship of adjoining nations, the maintenance of peace can for the latter be only a question of time, which may be decided at any moment. On Grammont’s appointment to the French Foreign Office it was feared in many quarters that the choice by the Emperor Napoleon of a statesman who was only remarkable for his personal impetuosity and his hostility to Germany indicated a desire to secure for himself greater liberty in breaking the peace. Unfortunately the haughty and aggressive tone of the Duke’s speech is not calculated to remove the apprehensions entertained at that time. He is not a minister of peace, but rather the instrument of a personal policy which shrinks from no responsibility. In itself the question as to who is to be the ruler of Spain is not one for which Germany would go to war. But the French demand that the German Government, in opposition to its own interests, should put artificial difficulties in the way of the Spaniards manifests a depth of self-conceit which scarcely any government amongst the independent States of Europe could submit to at the present day. We seek no quarrel, but if any one tries to force one upon us he will find us ready to go through with it to the bitter end.”
2. In another article (there was too much material to be disposed of in one) the following considerations were to be developed. This was not to be communicated to the official organs, but either to the Kölnische Zeitung or the Spenersche Zeitung, while it was to be given in a curtailed form to Hahn’s Literary Bureau. “If the candidature of Alphonso had up to the present any prospect of success in Spain, it would have been most prejudicially affected by the foolish uproar raised in France, which stamped it with a French official character. No worse service could be done to that Prince than to represent him as a French candidate. Montpensier had already suffered under the reproach that he was a Frenchman. The Bourbons had formerly been imposed upon the Spaniards, and had proved themselves no blessing. The manner in which the succession to the throne is now discussed in France would offend a nation even less proud than the Spaniards.”
3. “Between the years 1866 and 1868, and particularly before the fall of Isabella, France schemed a great deal against Germany with Austria, Italy, and also with Spain. Those intrigues were set at nought by the Revolution of September, to which Count Bismarck referred when he said at that time in Parliament that the danger of war, which had been very imminent, had been dispelled by an unforeseen event. So long as France maintains her warlike intentions towards Germany, she will desire to see on the Spanish throne a dynasty favourable to those schemes, possibly an Ultramontane one, as in case of an attack on Germany it would make a difference of about 50,000 men to France whether she had a benevolent, or at least a neutral neighbour on the other side of the Pyrenees or one whose attitude might be suspected. It is true that France has nothing to fear directly from Spain if the French, who for the past eighty years have been unable to make up their own minds, and who cannot govern themselves, would give up the attempt to play the part of tutor to other nations. Let the period 1848–1850 in France be compared with that of 1868–1870 in Spain, and the comparison will not be to the advantage of the nation qui marche à la tête de la civilisation.”
4. “England is accustomed to look upon the Peninsula as a dependency of her own, and doubtless believes that her influence can be more easily made to prevail in a state of insecurity than under the rule of a powerful dynasty. It is not wise of the English to recall certain incidents of Spanish history, a course in which they are followed by the French newspapers. The Spanish version of the history of the wars against the First Napoleon is very different to the English one. In Buen Retiro every traveller is shown the site of a once prosperous porcelain manufactory, which was needlessly burned to the ground by the British allies of Spain.”
5. Still another subject. “Very pleased with the article in the Spenersche Zeitung (this was addressed to me). Please again call attention in a somewhat similar manner to the impetuosity of Grammont therein referred to. What is the real ground for all this alarm? A paragraph in the Agence Havas to the effect that the affair had been settled without the concurrence of the Cortes. It is probable that the French Government itself had this paragraph inserted, and it was, moreover, concocted in complete ignorance of the Spanish Constitution and of the laws governing the election of a King. This, which was the only new feature, was a barefaced invention. It had already been mentioned in all the papers that Prim’s speech of the 11th of June referred to the Prince of Hohenzollern, and that had caused no excitement in France. Is the present agitation then a coup monté? Does the French Government insist upon a ‘row’? Has Louis Napoleon chosen Grammont in order to pick a quarrel with us? At any rate he has been unskilful in his treatment of this question. The general moral to be drawn as often as possible is: the French Government is, after all, not quite so shrewd as people believe. The French have succeeded in many things with the assistance of 300,000 soldiers, and owing to that success they are regarded as immensely clever. Is that really so? Circumstances show that it is not.”
July 10th, evening.—Received further series of sketches and drafts for articles from Bucher, who acts as the mouthpiece of the Chancellor’s views and intentions.
1. For the Spenersche or Kölnische:—“Those foreign Powers that are not concerned in the differences respecting the Spanish throne are as desirous to maintain peace as Germany herself. Their influence will, however, be neutralised by Grammont’s ill-considered threats. Should the German Governments consider the security of our frontier to be seriously threatened, they would scarcely come to a decision without convoking Parliament.”
2. “The French are running amuck like a Malay who has got into a rage and rushes through the streets dagger in hand, foaming at the mouth, stabbing every one who happens to cross his path. If France is mad enough to regard Germany as a fit object for a vicarious whipping, nothing will restrain her, and the result will be that she will herself receive a personal castigation.”