Monday, September 26th.—In the morning wrote various paragraphs for the press on the following theme: It is urged that we cannot be allowed to bombard Paris, with its numerous museums, beautiful public buildings and monuments; that to do so would be a crime against civilisation. But why not? Paris is a fortress, and if it has been filled with treasures of art, if it possesses magnificent palaces and other beautiful structures, that does not alter this character. A fortress is an instrument for warlike operations which must be rendered powerless without regard to whatever else may be bound up with it. If the French wanted to preserve their monuments and collections of books and pictures from the dangers of war they should not have surrounded them with fortifications. Besides, the French themselves did not hesitate for a moment to bombard Rome, which contained monuments of far greater value, the destruction of which would be an irretrievable loss. Also sent off an article on the bellicose tendencies of the French Radicals previous to the declaration of war, for use in our newspapers in Alsace.
At dinner, as we were discussing military matters, the Chief declared, inter alia, that the uhlans were the best cavalry. The lance gave the men great self-confidence. It was urged that it was a hindrance in getting through underwood, but that was a mistake. On the contrary, the lance was useful in moving aside the branches. He knew that from experience, as, although he first served in the rifles, he was afterwards in the Landwehr cavalry. The abolition of the lance in the entire mounted Landwehr was a blunder. The curved sabre was not much use, particularly as it was often blunt. The straight thrusting sword was much more practical.
After dinner a letter was received from Favre, in which he requested, first, that notice should be given of the commencement of the bombardment of Paris, in order that the diplomatic corps might remove; and, second, that the city should be permitted to remain in communication with the outer world by letter. Abeken said, as he brought the letter down from the Chief’s room, that the answer would be sent by way of Brussels. “But then the letter will arrive late or not at all, and be returned to us,” observed Keudell. “Well, that does not matter,” answered Abeken. From the further conversation it appears that the answer agrees to the French proposals under certain conditions.
In the evening I was again called to the Chief on several occasions to take instructions. Amongst other things, I ascertained that, “while Favre’s report respecting his interviews with the Chancellor shows, it is true, a desire to give a faithful account of what passed, it is not quite accurate, which is not surprising in the circumstances, especially as there were three different meetings.” In his statement the question of an armistice occupies a secondary position, whereas, in fact, it was the chief point. Favre was prepared to pay a considerable cash indemnity. In the matter of a truce two alternatives were discussed. First, the surrender to us of a portion of the fortifications of Paris, namely, at a point which would give us the command of the city, we on our part to allow free communication with the outer world. The second was that we should forego that condition, but that Strassburg and Toul should be surrendered to us. We put forward the latter demand because the retention of these towns in the hands of the French increases our difficulties of commissariat transport. The Chancellor stated that with respect to a cession of territory, he could only disclose its extent and frontiers when our demand had been accepted in principle. On Favre requesting to have at least an indication of what we proposed in this respect, he was informed that for our security in the future we required Strassburg, “the key of our house,” the departments of the Upper and Lower Rhine, Metz, and a portion of the Moselle department. The object of the armistice was to submit the question of peace to a National Assembly to be summoned for the purpose.
Again called to the Chief. “The King wishes to see some of the newspapers, and he desires to have the most important passages marked. I have proposed Brass to him, and when the papers come, put that one (the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung) always aside for him.” He added, smiling, “Just mark some places for the sake of appearances, it does not much matter what, and send me up the paper.”
At tea we hear a great piece of news:—the Italians have occupied Rome, the Pope and the diplomatists remaining in the Vatican.
Tuesday, September 27th.—Bölsing, on the Chief’s instructions, shows me the answer to Favre’s letter, which the Minister has rewritten in a shorter and more positive form. It says, 1. It is not usual in war to announce the commencement of an attack; 2. A besieged fortress does not appear to be a suitable residence for diplomatists; open letters containing nothing objectionable will be allowed to pass. It is hoped that the corps diplomatique will agree with this view of the matter. They can go to Tours, whither it would appear the French Government also intends to remove. The answer is written in German, a course already begun by Bernstorff, but which was carried out more consistently by Bismarck. “Formerly,” said Bölsing, “most of the Secretaries in the Foreign Office belonged to the French colony, of which Roland and Delacroix still remain. Almost all the Councillors also wrote in that language. Even the register of the despatches was kept in French, and the Ambassadors usually reported in that language.” Now the speech of the “vile Gaul,” as Count Bohlen calls the French, is only used in exceptional cases, that is, in communicating with Governments and Ambassadors to whom we cannot write or reply in their mother tongue. The registers have for years past been kept in German.
The Chief has been at work since 8 o’clock in the morning—unusually early for him. He has again been unable to sleep.
Prince Radziwill and Knobelsdorff, of the general staff, joined us at dinner. In speaking of that part of Favre’s report in which he says that he wept, the Minister thinks he can only have pretended to do so. “It is true,” he said, “that he looked as if he had done so, and I tried to some extent to console him. On my observing him more closely, however, I felt quite certain that he had not succeeded in squeezing out a single tear. It was all merely a piece of acting on his part. He thought to work upon me in the same manner as a Parisian lawyer tries to move a jury. I am perfectly convinced that he was painted at Ferrières—particularly at the second interview. That morning he looked much greyer and quite green under the eyes—I am prepared to bet that it was paint—grey and green, to give himself an appearance of deep suffering. It is, of course, possible that he was deeply affected; but then he can be no politician or he would know that pity has nothing to do with politics.” After a while the Minister added: “When I hinted something about Strassburg and Metz, he assumed a look as if he thought I was jesting. I could have given him, the answer which the great fur dealer of Unter den Linden in Berlin once gave me. I went there to choose a fur coat, and on his naming a very high price for one to which I had taken a fancy, I said, ‘Surely you are joking.’ ‘No,’ he replied, ‘I never make jokes in business.’”
The conversation then turned upon the occupation of Rome and the Pope’s position in the Vatican, on which point the Chief said, amongst other things: “He must remain a Sovereign. The only question is, how? It would be possible to do more for him if the Ultramontanes were not so much opposed to us everywhere. I am accustomed to pay people back in their own coin. I should like to know how our Harry (von Arnim, the North German Ambassador to the Holy See) now feels. Probably, like his reports, his feelings change three times within the twenty-four hours. He is really too distinguished an Ambassador for such a small Sovereign. The Pope, however, is not merely the ruler of the Papal States, he is also the head of the Catholic Church.”