“Any other news on military matters?” asked Putbus.
“Perhaps at the General Staff,” replied the Minister, “but we know nothing here. We only get such information as can be obtained by dint of begging, and that is little enough.”
Later on it was stated that the Government of National Defence was thinking of contracting a new loan. Turning to me, the Minister said: “It may be useful to call attention in the press to the danger investors run in lending money to this Government. It would be well to say that the loans made to the present Government might possibly not be recognised by that with which we concluded peace, and that we might even make that one of the conditions of the peace. That should be sent to the English and Belgian press in particular.”
Löwinsohn mentioned to me in the evening that a Conservative of high position, from whom he sometimes obtained information, had said to him that his friends were anxious to know what the King was going to say to the deputation from the Reichstag. It was understood that he was not pleased at their coming, as only the first Reichstag which would represent all Germany, and not the North German Reichstag, could tender him the imperial crown. (Doubtless the King is thinking less of the Reichstag, which cannot proffer him the imperial dignity independently, but only in concert with the Princes in the name of the whole people, than of the Princes themselves, all of whom will not as yet have replied to the proposal of the King of Bavaria.) Furthermore, this Conservative of high position would prefer to see the King become Emperor of Prussia. (A matter of taste.) Under the other arrangement Prussia will be lost in Germany, and that arouses scruples in his mind. Löwinsohn also reported that the Crown Prince is very indignant at certain correspondents who compared Châteaudun to Pompeii, and drew lively pictures of the devastation of the country owing to the war. I suggested to Löwinsohn that he should deal with the subject of the new French loan and that of “Chaudordy and Garibaldi’s ear-clippers” in the Indépendance Belge, with which he is connected. He promised to do this to-morrow.
An article for the Kölnische Zeitung on the new French loan was accordingly despatched in the following form:—
“Yet another loan! With wicked unconcern the gentlemen who now preside over the fortunes of France and who are plunging her deeper and deeper into moral and material ruin, are also trying to exploit foreign countries. This was to be anticipated for some time past, and we are therefore not surprised at it. We would, however, call the attention of the financial world to the very obvious dangers accompanying the advantages which will be offered to them. We will indicate there in a few words, in order to make the matter clear. High interest and a low rate of issue may be very tempting. But, on the other hand, the Government which makes this loan is recognised neither by the whole of France nor by a single European Power. Moreover, it should be remembered that we have already stated our intention that measures would be taken to prevent the repayment of certain loans which French municipalities tried to raise for the purposes of the war. We imagine that is a sufficient hint that the same principle might be applied on a larger scale. The French Government which concludes peace with Prussia and her allies (and that will presumably not be the present Government) will in all probability be bound, among other conditions of peace, not to recognise as binding the engagements for payment of interest and redemption of loans made by MM. Gambetta and Favre. The Government referred to will unquestionably have the right to do this, as those gentlemen, although it is true they speak in the name of France, have received no mission and no authority from the country. People should therefore be on their guard.”
Wollmann came up to me after 10 o’clock, and said that the deputation from the Reichstag had arrived. Their chairman, Simson, was now with the Chief, who would doubtless inform him of the King’s disinclination to receive them before all the Princes had sent letters declaring their approval. These letters would go first to the King of Bavaria, who would afterwards send them to our King. All the Princes had already telegraphed their approval—only Lippe still appeared to entertain scruples. Probably in consequence of this postponement it will be necessary for a few members of the deputation to fall ill.
Saturday, December 17th.—In the course of the forenoon I wrote a second paragraph on the new French loan.
In the afternoon wrote another article on the ever-increasing instances of French officers breaking their parole and absconding from the places where they were interned, and returning to France to take service against us again. Over fifty of these cases have occurred up to the present. They include officers of all ranks, and even three generals—namely, Ducrot, Cambriel, and Barral. After the battle of Sedan we could have rendered the army that was shut up in that fortress harmless by destroying it. Humanity, however, and faith in their pledged word induced us to forgo that measure. The capitulation was granted, and we were justified in considering that all the officers had agreed to its terms and were prepared to fulfil the conditions which it imposed. If that was not the case we ought to have been informed of the fact. We should then have treated those exceptions in an exceptional way, that is to say, not accorded to the officers in question the same treatment that was granted to the others. In other words, they would not have been allowed the liberty which they have now abused in such a disgraceful manner. It is true that the great majority of the captive officers have kept their word, and one might therefore have dismissed the matter with a shrug of the shoulders. But the affair assumes another aspect when the French Provisional Government approves this breach of their pledged word by reappointing such officers to the regiments that are opposing us in the field. Has there been a single case in which one of these deserters was refused readmission to the ranks of the French army? Or have any French officers protested against the readmission of such comrades into their corps? It is, therefore, not the Government alone, but also the officers of France, who consider this disgraceful conduct to be correct. The consequence, however, will be that the German Governments will feel bound in duty to consider whether the alleviation of their imprisonment hitherto accorded to French officers is consistent with the interests of Germany. And further, we must ask ourselves the question whether we shall be justified in placing confidence in any of the promises of the present French Government when it wants to treat with Germany, without material guarantees and pledges.
We were joined at dinner by Herr Arnim-Krochlendorff, a brother-in-law of the Chief, a gentleman of energetic aspect, and apparently a little over fifty. The Minister was in very good humour, but the conversation this time was not particularly interesting. It chiefly turned upon the bombardment, and the attitude assumed towards that question by a certain party at headquarters. Arnim related that when Grävenitz spoke to the Crown Prince on the matter, the latter exclaimed: “Impossible! nothing to be done; it would be to no purpose,” and when Grävenitz ventured to argue the point, the Prince declared: “Well, then, if you know better, do it! Bombard it yourself!” To which Grävenitz replied: “Your Royal Highness, I can only fire a feu de joie (ich kann nur Victoria schiessen).” The Chief remarked: “That sounds very equivocal.” The Crown Prince told me the same thing, viz., if I thought the bombardment would be successful, I had better take over the command. I replied that I should like to very much—for twenty-four hours, but not longer. He then added in French, doubtless on account of the servants: “For I do not understand anything about it, although I believe I know as much as he does, for he has no great knowledge of these matters.”