The following particulars relating to the King of Bavaria are contained in a report from Munich: “His kingdom is not of this world. It has been further observed that Major Sauer has no longer any influence upon him, while that of Privy Councillor Eisenhart has increased, as indeed also that of Count Holnstein. He is not coming to Versailles, in the first place because he would be obliged to ride, which he can no longer do with comfort, and in the next place because he does not like to play second fiddle. All that Bray thinks of is to keep his own position in Vienna warm, if only for the sake of his livelihood.” Lutz is “the tête forte in the Ministry, and is very ambitious.” The Princes Karl and Ludwig are strongly anti-Prussian. The Nuncio’s secretary exercises a great influence with his chief.—Read a letter from King Lewis to our Crown Prince. It was written at the commencement of the war. The handwriting is coarse and ugly and the lines are not straight. It expresses a hope that the independence of Bavaria will be respected. Otherwise the tone of the epistle is soundly patriotic.
In the evening I handed Bucher, as material for an article, all the newspaper reports I have collected on the barbarous conduct of the war by the French, contrary to the law of nations.
At 10 o’clock I was called to the Chief, who was lying before the fire on the sofa, wrapt in a blanket. He said: “Well, we’ve got him!” “Whom, your Excellency?” “Mont Avron.” He then showed me a letter from Count Waldersee, reporting that this redoubt was occupied by the troops of the 12th Army Corps this afternoon. “It is to be hoped that they have laid no mine and that the poor Saxons will not be blown up.” I telegraphed the news of this first success in the bombardment to London, but in cipher, “as otherwise the general staff might be angry.”
Subsequently the Chancellor sent for me once more to show me an outburst of the Vienna Tageblatt which has been reproduced by the Kölnische Zeitung. It declares that Bismarck has been thoroughly deceived as to the power of resistance of Paris, and in his overhaste, which has already cost the lives of hundreds of thousands (why not at once say millions?), has put forward excessive demands in connection with the peace. We reply, through the Spenersche Zeitung, that up to the present no one knows what the Chancellor’s conditions are, as he has not yet had any opportunity of stating them officially, but they do not in any case go so far as German public opinion, which almost unanimously demands the cession of all Lorraine. No one can say either what his views were respecting the power of resistance of Paris, as he has never had to give official expression to them.
Friday, December 30th.—The bitter cold of the last few days still continues. In consequence of his indisposition the Chief still keeps to his room, and is indeed mostly in bed. In the morning, on his instructions, I telegraphed particulars of the occupation of Mont Avron, and of the disgraceful conduct of the French authorities, who, according to the official acknowledgment of the delegation at Tours, have offered a premium to imprisoned officers to return to France, in breach of their word of honour. On the suggestion of the Chief I write paragraphs on this subject for the German press as well as for the local Moniteur to the following effect:—
“We have frequently had occasion to direct attention to the profound demoralisation manifested by French statesmen and officers in the matter of military honour. A communication, which reaches us from a trustworthy source, proves that we had not up to the present realised how deep and widespread that evil is. We have now before us an official order issued by the French Ministry of War, the 5th Bureau of the 6th Department, which bears the title ‘Solde et revues.’ It is dated from Tours on the 13th of November, and is signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Jerald, and by Colonel Tissier of the general staff of the 17th Army Corps. This order, which is based upon another dated the 10th of November, assures all French officers imprisoned in Germany, without distinction, a money payment in case they escape from custody. We repeat, all the French officers without distinction; that is to say also those who have given their word of honour not to escape. The premium offered for such dishonourable conduct amounts to 750 francs. A measure of this description needs no comment. Honour (which is the dearest treasure of every German officer and—duty and justice demand that we should add—formerly also of all French officers) is regarded by the men who came to power on the 4th of September as a commodity to be bought and sold, and indeed very cheaply. In this way officers of the French army will come to believe that France is no longer administered by a Government, but is on the contrary exploited by a trading firm, and one with lax principles of honesty and decency, under the title of ‘Gambetta and Co.’ ‘Who’ll buy gods?’ ‘Who’ll sell his word of honour?’”
Afterwards I write another short article on an error frequently committed by the Kölnische Zeitung and recently repeated in connection with the Chancellor’s despatch to Vienna. The great Rhenish newspaper writes: “Ever since 1866 we have been amongst those who have persistently warned both Vienna and Berlin to dismiss their idle jealousies and to come to the best understanding possible in the circumstances. We have often regretted the personal irritation between Bismarck and Beust which appears to stand in the way of such a rapprochement, &c.” The reply is to the following effect: “It has been observed that the Kölnische Zeitung has already frequently sought to explain political acts and omissions of the Chancellor of the Confederation by personal motives, personal likes and dislikes, personal disposition and ill humour; and we have here a further instance of this unjustifiable course. We cannot imagine why such suspicions are time after time brought forward. We only know that absolutely no feeling of personal irritation exists between the Chancellor of the North German Confederation and the Chancellor of the Austria-Hungarian Monarchy, and indeed that, previous to 1866, when they often came into personal contact, they were on excellent terms, as Count Bismarck himself declared in the North German Reichstag. Since then nothing has happened between them as private persons calculated to create bitterness, if for no other reason than because they have had no personal intercourse. If they have taken up a position more or less antagonistic to each other the reasons are obvious. Up to the present they were the representatives of different political systems, and acted upon different political principles which it was difficult although not quite impossible to reconcile. This, and this alone, is the sole explanation of what the Kölnische Zeitung ascribes to personal motives, from which the thoughts and acts of no statesman of the present day is farther removed than those of the Chancellor of the Confederation. It may also be remarked incidentally that not only has Count Bismarck not been ‘thoroughly’ deceived as to the power of resistance of Paris, but he has not been deceived at all. His opinion has never been asked on the subject; but we know on the best authority that months ago he regarded the capture of the city as difficult, and was decidedly opposed to the investment even before the fall of Metz.”
In reading documents in the evening I find that the Chief has had a letter sent to General Bismarck-Bohlen stating that he does not agree with the general in thinking that his main task should be to alleviate the misery caused by the war, and to render the Alsacians well disposed towards the future masters of the country. For the moment his first business must be to promote the objects of the war and to secure the safety of the troops. He should therefore expel such French officials as will not take service under us, including the magistrates who will not discharge the duties of their office; and he should also withhold the payment of pensions directing the pensioners to apply to the Government at Tours. Under such conditions the people would be more disposed to call for peace.
Saturday, December 31st.—All our people are ailing. I also begin to feel exhausted. It will be well to shorten the night work which my diary entails, or to interrupt it altogether for a few days.
Tuesday, January 3rd.—I observe that the opinion already expressed by the Chief on several occasions, that the dispersion of the German forces towards the north and south-west is dangerous, and that more in concentration is desirable, is also held elsewhere. A military authority has written on this subject in the Vienna Presse; and the National Zeitung of the 31st of December publishes an article which is even more in harmony with the Chief’s views. It says, inter alia:—“The withdrawal of our troops from Dijon and the non-occupation of Tours, to the gates of which a division of the 10th Army Corps had advanced, give perhaps an indication of the views entertained generally on the German side, and which will govern the continuation of the campaign. It may possibly be expected that France will forgo further resistance after the fall of Paris, and will agree to the German conditions of peace. That, however, is not certain, and it is necessary to be prepared for an opposite contingency. In any case the fall of Paris will not be immediately followed by the establishment of a Government generally recognised and supported by a National Assembly, with which we could enter into negotiations for peace. Then if hostilities are to be continued they cannot aim at conquering the whole of such an extensive country as France. Our army, as hitherto, might indeed be everywhere victorious and disperse the hostile forces. That, however, would not be sufficient. It would be necessary to organise a new civil administration in all the conquered districts and to subject the population to its rule. Even in the country lying between the Channel and the Loire our forces would not be sufficient to completely secure the safety of communications and to maintain the authority of a foreign administration in each town and village, to prevent treacherous attacks and to collect the taxes as well as the contributions and supplies that are indispensable for the purposes of the war. To extend the area of occupation indefinitely would not only be to overtax our military power, however highly we may rate it, but to unduly drain our home services for the necessary supply of civil administrators. Therefore, if peace is not attainable within a very short time our military authorities must set clear and distinct limits to the task which they propose to themselves. They must select a fixed portion of French territory, which they can occupy so completely that we shall have full command over it, and can retain it as long as may be desired. This portion should include the capital and the best provinces, with the finest and most warlike population, and it would have, of course, to bear the whole burden and cost of the war until a peace party had grown up throughout the country strong enough to force its views upon the Government of the day. The occupied territory should be so limited as to make its defence as easy as possible from a military point of view. Of course further offensive operations for temporary purposes might be undertaken beyond those lines, but there should from the beginning be no intention of going permanently beyond them. In the meantime the work of annexation should be proceeded with in those districts which Germany requires for the security of her frontier without awaiting the conclusion of peace.”