“Saml. Culper.”

Alexander Hamilton, without waiting for the return of Washington, forwards Culper’s message to Lafayette.

See [page 84].

There being some question about finding Tallmadge at that moment Woodhull crossed John Bolton’s name from one of the letters and probably Brewster found a man to carry it directly to Headquarters, where it was received by Alexander Hamilton before 4 p. m. July 21st. As General Washington was not there Hamilton sent the news by a special messenger to General Lafayette, then on his way to Newport.[21] Likewise Major Tallmadge, as soon as the news reached him sent the information to General Washington and also to Generals Robert Howe and William Heath. General Washington later, upon studying the details, figuratively sharpened his quill pens and with them accomplished more than might have been possible at that moment with the sword. Hours went by, in fact several days, for the British transports were slow in arriving at Frog’s Neck, but they were fairly on their way to Newport when a man whom none could suspect, left at the British outpost a package that he claimed he had picked up along the road. It was found to be the details of General Washington’s plan of attack on New York. Already it was time for the American forces to strike the blow—they might be expected at any moment. The British signal fires were lighted,[22] and promptly came sailing back the fleet. A few days later as an excuse for the affair, in a letter to Lord George Germain Sir Henry Clinton said: “Washington must have learned that my armament had not proceeded to Rhode Island. He (I apprehend in consequence of this) re-crossed the river, and is now near Orange-town”. But in fact General Washington was not prepared to attack New York at that time and had no intention of doing so. In Sir Henry Clinton’s letter he says:

“On the 18th, by a courier from the east end of Long Island, the first intelligence was received of the arrival, on the 10th, of the French off Rhode-Island, which I transmitted immediately to Admiral Arbuthnot.

“In the hope that I might yet be in time to undertake something offensive against the enemy, either by a land attack solely, or, if the Admiral should have found it advisable, a joint attempt with the fleet, I determined as speedily as possible to put a body of troops afloat in the Sound, ready for operation to the eastward, if further information should warrant it, and not too distant to return rapidly, and act against the rebel army, should they, in my absence, form an enterprize against these posts.

“Many causes conspired to retard the arrival of transports at Frog’s-neck, from which place my embarkation was only effected the 27th. During this time all hopes of success from a coup de main were of course wafted away.

“The Camilla and Amphitrite, which were appointed to convey us, joining the same day, I proceeded with the transports to Huntington-bay, where I was honoured with such accounts from the Admiral of the attention the enemy had given to fortify themselves, that I no longer entertained an idea of making any attempt solely with the troops. I cannot judge what might have been expected from a joint operation; but I presume that, in the aspect affairs bore at that time, it was not to be undertaken with propriety.

“On the 31st therefore I returned to White-stone, where I disembarked the troops, keeping the transports in readiness to receive them again, if necessary; and the army encamped near the shore.