The unconscious

by Morton Prince

The secondary units are the acquired complexes and systems of complexes within which are incorporated one or more primary units. In these are found as already mentioned the ideals, “sentiments,” wishes, aspirations, forebodings, apprehensions, and all other organized systems of thought which, on the one hand have their roots in the deposited experiences of life and, on the other, their promptings and urges in the primitive innate instincts and other dispositions. Thus the innate and acquired dispositions are organized into unitary systems of greater and greater complexity but each having a tendency and, under certain conditions of dissociation, a greater or less freedom to function as a psychic whole. And the integration or potential integration of all these units and unitary complexes and systems into a functioning whole is personality. This does not mean that all the primary and secondary units take part in the functioning of the personality; on the contrary, as we have seen, many lie dormant, for one reason or the other, in the unconscious. But, as we have also seen, they are potentially capable of being awakened and determining mental and bodily behavior. Furthermore, evidence has been adduced to show that the various units of personality do not always coöperate and function harmoniously with one another, as no doubt they ought to do, but sometimes are incited to conflicts and then they play the deuce with the individual and he fails to be able to adapt himself to the realities of life.

Amongst these acquired unitary systems there are certain ones which are of preëminent importance for the personality in the determination of mental behavior. I refer to those complexes known as the sentiments. By this term, as we have seen, is understood the organization of an acquired disposition—the idea of an object—or complex of such dispositions (the psychic whole of idea plus its “meaning” derived from the setting of associated experiences) with one or more innate emotional dispositions. It must not be overlooked for one moment that a sentiment is something more than the organization of an emotion or other affect with an idea. There is nothing novel or fruitful in such a limited conception of the structure of a sentiment as this. A sentiment in its structure is the organization of an idea and meaning with an emotional instinct which has an aim and end which the instinct strives to attain and which alone satisfies the urge of the instinct. Such a structure has great significance and the conception is a most fruitful one. For because of this structure the excitation of the idea necessarily involves the excitation of the instinct and the impulse of the latter determines behavior in reference to the object of the idea and carries the instinct to fruition. Thus if the sentiment be one of love the excitation of the instincts organized with the object determines through their urge the behavior to cherish or possess the object of the sentiment. And the attainment of this aim alone satisfies it. If the sentiment be one of apprehension of an object the instinct of fear incites behavior to escape from the danger contained in the meaning of the object. A sentiment in the hierarchy of units is a unitary system built up by the organization (through experience) of primary units with a secondary unitary complex (idea, meaning, etc.).

The importance of the sentiments in the dynamics of personality and therefore in the determination of mental and bodily behavior I have already dwelt upon (Lecture XV). But there is one sentiment which plays such an important rôle both in these respects and in that unitary system which we know as the empirical self, or consciousness of self that something more needs to be said about it. This sentiment is that which McDougall has termed the “self-regarding sentiment” which is intimately bound up with the idea or conception of the empirical self, and both should be considered together. It is only by regarding, as it seems to me, the conception or idea of the empirical self as a secondary unitary complex organized by experience that we can approach the solution of the problem of the self and understand the phenomenon of two selves in one personality, as so often occurs in multiple personality.

The self-regarding sentiment, according to McDougall’s theoretical analysis—and I may say his analysis has been confirmed by my own practical analyses of concrete cases—has structurally organized within it by experience the two opposing instincts, self-abasement and self-assertion, but either may be the dominating one. The idea or conception of self, proper, is, according to the theory, a complex and integrated whole organized by experience like the self-regarding sentiment. “McDougall has argued,” to quote what I have written in a study of multiple personality,[^[263]] “and I think soundly ‘that the idea of self and the self-regarding sentiment are essentially social products; that their development is effected by constant interplay between personalities, between the self and society; that, for this reason, the complex conception of self thus attained implies constant reference to others and to society in general, and is, in fact, not merely a conception of self, but always one’s self in relation to other selves.’ But, as I would argue, this formulation must be considerably broadened. Every sentiment (and therefore the self-regarding sentiment) has roots in and is consequently related to what has gone before. And the experiences of what has gone before of the self, i.e., what has been previously experienced (ideally or realistically) by the individual in reference to the object of the sentiment, determines the attitude of mind and point of view towards that object, and is responsible for the organization of the object and instinct into a sentiment. The sentiment is the resultant and the expression of those antecedent experiences. They form its setting and give it meaning beyond the mere emotional tone. You cannot separate sentiment, conceived as a linked object and emotional instinct, from such a setting. They form a psychic whole. This is not only theoretically true, but actual dealings with pathological sentiments (in which the principle can be most clearly studied), called phobias and other emotional obsessions, bring out this intimate relation between the sentiment and the conserved setting of antecedent experiences. Such practical dealings also show not only that the sentiment is the outgrowth of and the expression of this setting, but that by changing the setting the sentiment can be correspondingly altered.... I want to emphasize that in the dynamic functioning of a sentiment the setting coöperates in maintaining and carrying it to the fruition and satisfaction of its aim.”

So far as concerns the incorporation of the two instincts, self-abasement and self-assertion, “McDougall with keen insight and analysis, has argued that the self-regarding sentiment is organized with these two innate dispositions, but in different degrees in different individuals, and with the growth of the mind one may replace the other in the adaptation of the individual to the changing environment. Taking two extreme types, he draws a picture of the proud, arrogant, self-assertive, domineering person, with the feeling of masterful superiority, and angry resentment of criticism and control, and who knows no shame and is indifferent to moral approval and disapproval. In this personality the instincts of self-assertion and anger are the dominating innate dispositions of the self-regarding sentiment. On the other hand we have the type of the submissive, dependent character, with a feeling of inferiority, when the contrary disposition is the dominating one. McDougall’s analysis was beautifully illustrated in the case of Miss Beauchamp by two personalities, BI and BIV, fragments of the original self, which were actual specimens from real life of his theoretic types. Again McDougall’s theoretic analysis of the conception of self, showing the idea to be one ‘always of one’s self in relation to other selves,’ is concretely illustrated and substantiated by the dissection of this mind effected by trauma.”

The study of another case, that of “Maria” furnished the same results as respects the two personalities that were manifested, as did that of “B. C. A.”

As to the conception of the empirical self and as “an important addition to this theory both from a structural and dynamic point of view, I would insist again that the complex conception of self includes a setting of mental experiences of much wider range, in which the idea of self is incorporated and which gives the idea meaning. The range of this setting extends beyond ‘other selves’ and ‘society in general’ and may include almost any of life’s experiences.” By way of illustration let us take the two selves known as the “Saint” (BI) and the “Realist” (BIV) in the case of Miss Beauchamp. "Concretely and more correctly the psychological interpretation of the ‘reference to others and society in general,’ of the relation of one’s self to other selves, would in this particular instance be as follows: the Saint’s conception of self (with the self-regarding sentiment) was related to an ideal world and ideal selves contained in religious conceptions; and hence it became organized in a larger setting which gave it a meaning of divine perfection such as is obtained, or aspired to by saints, and in which were incorporated the emotional dispositions of awe, reverence, love, self-abasement, etc. This conception was not a product of, or related to the social environment. Rather it was the product of an ideal world. She, as has been said, lived in a world of idealism, oblivious of the realities round about her, which she saw not ‘clearly and truly’ but as they were colored by her imagination. Her idea of self thus became the ‘saintly sentiment’ of self-perfection.

“On the other hand the conception of self in BIV, the Realist, was related to and set in the realities of this social world as they clearly are, the world of her objective environment. And in this conception of self the instinctive dispositions of self-assertion and anger contributed the promptings and motive force to dominate these realities and bend them to her will.”

It must be an obvious conclusion from the numerous and multiform subconscious phenomena which were cited in previous lectures that all the unitary and complexes and systems which enter into the composite structure of personality do not necessarily emerge into awareness. Some function subconsciously and in this way determine conscious mental processes and behavior. Many remain conserved in the unconscious and have only a potential reality in that they remain latent but susceptible of being awakened into activity. It is also true that in the course of the growth of the personality many become modified by experience and metamorphosed into new sentiments, new ideals, new desires, new apprehensions, new meanings, etc.

The necessity for adaptation of the personality to the realities of life necessarily gives rise to conflicts, for the urges of some unitary complexes cannot be satisfied, and some are incompatible with the situations which reality presents, or with one another. A practical solution of the problem is compulsory. Compensation is sought. Sometimes compensation or compromise is successfully attained; sometimes it is not. Or the solution may be accepted and the urge of a rebellious system incompatible with the demands of reality is suppressed by voluntary or automatic repression. When neither compensation nor compromise is attained, or when the situation is not accepted and the rebellious urge continues, then disruption or disarrangement of the personality may follow with such resulting phenomena as have been already described. Integrated systems may become disintegrated or dissociated, permitting of independent autonomous functioning of conflicting systems. And of the unitary systems taking part in such conflicts one or more may, as we have seen, function subconsciously. Furthermore, as observation shows, dissociated complexes may take on growth independently of the integrated systems of the personal consciousness and thus create large subconscious systems. On the other hand both one or more primary units (innate dispositions) and secondary unitary complexes and systems (acquired dispositions) may by the force of conflicts be completely repressed and cease to function within the personality. Thus, for example, certain instincts may be suppressed and systematic amnesia and other defects be produced. And so on.