Proposition II. There is a vacuum.
Proposition III. Time is composed of time-atoms.
Proposition IV. Substance cannot exist without numerous accidents.
Proposition V. Each atom is completely furnished with the accidents (which I will describe), and cannot exist without them.
Proposition VI. Accidents do not continue in existence during two time-atoms.
Proposition VII. Both positive and negative properties have a real existence, and are accidents which owe their existence to some causa efficiens.
Proposition VIII. All existing things, i.e., all creatures, consist of substance and of accidents, and the physical form of a thing is likewise an accident.
Proposition IX. No accident can form the substratum for another accident.
Proposition X. The test for the possibility of an imagined object does not consist in its conformity with the existing laws of nature.
Proposition XI. The idea of the infinite is equally inadmissible, whether the infinite be actual, potential, or accidental, i.e., there is no difference whether the infinite be formed by a number of co-existing things, or by a series of things, of which one part comes into existence when another has ceased to exist, in which case it is called accidental infinite; in both cases the infinite is rejected by the Mutakallemim as fallacious.