Major Campbell, having advanced some way into the valley, soon found himself opposed to an immense body of Kaffirs, who opened a heavy fire upon the troops. The ascent of the infantry up a hill clothed with thick bush, was accomplished under desperate circumstances—thousands of Kaffirs, secure in ambush, or assembled on the mountains around them, shouting their war-cry of “Izapa! Izapa!”—“Come on! Come on!” On reaching a kloof, a few Kaffirs made their appearance; but, “it being suggested to Major Campbell that these were merely put there to divert attention from the scrub (bush intermingled with stones) on the left, he desired his men to keep a sharp lookout in that direction.” It was well he did so; the Kaffirs “opened a tremendous fire from that point, from the kloof on the right, and in the rear.” “I never before,” says the writer of an account from the scene of action, “experienced such dreadful fatigue; what with the steepness of the mountain, and having to ascend it amid a shower of balls, I was compelled to lie down twice, screened by the thorn-trees, before I reached the top. Two men fainted by the way, four of the 91st were killed, and two wounded. From the number of shots fired, I am surprised half of us were not killed.”
By the time the division had reached the summit of the mountain, they were all fairly exhausted. It was a joyful sight for them when they found their position was discovered, and they saw the Cape Corps coming to their assistance, with a gun, from the other side. The red-jackets cheered the reinforcement from the hill-top, and then rested on their arms, while the Cape Corps went to work, and soon silenced the enemy there.
In getting round the mountain, Colonel Somerset, after crossing a difficult drift with a gun, discovered a large drove of cattle on the left. Captain Sutton, with his Burghers, Captain Pipon, with a troop of the 7th, and Captain Donovan, with some Cape Mounted Rifles, were despatched to capture them, and succeeded in taking eighteen hundred head. At sunset, the troops encamped for the night on the flat under the Amatola.
The first day’s action at Burn’s Hill was disastrously marked by the death of Captain Bambrick, 7th Dragoon Guards, a fine old Waterloo soldier, who had also served for many years in India, in the 11th Hussars. He unhappily went too far into a dense bush, and was shot. One or two circumstances connected with his death are worthy of notice.
Captain Bambrick’s troop formed part of a division under Major Gibsone, 7th Dragoon Guards, who had been left in charge of the baggage. During the day, some Kaffirs came down upon the herds and oxen belonging to the waggons, and in fighting for the cattle, mortally wounded a young boy, named McCormick. His brother ran to his assistance; and the dying child, seeing the other herds retreating, raised himself, and shouting, in his death-agony, “Don’t run! don’t run! We’ll beat them yet!” sank back exhausted, and spoke no more. Captain Bambrick was sent in pursuit of the Kaffirs who had killed this poor young settler; and the old dragoon officer, reckless of the foe, seen or unseen, and accustomed to charge wherever that foe might be, dashed into the bush at the head of his troop, went too far, and fell in consequence by the hand of a concealed savage. Shocking to relate, his body was cut in pieces by the enemy, and either burned or hung about the bush. Oh “pastoral and peaceful” people! as Missionary Society Agents have styled them. Ere Captain Bambrick fell, he called to his men to retire, having found out, too late, that “that was no place for cavalry.”
He must have received many wounds. His charger galloped past the troop without its rider; its trappings and saddle were covered with blood; while the savages bore off the mangled body of their victim, brandishing his sword on the top of the hill as they retreated. Captain Bambrick was forty-seven years of age, and had served his country more than thirty years.
As I have observed, Captain Bambrick’s troop formed part of a division, under Major Gibsone, left in charge of baggage and ammunition, while Colonel Somerset proceeded with the main body towards the wooded kloofs and steep ascents of the Amatola Mountains. Before proceeding in search of the plundered cattle to a hill overlooking “Sandilla’s drift,” Captain Bambrick received distinct orders from Major Gibsone “by no means to proceed to any distance.” The old soldier could not, or would not, understand a warfare which demanded such caution, dashed onwards, full of chivalry, utterly wasted on such a foe, and fell, as might be expected. It may be added, that, had he not fallen when he did, the whole troop would have become the victims of his noble but ill-timed daring.
Major Gibsone’s dispatch states further—“About seven o’clock, just as I had diminished the size of my camp, we were attacked by a considerable body of Kaffirs, whom we beat off in six or seven minutes, I am sorry to say, with the loss, of four men of the 91st killed, and four wounded.” On the 17th, Major Gibsone, in compliance with Colonel Somerset’s instructions, moved from Burn’s Hill, at half-past ten a.m. From the number of waggons (one hundred and twenty-five), and the necessity of giving a support to the guns, Major Gibsone was only enabled to form a front and rear baggage-guard, and could not detach any men along the line of waggons. After proceeding about a mile, shots issued from a kloof by the side of the road; Lieutenant Stokes, R.E., ran the gun up to a point some three hundred yards in advance, and raked the kloof with a shell. When half the waggons had passed, the Kaffirs made a dash upon one of them, firing at the drivers and some officers’ servants, who were obliged to fly; then took out the oxen, and wheeled the waggon across the river. An overpowering force then rushed down from the hills in all directions, keeping up an incessant fire, which was returned by the 7th Dragoon Guards and the 91st, with great spirit. The gun was also served with much skill; but, owing to the Kaffirs’ immense superiority in numbers, Major Gibsone, to prevent his men from being cut off, was obliged to return to Burn’s Hill, where he again put the troops in position. A short time after this, a company of the 91st, under Captain Scott, advanced in skirmishing order, keeping up a heavy fire; but the waggons completely blocking up the road, the troops were obliged to make a détour, and, after considerable difficulty, succeeded in getting the ammunition-waggons into a proper line, but found it quite impracticable to save the baggage-waggons, the Kaffirs having driven away the oxen. One of the ammunition-waggons broke down, but the ammunition was removed to another; the troops then fought their way, inch by inch, to the Tyumie Camp, where they were met by Colonel Somerset’s division, and where they again encamped for the night.
Colonel Somerset, in his dispatch, dated “Block Drift, 18th of April,” describes the Kaffirs as “assembling in a very large force on the heights above the troops, on the 17th, and, on arriving at the Tyumie Drift, the enemy pressed upon them at every point. Lieutenant Hill, R.A., got the gun into position, and made excellent practice into the dense bush along the river, the enemy pressing on, and opening a severe fire on our advance. Lieutenant Armstrong, with some Cape Mounted Rifles, then scoured the bush in all directions; the flanking-parties of the 91st kept up a strong fire on the enemy; and Colonel Richardson supported the rear in the most able and gallant manner. Major Campbell held the drift, while ammunition-waggons passed; Captain Browne’s guns taking up an admirable position, and doing great execution under a heavy fire.”
Thus, scarcely fifteen hundred men, not all regular troops, encumbered with a hundred and twenty-five waggons, made their way into the fastnesses of these savages, who were many thousands in number; and although unable to follow up the enemy, of whom they killed at least three hundred, succeeded in saving all their ammunition, captured eighteen hundred head of cattle, and finally fought their way to the original ground of dispute.