Before the engagement the troops had marched thirty miles. No great loss was sustained on the British side, and a great many Kaffir guns were taken. “Colonel Somerset,” remarked the “Graham’s Town Journal,” “made an admirable disposition of the force under his command, and directed the whole movement with great skill. The General overlooked the whole affair, and is said to have expressed his satisfaction at the spirited and gallant manner in which the troops, and all who were engaged, behaved. The gallantry and activity of Colonel Somerset throughout the affair were conspicuous: directing, under the General, the whole of the operations below the mountain, he displayed the most perfect acquaintance with the habits of the enemy and the character of the country; he was to be seen at every point where danger presented itself, or direction was needed, and ably and zealously was he supported by every officer and engaged in one of the severest field-days ever experienced since the commencement of the present contest.”

At least thirty Kaffirs were counted dead after this action; some of them wearing the clothes of the deceased officers. Mr Faunt’s horse was captured in the fray, and poor Captain Baker’s charger galloped into the camp, still saddled, and bleeding from an assegai wound in its head.

Soon after this affair, Colonel Somerset succeeded in crossing the Kei, with the Cape Corps, and Captain Hogg’s levy, all in light marching order, with supplies for five days. As soon as this force was on the other side of the river, Páto came back. Captain O’Reilly was then detached, with some of the Cape Corps, to look for him, when he again doubled, and escaped with a quantity of Colonial cattle; only four hundred being captured in the course of these operations.

Umhala was suspected of sheltering Páto’s people and the cattle; and afterwards, when disturbed on his location by the operations of the troops, he had the insolence to remonstrate on the inconvenience he was put to by being thus suspected. Such fallacious reasoning did not influence Colonel Somerset’s plans. The craftiness of these Kaffirs is the most difficult thing possible to contend with. What, for instance, could be more cunning than Kreli’s reply, when accused of sheltering Páto? “Colonel Somerset’s commands,” he said, “had forced Páto over the Kei into his (the Amaponda) country, and so precipitately that the stolen Colonial cattle had got mixed up with Kreli’s in the pasture-ground. Now,” said Kreli, “this could not have been so, had Páto come hither with my permission, as, in that case, I should have separated my cattle from his.” He also begged to know on what authority the British Government had decided that he had sheltered Páto. He was told, in reply, that the information had been received from certain Kaffir prisoners, whose names, however, were unknown; whereupon his councillors answered, “You, Colonel Johnstone (27th), and the Governor, and Somerset, and Stockenstrom, and Kreli, are great men, and are you going to settle an important national question, upon the report of prisoners of whom you know nothing?” Certainly a Kaffir would puzzle Lord Brougham himself, by his plan of meeting cross questions with crooked answers.


Note 1. The poison used by the Bushmen is extracted from the serpent’s bag, from the root of the agapanthus, lily, and other plants.

Note 2. Captain Baker, Lieutenant Faunt, Ensign Burnop, and Surgeon Campbell, all of the 73rd, and Assistant-Surgeon Loch, 7th Dragoon Guards.


Part 2, Chapter XIX.