The responsibility of the Chief Magistrate of the United States in the late war was remarkable. Everything of moment was referred to him from the Cabinet officers of the Government, and he gave all the closest attention, making, after conscientious consideration, the decisions that determined the course of action taken. This was true in unusual measure of the Treasury, State, War and Navy Departments.
It is well the President resisted while he could the "rush line" in Congress, that strove headlong for war, and strenuously urged in the time gained essential preparations, and that he pressed the war the day it was declared with a hurry message to Admiral Dewey, who won his immortal victory on the other side of the world within a week of his orders by cable to "destroy" the squadron of the enemy that might be found somewhere on the west coast of Luzon.
Nearer home there was a harder task. The Spanish army in Cuba was much more formidable on the defensive than in the offensive. There were greater numbers of soldiers of a better class in the service of Spain on the island, than had been supposed, and they did not lack, in the degree believed, discipline, ammunition or provisions. The Spaniards had an effective field artillery, more than one hundred guns, and their Mauser rifles were excellent, far-reaching; and, in field ammunition, they were ahead of us in smokeless powder. Our regiments would have given way before the Spanish rifles, that told no tales except with bolts, that flew invisible, fatal arrows, from the jungles, if the American soldier had not been of stuff that was like pure steel, and marched unflinchingly through the deadly hail, regarding the bitter pelting as a summons to "come on" and carry the trenches and ambuscades by storm. The incapacity of the Spaniards to put down the Cuban Rebellion caused grave misapprehensions, both as to the Spanish and Cuban soldiery, for few Americans understand the conditions of the interminable guerilla warfare, the particular military accomplishment of the Spanish race, impotent in all save the destructive effect upon those not engaged in it. In Congress no impression could be made of the real feebleness of the Cubans, except in bushwhacking, and it is still a puzzle that the immense masses of Spanish troops should be so helpless against the insurgents, and yet so troublesome in harassing invaders. The Cuban army was not a myth, certainly, but it has been a disappointment to those who were swift in shouting its praises, upon information given by the Cuban Key West Bureau of News novelettes. It was well that the attack on Spain in the West Indies was directed upon Santiago and Porto Rico. The former manifestly was a point that commanded the central waters of the West Indies; recently there have been expressions of surprise that the expedition to Porto Rico, finally and handsomely led by Major General Miles, commanding the army of the United States, was so delayed. Investigation from the inside will duly determine that no harm was done in that case by loss of time. Santiago was pointed out by many circumstances as the vital spot of Spanish power in America, where a mortal blow might be delivered. It was in the province where the insurgents had greater strength than in any other part of the island. It was so situated that our fleet in that locality was close to the Windward Passage, east of Cuba, where Columbus was at once perplexed and triumphant, and to Hayti, Jamaica and Porto Rico; and there were several landings where it would be possible to disembark troops, protected by the fire of our ships. More than that, Santiago is the old capital of Cuba, the place where the head of the Cuban church abides, and the scene of the Virginius Massacre—altogether having a place in history almost equal to that of Havana. It was not doubted the sanitary situation of the east end of Cuba was better than that of the west end. Experience shows that this easy assumption was questionable. If we omit the great plague spot, the city of Havana, it will appear that Santiago is in a region as pestilential as can be found in the provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio. More than all other associations and conspicuities, the attention of the world was directed to Santiago because Cervera's elusive fleet, short of coal and provisions, and overmatched by the United States navy, took refuge in the deep harbor, hoping to clean his ships, get supplies and escape with coal enough to open a new career. The Spaniards were too slow, and the only ships of Spain that showed a sign of the spirit of enterprise and the capacity of adventure, were bottled up by a relentless blockade. Lieutenant Hobson became famous in a night in his most hazardous effort to use the Merrimac as a cork for the bottle, but fortunately left a gap through which the Spaniards made haste to their doom. When the second fleet of Spain was destroyed, all chance of disputing our supremacy at sea, or of doing anything to guard Spanish interests either in the East or West Indies, was extinguished.
There has been no marked features of contention as to the battles of Manila, except in the case of the gratuitous observations of critical persons, whose feelings have been disturbed, that the storming of the town was not bloody enough. The victory, however, was all the greater, for the casualty lists were not long, owing to the management of the Commanding General and the heroic Admiral, who won a battle famous as that at New Orleans, with less bloodshed, but as Jackson's victory was not belittled because he lost but half a dozen men killed, the victories at Manila should not be slighted. The Santiago battles, however, have stirred controversies, and there is a great mass of literature, official and other, subject to endless examination, and perhaps so voluminous as to confuse readers for some generations. The leading and indisputable facts are, that the Spaniards fought well on land, but were ineffectual afloat, in their attempts to inflict injuries, though they put to sea in dashing style, and did not flinch in efforts to evade a superior force, until the fire of the Americans crushed them. In the incidents of warfare on the hills around and the waves before Santiago, it is fair to say that the Spaniards redeemed themselves from imputation of timidity, and fought in a manner not unworthy of the countrymen of the Garrison of Morro Castle, Havana, whose gallantry in resisting the army and fleet of England, in 1762, commanded the respectful regard of their conquerors, and is a glorious chapter in the story of Spain. The Santiago events were most honorable to American arms, and it would lessen the splendor of the reputation of the American soldiers if one failed to do justice to the sturdy fighters they overcame. It is too early or too late for participation in the debates whether civil or acrimonious, as to the merits or faults of those engaged at Santiago, further than to quote that golden sentence from the report of Commodore Schley, that there was "glory enough to go around." We, whatever is said, remember what was done on those hills that have an everlasting place in history. There forever is to be application of marvelous propriety, of the mournful and noble lines of Kentucky's poet, Theodore O'Hara:
"On Fame's eternal camping ground
Their silent tents are spread,
And Glory guards with solemn round
The bivouac of the dead."
There was a speedy realization by the country, and all the intelligent peoples of the earth, when our troops were embarked for the Santiago campaign, that the crisis of the war was at hand. No American thought of failure. The only questions were as to the power of the defense of Cuba by Spain, and the cost to us in men and money to overcome the defenders. Those who knew the most about the conditions in Cuba had the least confidence in the efficiency of the Cuban Army. The only body of organized Cubans of importance was that under command of Garcia, and it was the province of which he was in partial occupation that we invaded in force. The public had been considerably interested and entertained by the rousing accounts of the various naval bombardments of Spanish shore fortresses. But the firing from our ships had not materially shaken the Spanish defenses. The sea power had not shattered the shore lines, but found abundant occupation in guarding transports and protecting the troops when landing. It would have been an act of the most gross imprudence and incompetency to have put an army ashore unless the supremacy of the navy on the sea was absolute. More than that, our own cities had to be assured that they were secure from attack. On the 31st of May orders were issued for the embarkation of the army of invasion as follows:
1. The Fifth Army Corps.
2. The Battalion of Engineers.
3. The detachment of the Signal Corps.
4. Five squadrons of cavalry, to be selected by the commanding general of the cavalry division, in accordance with instruction previously given.