CHAPTER VIII
Why We Hold the Philippines.
The Responsibility of Admiral Dewey—We Owe It to Ourselves to Hold
the Philippines—Prosperity Assured by Our Permanent Possession—The
Aguinaldo Question—Character Study of the Insurgent Leader—How
Affairs Would Adjust Themselves for Us—Congress Must Be Trusted to
Represent the People and Firmly Establish International Policy.
If Admiral Dewey, after obeying the order of the President to destroy the Spanish fleet at Manila, had steamed away and sought a station to get coal to drive him somewhere else, there would have been no Philippine question on the other side of the world from Washington City. The Admiral desired to keep open telegraphic communication, and made a proposition to that effect, but the Spanish authorities curtly refused. Then the cable was cut by order of the Admiral, a section removed, and both ends marked by buoys. Reflection caused the Spaniards to regret that they had not consented to keep open the cable, that it might be used under restrictions by both belligerents. They mentioned their change of mind, and were told they were too late. The American Admiral may have been apprehensive, and he had reason to be, that the Spaniards, knowing they would be crushed in the West Indies if they risked a decisive naval engagement there, might send all their available ships of war to the Philippines, and secure a superiority of force, possibly to destroy their enemies at Manila. It is clear now that this is what the Spaniards ought to have tried to do. The Americans were committed to the blockade of Cuba, occupying all the vessels of war they had at hand, and the whole fleet of Spain could have been in the Suez Canal, on the way to Manila when the movement was known to our navy department. Then Admiral Dewey would, of course, have been warned by way of Hong Kong and a dispatch boat, that he should put to sea and take care of his men and ships. The result might have been the temporary restoration of the Philippines to Spain. Our Admiral, six hundred miles from Hongkong, the closest cable connection, could not afford to leave Manila in direct communication with Madrid. It was for this reason and not that he desired to keep out of way or orders, as some able publicists have kindly promulgated, that the Admiral cut the cable.
The gravest of his responsibilities came upon him after his victory freed the harbor of declared enemies, and placed the great city at his mercy. If the Spaniards used their big Krupp guns against his ships, he could bombard the city and burn it. He held the keys to the Philippines, with Manila under his guns, and the question before him then was the same before the country now. The question that incessantly presses is, whether the Dewey policy is to be confirmed, and the logic of the stay in the harbor, and the dispatch of troops to take the town made good. We hold the keys of the Philippines. Shall we continue to do so? This question transcends in immediate importance—inevitable consequence—remote as well as near, all the war with Spain has raised. So broad a matter should not be rested on narrow grounds, nor decided with haste. It ought to be scrutinized in all its bearings, and all susceptibilities and material affairs regarded, for it will affect all the people for all time.
What are the Philippines? They are the richest prize of soil and climate that has been at hazard in the world for many years—one that would be seized, if it could be done without war, by any of the great nations other than our own without hesitation. The only scruple we need entertain, the sole reason for deliberation, is because it is a duty of the government to be sure when there are imperial considerations to be weighed, that the people should be consulted. It was on this account distinctly, that the President knew the issue of the permanency of the possession of the Philippines was one of peculiar novelty and magnitude, that he permitted it to exist. Spain must have been as acquiescent in this as in yielding the independence of Cuba, and the concession to us without any intermediate formality of Porto Rico. It is not inconsistent with the policy of magnanimity that is generally anticipated after the victory of a great power over a lesser one, that we should hold the Philippines. We have only to keep the power we have in peace, and let it work as a wholesome medicine, and all the islands of the group of which Manila is the central point, will be ours without conflict. In our system there is healing for wounds, and attraction for the oppressed. The holding of the islands by Spain would signify the continued shedding of blood, and drainage of the vital resources of the peninsula. As against Spain the Philippines will be united and desperate unto death, while they would without coercion walk hand in hand with us, and become the greatest of our dependencies—not states, but territories.
It would be an act of mercy to Spain to send her soldiers and priests from the Philippines, home. Even if we consent that she may keep her South Sea possession, she will lose it as she has all the rest, for the story of the Philippines is that of Spanish South and Central America, and the modern story of Cuba is the old one of all countries South and West of the Gulf of Mexico and around by way of the Oceans to Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Chili, and the rest had the same bloody stream of history to trace, and sooner or later the tale must all be told. Since Spain has already surrendered Cuba and Porto Rico, the record of the Philippines is the last chapter of her colonial experiences, by which she has dazzled and disgusted the world, attaining from the plunder of dependencies wealth that she invested in oppressive warfare to sustain a depraved despotism and display a grandeur that was unsound, sapping her own strength in colonial enterprises that could not be other than without profit, because the colonies were the property of the crown, and the prey of caste.
The Spanish nation was forbidden by their government, not of the people or for the people, to profit by the colonies, and the viceroys, the captain-generals, and the whole official class were corrupted, and inefficient in all things, except methods of tyranny to procure a harvest of gold and silver not from the mines of the metals alone, but from the industries, whatever they were. The people at large were allowed no share in their own earnings, beyond a subsistence so scanty that deep humiliation and grievous hardship were the fateful rewards of labor.
It was because the colonial policy of Spain impoverished and degraded the Spaniards at home, through the injustice, greed and profligacy of those abroad, that the huge structure, once so great an imposition upon mankind, a rotten fabric so gilt that the inherent weakness was disguised, has finally fallen into universal and irretrievable ruin.
It is well Spain should retain the Canaries and the Balearic group, for they are as Spanish as any peninsular province, and legitimately belong therefore to the kingdom. The application of this principle excludes Spain from the Philippines, and their des- [NOTE: gap in original] been committed by the failure of war to our hands. There is no nation that will dispute our peaceable possession of the Philippines. Any other nation's proprietorship will be challenged. Our authoritative presence in the islands will be a guarantee of peace. Any other assertion of supremacy will be the signal for war. Our assumption of sovereignty over the islands would quickly establish tranquility. Any other disposition of the burning questions now smoldering will cause an outburst of the flames of warfare. The Spaniards in Manila have been transient. They are not rooted in the soil. They all come and go like Captain-Generals, a mere official class, with the orders of the Church participating actively in secular concerns, more active as politicians than as teachers of religion. In the view of the native population it is as indispensable that the priests of Spain shall return to their native land as that the soldiers should go. The deportation of these people would remove classes of consumers and not affect unfavorably a productive industry, or the prosperity of a self-sustaining community, and there would be but rare instances of the severance of family ties.