If any Province is still under Spanish rule its Representative is to be appointed by the President. Congress is to deliberate on "all grave and transcendental questions, whose decision admits of delay and adjournment, but the President may decide questions of urgent character, giving the reasons for his decision in a message to Congress." The acts of Congress are not binding until approved by the President, and he has power of absolute veto.
Congress was to hold its first session at Saloles about September 28th.
While this scheme of Government is a pure despotism, yet it claims to be only temporary, and intended to "prepare the country so that a true Republic may be established." It also provides a rude form of governmental machinery for managing the affairs of the Provinces. To what extent it has actually gone into operation it is difficult to say. Aguinaldo claims, in his address of August 6th, that it is in force in fifteen Provinces, whose aggregate population is about 2,000,000. They include the island of Mindoro and about half of Luzon. None of those (except Cavite) have yet been visited by Americans, and all communication with them by the Spanish Government at Manila has been cut off since May 1st.
In the province of Cavite and that portion of the Province of Manila outside of the city and of its suburbs, which was occupied by the insurgent troops as well as those of the United States, their military forces, military headquarters, etc., were very much in evidence, occupying the principal houses and churches in every village and hamlet, but there were no signs of Civil Government or administration. It was reported, however, that Aguinaldo's agents were levying taxes or forced contributions not only in the outside villages, but (after we entered Manila) by means of secret agents, in the market places of the city itself. At Aguinaldo's headquarters, in Bacoor, there were signs of activity and business, and it was reported that his Cabinet officers were in constant session there.
Aguinaldo never himself failed to claim all the prerogatives due to his alleged position as the de facto ruler of the country. The only general officer who saw him or had any direct communication with him was General Anderson. He did much to thwart this officer in organizing a native wagon train and otherwise providing for his troops, and he went so far, in a letter of July 23d (copy herewith marked "J"), as to warn General Anderson not to land American troops on Philippine soil without his consent—a notice which, it is hardly necessary to say, was ignored. The day before the attack on Manila he sent staff officers to the same General, asking for our plans of attack, so that their troops could enter Manila with us. The same request had previously been made to me by one of his Brigade Commanders, to which I replied that I was not authorized to give the information desired.
Aguinaldo did not call upon General Merritt on his arrival, and this enabled the latter to avoid any communication with him, either direct or indirect, until after Manila had been taken. General Merritt then received one of Aguinaldo's staff officers in his office as Military Governor. The interview lasted more than an hour. General Merritt referred to his proclamation as showing the conditions under which the American troops had come to Manila and the nature of the Military Government, which would be maintained until further orders from Washington. He agreed upon the lines outside of the city of Manila, up to which the insurgent troops could come, but no further with arms in their hands. He asked for possession of the water works, which was given, and, while expressing our friendship and sympathy for the Philippine people, he stated very positively that the United States Government had placed at his disposal an ample force for carrying out his instructions, and even if the services of Aguinaldo's forces had been needed as allies he should not have felt at liberty to accept them.
The problem of how to deal with Aguinaldo's Government and troops will necessarily be accompanied with embarrassment and difficulty, and will require much tact and skill in its solution. The United States Government, through its Naval Commander, has, to some extent, made use of them for a distinct military purpose, viz.: to harass and annoy the Spanish troops, to wear them out in the trenches, to blockade Manila on the land side, and to do as much damage as possible to the Spanish Government prior to the arrival of our troops, and for this purpose the Admiral allowed them to take the arms and munitions which he had captured at Cavite, and their ships to pass in and out of Manila Bay in their expeditions against other Provinces. But the Admiral has been very careful to give Aguinaldo no assurances of recognition and no pledges or promises of any description. The services which Aguinaldo and his adherents rendered in preparing the way for attack on Manila are certainly entitled to consideration, but, after all, they were small in comparison with what was done by our fleet and army.
There is no reason to believe that Aguinaldo's Government has any elements of stability. In the first place, Aguinaldo is a young man of twenty-three years. Prior to the insurrection of 1896 he had been a schoolmaster, and afterward Gobernadorcillo and Municipal Captain in one of the pueblos in the Province of Cavite. He is not devoid of ability, and he is surrounded by clever writers. But the educated and intelligent Filipinos of Manila say that not only is he lacking in ability to be at the head of affairs, but if an election for President was held he would not even be a candidate. He is a successful leader of insurgents, has the confidence of young men in the country districts, prides himself on his military ability, and if a Republic could be established the post he would probably choose for himself would be General-in-Chief of the Army.
In the next place, Aguinaldo's Government, or any entirely independent Government, does not command the hearty support of the large body of Filipinos, both in Manila and outside, who have property, education and intelligence. Their hatred of the Spanish rule is very keen and they will co-operate with Aguinaldo or any one else to destroy it. But after that is done they fully realize that they must have the support of some strong nation for many years before they will be in a position to manage their own affairs alone. The nation to which they all turn is America, and their ideal is a Philippine Republic, under American protection—such as they have heard is to be granted to Cuba. But when it comes to defining their ideas of protection and the respective rights and duties of each under it, what portion of the Government is to be administered by them and what portion by us; how the revenues are to be collected, and in what proportion the expenses are to be divided; they have no clear ideas at all; nor is it expected that they should have, after generations of Spanish rule without any experience in self government. The sentiment of this class, the educated native with property at stake, looks upon the prospect of Aguinaldo's Government and forces entering Manila with almost as much dread as the foreign merchants or the Spaniards themselves.
Finally, it must be remembered that this is purely a Tagalo insurrection. There are upwards of thirty races in the Philippines, each speaking a different dialect, but five-sixths of the entire Christian population is composed of the Tagalos and Visayas. The former live in Mindoro and the southern half of Luzon, and the latter in Cebu, Iloilo and other islands in the center of the group. The Tagalos are more numerous than the Visayas, but both races are about equal in civilization, intelligence and wealth. It is claimed by Aguinaldo's partisans that the Visayas are in sympathy with his insurrection and intend to send representatives to the congress. But it is a fact that the Visayas have taken no active part in the present insurrection nor in that of 1896, that the Spanish Government is still in full control at Cebu and Iloilo, and in the Viscayas islands, and that Aguinaldo has as yet made no effort to attack them. The Visayas number nearly 2,000,000, or about as many as the population of all the Tagalo Provinces, which Aguinaldo claims to have captured. There is no evidence to show that they will support his pretensions, and many reasons to believe that on account of racial prejudices and jealousies and other causes they will oppose him.