"Shortly after the naval battle of Manila Bay, the principal leader of the insurgents, General Emilio Aguinaldo, came to Cavite from Hongkong, and, with the consent of our naval authorities, began active work in raising troops and pushing the Spaniards in the direction of the city of Manila. Having met with some success, and the natives flocking to his assistance, he proclaimed an independent government of republican form, with himself as president, and at the time of my arrival in the islands the entire edifice of executive and legislative departments and subdivision of territory for administration purposes had been accomplished, at least on paper, and the Filipinos held military possession of many points in the islands other than those in the vicinity of Manila.
"As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival, nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and stated that "the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants," I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority, in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs.
"For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city were pressed, and military operations conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent forces. The wisdom of this course was subsequently fully established by the fact that when the troops of my command carried the Spanish intrenchments, extending from the sea to the Pasay road on the extreme Spanish right, we were under no obligations, by prearranged plans of mutual attack, to turn to the right and clear the front still held against the insurgents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy the city and suburbs."
General Anderson was the first officer of the American army to arrive, and says Admiral Dewey gave him "every possible assistance," and favored him "with a clear statement of the situation." On the second day after he appeared at Cavite, which was one day after General Merritt's departure from San Francisco, he had "an interview with the insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, and learned from him that the Spanish forces had withdrawn, driven back by his army as he claimed, to a line of defense immediately around the city and its suburbs. He estimated the Spanish forces at about 14,000 men, and his own at about the same number. He did not seem pleased at the incoming of our land forces, hoping, as I believe, that he could take the city with his own army, with the co-operation of the American fleet.
"Believing that however successful the insurgents may have been in guerilla warfare against the Spaniards, that they could not carry their lines by assault or reduce the city by siege, and suspecting, further, that a hearty and effective co-operation could not be expected, I had at once a series of reconnaissances made to exactly locate the enemy's lines of defense and to ascertain their strength."
The date of the impression made on General Anderson's mind as to the displeasure of Aguinaldo is important. The insurgent chief would have preferred the military distinctions to have been reserved for himself. General Anderson says of the Spanish attacks on General Greene's lines:
"These conflicts began on the night of July 31, as soon as the enemy had realized that we had taken the places of the Filipinos, and began a system of earthworks to the front of their old line. It may have been merely coincident, but these attacks and sorties began at the time the Captain General of Manila was relieved by his second in command. For more than six weeks the insurgents had kept up a bickering infantry fire on the Spanish trenches, firing occasionally some old siege pieces captured by Admiral Dewey at Cavite and given to Aguinaldo. These combats were never serious, and the Spaniards, so far as I know, made no sorties upon them. But there is no doubt of the fact that the Spaniards attacked our lines with force and vindictiveness, until they were informed that the bringing on of a general engagement would lead to a bombardment of the city. After this there was for several days a tacit suspension of hostilities."
As to the situation of General Greene, Brigadier General Merritt says:
"The difficulty in gaining an avenue of approach to the Spanish line lay in the fact of my disinclination to ask General Aguinaldo to withdraw from the beach and the 'Calle Real,' so that Greene could move forward. This was overcome by instructions to General Greene to arrange, if possible, with the insurgent brigade commander in his immediate vicinity to move to the right and allow the American forces unobstructed control of the roads in their immediate front. No objection was made, and accordingly General Greene's brigade threw forward a heavy outpost line on the "Calle Real" and the beach and constructed a trench, in which a portion of the guns of the Utah batteries was placed.
"The Spanish, observing this activity on our part, made a very sharp attack with infantry and artillery on the night of July 31. The behavior of our troops during this night attack was all that could be desired, and I have, in cablegrams to the War Department, taken occasion to commend by name those, who deserve special mention for good conduct in the affair. Our position was extended and strengthened after this and resisted successfully repeated night attacks, our forces suffering, however, considerable loss in wounded and killed, while the losses of the enemy, owing to the darkness, could not be ascertained.