"Captain Grove and Lieutenant Means, of the First Colorado, had been particularly active in this work and fearless in penetrating beyond our lines and close to those of the enemy. As the time for attack approached, these officers made a careful examination of the ground between our trenches and Fort San Antonio de Abad, and, finally, on August 11, Major J. F. Bell, United States Volunteer Engineers, tested the creek in front of this fort and ascertained not only that it was fordable, but the exact width of the ford at the beach, and actually swam in the bay to a point from which he could examine the Spanish line from the rear. With the information thus obtained it was possible to plan the attack intelligently. The position assigned to my brigade extended from the beach to the small rice swamp, a front of about 700 yards.
"After the sharp skirmish on the second line of defense of the Spaniards, and after Greene's brigade moved through Malate, meeting a shuffling foe, the open space at the luneta, just south of the walled city, was reached about 1 p. m. A white flag was flying at the southwest bastion, and I rode forward to meet it under a heavy fire from our right and rear on the Paco road. At the bastion I was informed that officers representing General Merritt and Admiral Dewey were on their way ashore to receive the surrender, and I therefore turned east to the Paco road. The firing ceased at this time, and on reaching this road I found nearly 1,000 Spanish troops who had retreated from Santa Ana through Paco, and coming up the Paco road had been firing on our flank. I held the commanding officers, but ordered these troops to march into the walled city. At this point, the California regiment a short time before had met some insurgents who had fired at the Spaniards on the walls, and the latter in returning the fire had caused a loss in the California regiment of 1 killed and 2 wounded.
"My instructions were to march past the walled city on its surrender, cross the bridge, occupy the city on the north side of the Pasig, and protect lives and property there. While the white flag was flying on the walls yet, very sharp firing had just taken place outside, and there were from 5,000 to 6,000 men on the walls, with arms in their hands, only a few yards from us. I did not feel justified in leaving this force in my rear until the surrender was clearly established, and I therefore halted and assembled my force, prepared to force the gates if there was any more firing. The Eighteenth Infantry and First California were sent forward to hold the bridges a few yards ahead, but the second battalion, Third Artillery, First Nebraska, Tenth Pennsylvania, and First Colorado were all assembled at this point. While this was being done I received a note from Lieutenant-Colonel Whittier, of General Merritt's staff, written from the Captain-General's office within the walls, asking me to stop the firing outside, as negotiations for surrender were in progress."
And General Greene continues: "I then returned to the troops outside the walls and sent Captain Birkhimer's battalion of the Third Artillery down the Paco road to prevent any insurgents from entering. Feeling satisfied that there would be no attack from the Spanish troops lining the walls, I put the regiments in motion toward the bridges, brushing aside a considerable force of insurgents who had penetrated the city from the direction of Paco, and were in the main street with their flag expecting to march into the walled city and plant it on the walls. After crossing the bridges the Eighteenth United States Infantry was posted to patrol the principal streets near the bridge, the First California was sent up the Pasig to occupy Quiapo, San Miguel, and Malacanan, and with the First Nebraska I marched down the river to the Captain of the Port's office, where I ordered the Spanish flag hauled down and the American flag raised in its place."
The insurgents were disposed to disregard the white flag and the process of the capitulation, but "a considerable force" of them was "brushed aside." General Greene's losses before Manila were 16 killed and 66 wounded: his force 5,100. He remarks: "The resistance encountered on the 13th was much less than anticipated and planned for, but had the resistance been greater the result would have been the same, only the loss would have been greater. Fortunately, the great result of capturing this city, the seat of Spanish power in the East for more than three hundred years, was accomplished with a loss of life comparatively insignificant."
Captain T.B. Mott, detached from General Merritt's temporarily, served on General Greene's staff, and received this mention:
"In posting troops in the trenches, in making reconnaissances, in transmitting orders under fire, and in making reports, he has uniformly exhibited courage, military ability, and sound judgment, the qualities, in short, which are most valuable in a staff officer."
Captain Bates, Lieutenant Schieflie, and Captain D.F. Millet, artist and author, are praised for activity, intelligence and valuable service. Millet was with Greene before Plevna, during the Russo-Turkish campaign. Greene was appointed the senior member of the committee to arrange the terms of the capitulation.
General Anderson had instructions to extend his line to crowd the insurgents out of their trenches with their consent, but this was not attempted, for that would have brought on an engagement prematurely. Anderson had purchased wire-cutters with insulated handles in San Francisco, and they were useful! Anderson had his trenches with the insurgents. McArthur's division was before a "circulated line of earthworks faced with sand bags," and the problem of the advance was made difficult because "we could not be sure whether our first attack was to be tentative or serious, this depending on action of the navy; second, from our orders not to displace the insurgents without their consent from their position to the right of their guns on the Pasay road. This to the very last the insurgent leaders positively refused to give. Yet, if we could not go far enough to the right to silence their field guns and carry that part of their line, they would have a fatal cross fire on troops attacking blockhouse No. 14. I therefore directed General MacArthur to put the three 2.10 inch guns of Battery B, Utah Volunteer Artillery, in the emplacement of the insurgent gun and to place the Astor Battery behind a high garden wall to the right of the Pasay road, to be held there subject to orders.
"I assumed that when the action became hot at this point, as I knew it would be, that the insurgents would voluntarily fall back from their advanced position, and that the Astor Battery and its supports could take position without opposition."