CHAPTER XVI
No attempt having been made in April, the best time was expected to be between May 12th and May 19th, when the moon would be more or less full; but Harry decided not to wait in the event of conditions otherwise becoming suitable in the interim. The general idea throughout the whole of the waiting period was to make a start between 5 p.m. and 7 p.m. (Greenwich time). It was expected that the ocean would be crossed about nineteen hours later. If he was able to proceed to Brooklands according to his intention, Harry hoped to land there about 7 p.m. (Greenwich time), i.e., 8 p.m. summer time, on the day after the start.
Grieve decided to take half-hourly sights during the passage, and, if they arrived in time, smoke-bombs would be used for ascertaining the drift over the ocean and to indicate to ships the position of the aeroplane in case of emergency. The smoke-bombs were not expected to arrive before May 8th In the event of a mishap occurring at night a white parachute flare was to be used, not unlike the flares used by the Zeppelins over London, and visible for miles. The white flare was to be fired at once if the engine failed or if a forced descent from any other cause were necessary. But the white flare or a wireless “S.O.S.” was only to be used in an emergency when the need for help was very urgent. A red flare was to be used for opening up communication with a ship.
In an article on “Temperament,” published in The Morning Post on Friday, April 25th, 1919, Mr. H. Massac Buist wrote:
“Mechanical achievement has been pushed to such a pitch that endurance on the part of pilot and crew is now demanded in the highest possible degree, whereas many a brilliant aerial performance that has attracted world-wide attention in the past has made the maximum demands on nerve, but practically none at all on sheer physical endurance, as instance looping-the-loop and suchlike feats. Even in the war the average flight did not try the physical endurance of the pilot in any high degree, the strain being instead on the nerve. Of course, the requirements of the Service occasionally called for prolonged efforts, but if all the flights made from the start to the finish of the campaign are considered it will be found that the vast majority occupied less than four hours. In the Transatlantic enterprise, however, we have no competitor whose calculated speed would enable him to make the aerial journey in less than 19½ hours under the most favourable conditions.
“The Best Preparation.
“Yet it is not a matter of mere endurance, because the longest over-water flight so far projected will be attempted in most cases with machines not designed to alight on the water. In other words, on setting out, each pilot will know that his life depends on nothing less than absolute success, and is almost certainly forfeit if anything goes wrong. That realisation represents the equivalent of the strain of flying in war service, while the duration of the effort is the multiplication of the strain. But the Transatlantic enterprise will differ from war service in that the pilot himself will order himself to start, whereas in war, no matter what betide, the individual has always a realisation that a power outside himself has determined his destiny and taken responsibility off him by giving him his orders, therefore the issue is on the knees of the gods.
“Such qualifications afford the additional confidence that comes of resource. One does not, of course, mean merely that the pilot helps to rig the machine—all Service pilots are trained to that extent—or that he touches ignition or throttle lever while the engine is running through a bench test; instead, one means that the pilot one would naturally look to successfully to perform a feat of this sort, other things being equal, is a man like Harry Hawker and Sidney Pickles, who year after year before there was a war, through the war, and after it, takes a hand in the building of the experimental machines of the firm employing him and puts them through all their tests, as well as the standard products of the given firm—work which, regarded in all its phases, represents taking as big risks per annum in peace time as are taken by any soldier in war service, since in an experimental stage none can really foretell what is going to happen when the first of a new type aircraft is taken into the air.