In the Fateh námeh it is said, that when it was known that the Ottomans were collecting troops on the frontiers, and marching towards Agria, an army of 300,000 men levied by the kings of Vienna and Spain, by the Pope, and the ruler of Transylvania, in short by the seven European monarchs, assembled also in the vicinity of Agria. This mighty host was furnished with one hundred pieces of ordnance, and with every kind of military apparatus. Its object was, so soon as the Moslem army was fairly engaged in carrying on the siege of Agria, suddenly to surround their camp, and cut them to pieces. The fate of Agria, however, reached them before they found an opportunity of accomplishing their object, and caused them to alter their manœuvres. They retreated two stages, but it was only with the view of deceiving. Their real purpose was, when they found the Moslem army had retired from Agria, to return with all their force and retake it: but the Moslems, who were informed of their movements, as well as of their purposes, resolved on anticipating them on their own ground.
Maximillian being lame and afflicted with blindness, the crown was conferred on his brother, Duke Matthias, and with it the whole command of the army. It is related in some history, that after the Duke and the ruler of Hungary had united in their hostility against the Osmánlís, they debated over their cups about the propriety of attacking the Moslem camp. Other histories say, however, that it was the Austrian minister to whom the joint command was given.
Ja’fer Páshá sent with a body of Troops to surprise the Enemy.
After it had been fully ascertained what the enemy meditated to do, Ja’fer Páshá, one of the most illustrious vezírs, and an eunuch, was dispatched with a chosen body of various troops to surprise the enemy in their strong-hold. Ja’fer Páshá, on leaving the camp, began to reflect what the issue of the expedition on which he was sent might be, and therefore sent out spies, who brought him intelligence with regard to the numerical force of the enemy, which was immense. Ja’fer Páshá, on receiving the above intelligence, sent word to his Majesty that his offering to contend with such a vast multitude with so small a force as he possessed, could only terminate in disgrace and ruin. For his own part, he said, the thought of his own life gave him no concern, and that at all times he was ready to sacrifice it, when necessary, for the honour and glory of the Mohammedan Faith: to proceed to the assault, therefore, under such circumstances, could not fail, as he had before observed, to throw disparagement on the Supreme authority: the great men in the camp however said, that this story was a mere pretence; and, in order to remove it, proposed sending the governor of Romeili with his Romeilian troops to his assistance. This proposal was accompanied by bitter reproach, and of course was very discouraging; yet Ja’fer Páshá, notwithstanding all this untoward aspect of things, attempted to face the enemy with the forces he had. After having girded on his arms he divided his artillery into two divisions, and having rescued his men out of the mud into which they had sunk, conducted the whole to a secure spot, but from which the enemy could not yet be observed. It was not long however before they began, like black mountains, to make their appearance, and seemed as if they covered the whole surface of the plains of Mehaj. Ja’fer Páshá, with a select body of borderers, ascended an eminence in order to get a view of the enemy’s camp, which had the appearance of an extended sea, whose raging billows beat against the shore. Though the troops of Ja’fer Páshá amounted only to three thousand, he resolved, few in comparison though they were, to attempt something, and prepared to engage some of these iron-cased infidels. They on perceiving his boldness dashed towards his standard and knocked it down. The contest became general. Ja’fer himself fought most desperately, though almost up to the breast in mud and water; and continued thus to show his bravery, till all who were about him either perished or fled from the contest, and he himself was nearly taken prisoner: such was the heroic boldness which this brave man evinced on this occasion of unequal battle. Several of the ághás came up to him and begged him on bended knees to retreat. “It was no bravery,” they observed, “for a handful of men to contend with a host; it was not necessary, in order to escape the reproach of the enemy, to throw one’s self into utter ruin and destruction: it was impossible for a small number of men, however valiant they might be, and where there was not one to a thousand, either to resist such a vast multitude as that with which they then contended, or even to make an impression upon it. Return,” they still continued, “return to the Moslem camp, and do not be the cause of the destruction of troops whom no one will blame. Such conduct can never advance the general interest.” This exhortation had not the desired effect on the mind of the valorous chief. It was night before he consented to yield to their entreaties. One Ahmed, in consequence of the darkness of the night, led his horse to the gates of Agria. The whole of his ordnance and heavy baggage fell into the hands of the enemy. About thirty or forty of the men perished; and had not night come on, not one of those who had entered the lists with the iron-cased soldiery would have escaped alive. Their retreat was however marvellously quick, for they performed in one night a journey of three days.
The emperor, on receiving intelligence of the above disaster, which was now become public, was displeased with Ja’fer, reprimanded him for his adventurous mode of attack, which ought to have been made during the night, deposed him from all his offices, and granted his principality to Mohammed Páshá, Sinán Páshá’s son.
On the morning after the disaster above described took place, the grand vezír, the reverend prelate, Sa’d-ud-dín, the vezírs and other magnates assembled in the royal pavilion, in order to take into grave consideration the propriety of giving the enemy battle or not. In this august assembly most of the grandees opposed the experiment of offering the enemy battle. The excellent and reverend Sa’d-ud-dín, however, formed an exception. He rose and addressed the assembly in the following heroic speech: “Doubtless, it is right,” said he, “to give battle to the enemy of our religion and perish to a man, rather than suffer their insult to pass unnoticed and with impunity: for should they perceive any unwillingness on our part to meet, or if they see us begin to retrace our steps, then most assuredly they will attack us. To act in this way, would be like alluring a bird into a gin. More especially,” continued he, raising his voice, “was it ever heard that an emperor of the Ottomans turned away his face from danger!” And even after the members who composed this council entered the royal apartment, he continued to express the same sentiments and with the same freedom—and again added: “the situation in which this fortress (Agria) is situated, is far from being favourable to our engaging with them in so narrow a space. Should they, for instance, succeed in placing their artillery on the surrounding hills, we shall find it hard work to resist them. The plains where the enemy now lies encamped afford ample space for performing heroic exploits: thither let us march. This is the first and only thing which ought to be attended to. We must attack them and not they us.” So much for the reverend prelate. The bold and heroic speech of the veteran priest made a deep impression on the heart of his royal master, and awakened within him that innate bravery which he had inherited from his ancestors.
It was proposed by some in the assembly, that Hasan Páshá, the válí of Romeili, should be appointed to conduct the next attack. This was opposed. To conduct so important an expedition as the one now contemplated, it was absolutely requisite, not only that the whole of the army should be called into requisition, but that the emperor himself should be its conductor. This last proposition met with the royal approval, when the discussion, of course, came to an end. The Reïs Effendí immediately sent off dispatches to Sultán Fateh Gheráí, brother to the Tátár khán, in which he instructed him to be on the look-out for such stragglers as might chance to fall in his way.
After the above-mentioned assembly or council broke up, the grand vezír Ibrahím Páshá entered into the fortress, and made a selection of such pieces of ordnance as could most easily be made use of in the approaching conflict. Among other arrangements which the grand vezír attended to, he appointed Súfí Sinán Páshá and Lála Mohammed Páshá, governor of Anatolia, with his provincial troops, to take charge of the garrison or rather fortress of Agria. Towards evening he returned to the emperor’s pavilion, when a note from the reverend prelate was put into his hand; it imported, that if the Anatolian troops were to occupy the fortress of Agria, his majesty, when he entered the field of battle in consequence of this arrangement, would necessarily be defenceless on one side. “This,” said the sagacious prelate, “is a dangerous thing. If the enemy should even attempt to get possession of Agria, its present garrison is sufficiently able to hold out till succours can be sent to them. From the garrison, in the day of battle, no aid can be expected. It is therefore proper that the troops of Anatolia, according to ancient custom, be appointed to form the right wing.” Lála Mohammed Páshá was, accordingly, ordered to be in readiness with the troops under his command.
After having made a distribution of provisions to those employed in repairing the breaches and appointed to garrison the fortress, many of whom were very ill off, the zealous, the orthodox army stood fully prepared to take the field.