EVENTS of the Year 1014, II.
It having been considered of the last importance to ascertain the actual state of the Hungarian frontiers, Mohammed Páshá was granted full power over the troops, and to employ them in any way he thought proper. It was also the emperor’s declared determination and wish that Osterghún should be reconquered from the enemy if possible. With this view Hasan Aghá, Tarnákjí’s brother, and ághá of the janissaries, was appointed to proceed with a large body of janissaries to Belgrade, and afterwards join the commander-in-chief at Buda. This body of troops left Constantinople on the 27th of Dhu’l hijja, and halted at Dávud Páshá for the purpose of making some further arrangements for the journey. Abdul Bákí Effendí was appointed treasurer to the army; Etmekjí Zádeh had been sent to Romeili to collect the taxes; Súfí Sinán Páshá having been in full power, and deputy of the Sublime Porte, sent Dávud Páshá to command the garrison of Kostamúní; and Nesúh Páshá was made commander in Anatolia, and appointed to protect the Ottoman boundaries in that quarter.
Hasan Aghá, after having remained a week at Dávud Páshá, recommenced his march towards Belgrade, which place he reached about the latter end of the month Sefer. Having refreshed his troops and attended to the other necessary preparations for prosecuting his march to Buda, he left Belgrade and passed the plains of Zimún for that fortress on the 4th of Rabia II. The whole army assembled at Usk, where a council of war was held. The commander-in-chief proposed for the consultation of the counsellors, what measure ought first to be adopted for securing the desired success? The borderers and several of the chiefs of the army thought it was by all means most advisable to proceed directly to Buda and Alba Julia, and check the progress of the enemy in those quarters, or at least protect them against any assault which the enemy might threaten. Information had already arrived, they said, which fully announced the threatening aspect the enemy was assuming with regard to both these places. The enemy, they were aware, was making every preparation in Komran for renewing hostilities, and already had acquired some success. It was their imperative duty, continued the speakers, to march immediately to Buda and Alba Julia, and protect these places against the enemy of their country and of their faith. Such were the arguments employed on one side of the question. Others, however, opposed them, and argued differently. They, in the weakness of their judgment, maintained that Buda and Alba Julia were places of strength, and well furnished with the means of self-defence; so much so, indeed, they said, that the enemy had given up all hope of succeeding against them. These two places, the objects of so much concern and anxiety, therefore, might very well, and without any danger, they maintained, be left to their own resources. But there is Mekamúriah, said these trifling advocates. It presented a fine field for enriching the army: the inhabitants were in a state of quietness, and no way in a capacity to offer resistance: they were rich. Let, therefore, the army, reiterated these orators, march into Mekamúriah without delay.
This motion was vigorously opposed by the opposite party, and many arguments were adduced to show the danger that would arise if adopted and acted upon: but the majority of the council was in favour of it; and for no other reason, but that it promised to satisfy their thirst for wealth. The commander-in-chief yielded to the majority, ordered the janissaries to proceed towards Kaniza, not very distant from which lay the country of Mekamúriah, and resolved on following them, on the next day, with the body of the grand army acting under his command.
Having given his orders he waited on the venerable cazí who accompanied the camp, Ahmed Effendí, and informed him of the resolution the council had adopted, and requested him to give his opinion. The reverend prelate expressed, in no unmeasured terms, his entire disapprobation of that resolution. “It is no mark of sound judgment,” said the venerable man, “to adopt a method which leaves in our rear the enemy watching our movements, whilst we are pursuing an uncertain object from motives of ambition. Moreover, it is entirely contrary to the will of the emperor, who expressly declared that it was his utmost wish that we should, in the first instance, attempt the reduction of Osterghún. Having had, therefore, the emperor’s mind on the subject, it is as clear as day that nothing could be more improper than to pursue the plan which has been adopted, and, in part, acted upon. If, in prosecuting your present plan, so much as one village belonging to the Ottoman empire should fall into the hands of the enemy, you will find yourself at a loss to give any satisfactory answer when you happen to be interrogated on that point. I would observe, moreover, that only about eighty days remain for continuing this campaign, and that should you, in pursuance of the resolution of the council, follow the course which promises to enrich the soldiery, no less than twenty or thirty days will be necessary for this purpose. The soldiery, bent on acquiring spoil, will pay no regard to your commands when once they are let loose after plunder. They will become disunited and scattered; neither can you expect that this year you will ever induce them again to act as a regular military force. If, in these circumstances, the enemy should commence their hostile movements, with whom, let me ask you, will you march to meet them? What preparations can you effect? What aid can you command? Now, however, that you have time and troops at command, turn your thoughts towards Osterghún, and endeavour at least to fulfil the emperor’s express desire. If you attend to this advice, though you should even fail in the attempt, you are sure to escape reproach.” The clear and cogent mode of the worthy prelate’s reasoning made a very deep impression on the mind of the commanding general; in short, he was like one awakened from sleep. The arguments of the priest carried irresistible conviction, and the general was no longer in doubt as to the line of conduct he ought to pursue. He immediately resolved on proceeding to Buda, countermanded the march of the janissaries, who by that time had marched a stage on their way towards Kaniza, and made arrangements for laying siege to Osterghún.
The reverend priest acted in the transactions we have alluded to without the least fear of blame or reproach. His open and manly conduct, so utterly void of any thing like hypocrisy, was such as threw a glory and dignity around his sacred office and character, and secured him the high approbation of the vezír himself, and all others. Petcheví relates this account somewhat differently, and Káteb Chelebí, in his Fezliké, confirms his view of the matter, but it is of no importance to show wherein the two accounts differ.
The commanding general having resolved, as we have seen, on laying siege to Osterghún, the army commenced its march towards that place. The beglerbeg of Bosnia, with the troops under his command, was ordered forward to Buda. Twenty-five pieces of artillery, thirty thousand balls, ten thousand talents of gunpowder and other ammunition were transported in boats towards the place which was soon destined to become the scene of action and of blood. The spáhís and janissaries, on reaching the plains of Mehaj, were all furnished with the weapons peculiar to each, and about the middle of Rabia II. the Moslem camp was pitched in the vicinity of Osterghún. On the same day, also, on which they had pitched their tents every disposition for commencing hostilities was quickly and promptly attended to. On one side of Osterghún was a high hill whereon stood a considerable castle; and it being probable that a secret way from it to the city might be discovered, by which much mischief to the besiegers might be avoided, Mustafa Páshá, beglerbeg of Buda, was ordered, with a body of troops, to assault this fortress or castle, called Dipadilin, which he did on all sides. Jegirdilin, another fortress or castle, in connection with Osterghún, and with which the Moslems had become well acquainted in a former siege, was also subjected to the operations of war. Vishégrade, situate somewhere on the Danube between Osterghún and Wáj, and which could easily prevent provisions or stores being transported by water to the aid of the Moslem army, was, after a short siege, allowed to capitulate. Khádem Khosrú Páshá, the beglerbeg of Bosnia, who commanded at the siege of Vishégrade, found the garrison was composed of those Franks whom the Pope had sent in aid of the Germans, as formerly mentioned, and who had been distributed into the different forts in the hands of the Austrians. Like their brethren, the Franks at Alba Julia, they entered voluntarily, and on similar terms, the service of the grand sultán. At the commencement of the siege their number amounted to more than a thousand, but most of them perished before they had agreed to capitulate.
We now return to Dipadilin. Vishégrade having been disposed of in the way now related, part of Khosrú Páshá’s troops, and the Franks above-mentioned, were sent to join the troops employed under the beglerbeg of Buda against Dipadilin. This augmentation of force so terrified the besieged that they became discouraged; but the hearts and hands of the Moslems were so mightily strengthened by it, that on the 6th of Jemadi II., the sixth day of the siege, after the hour of morning devotions, they fired off three large guns, and all at once rushed forward to a general assault. It so happened, by the providence of God, that the morning was very dark and hazy; so much so, indeed, that objects could hardly be seen at the shortest distance; and thus the Moslems entered the place before they were discovered. Not only this place, but, in short, every other between it and Osterghún, in the short space of this one day, fell into the hands of the Moslem conquerors. Not one of the infidels in any of these different places escaped with his life: more than four thousand, it was said, perished. The count, who commanded in Osterghún, came forth to stimulate and encourage the infidels to oppose the Moslems, but he never returned: his body was found among the slain. A number of troops, and a quantity of provisions and other stores, which had been advancing by the Danube to the aid of the Moslems, but which, on account of the infidels in Vishégrade, were hindered from reaching their destination, were at once, by the fall of that place, allowed to proceed. The troops on board, having received intimation from the commander who carried on the siege of Vishégrade, disembarked, took up their quarters in a small island, attacked those of the enemy who had been employed in menacing them whenever they offered to sail forward, and slew about two hundred of them. These and the other troops now joined their brethren who were set down before Osterghún itself, the downfall of which was the principal object in the Moslem army’s taking the field this year.