National character

by N. C. Burt

Being called together by our civil authorities, and that to recognize the hand of God over us as a people, the occasion is suitable for considering the general subject of National Character, and in connection with it, the duties and destinies of our own nation.

What now, to begin at the beginning, is the proper idea of a nation? The idea is a complex one, involving, to a greater or less extent, the ideas of community of birth, community of language, occupation of the same territory, citizenship under the same government.

The word nation signifies a body of men descended from the same progenitor,—those having community of birth. We may, from the sense of the word, call the Jews a nation, though using a diversity of languages, and though scattered over the earth, without distinct territory or separate government.

Community of language commonly follows upon community of birth. Yet community of language does not of itself determine or secure nationality. The English and ourselves speak the same language, yet are distinct nations. The Swiss are one nation, yet speak some of them French, others German, others Italian.

Occupation of the same territory is not essential to nationality. Not only may a nation be scattered,—its parts dwelling in several lands,—as in the case of the Jews, but a nation may migrate in a body and preserve its national character in transit, or it may have no fixed territorial abode whatever. The Tartars and the Arabs are nations ever in motion, and held but the most loosely by any tenure of soil.

And even citizenship under the same government, does not of itself exhaust the idea of a nation. Russia may be said to include many nations under her sway.

Yet the ideas of race, language, country and government, all enter into, and with greater or less distinctness, and to a greater or less extent, constitute the general idea of a nation. The French have in general the same origin: they speak the same language: they possess a definite territory: they live under one government. They are of Gallic origin: we call their language French: their home is France: they are the subjects of Napoleon.

These several ideas of a nation do not, however, seem to be equally essential. It is in the idea of Government, the idea of the State, in which an associated body of men rises to view as a personality, and as a sovereign power, clothed with divine privileges and prerogatives, subsisting for high moral ends, dispensing justice amongst its own citizens in the name of God, and treating with other States as responsible persons like itself, with whom it dwells as in a family of nations to possess the earth;—it is in this idea that the ideas of community of origin and of language, and occupation of the same territory, merge themselves as subordinate or accidental, and that our view of a nation is most satisfactory and complete.

The functions of supreme government are rarely exercised over a very small body of men. And nations need to be of some magnitude to realize the benefits of national existence. A nation, just in virtue of its national constitution, is in a measure separated from the rest of mankind. It has an existence by itself. It ought, then, to have a completeness in itself. It should be made up of so many and such variety of parts, that these parts in their inter-action, may produce a sufficient life. Its classes of citizens and their occupations, should be so diversified and numerous, that in the mutual dependence and support, the highest possible benefit may result. Size has to do materially with the idea of a nation. This, indeed, makes all the difference between a family and a nation, if only sovereign prerogatives be conceded to the family, as was done in patriarchal times. It is in the life of the State rather than that of the family, that we have civilization. The very word civilization implies this—civis, being a citizen, and civitas, a State.

The importance of national relations may be seen in the consideration of the nature of history. What is history? Is it a collection of the biographies of individual men? We do not, as a fact, give to such collection the name of history. History has been called "the biography of society." But of society founded upon what basis, working by what agencies, involving what interests, proposing what ends? Not surely voluntary associations, formed for the promotion of the arts, or commerce, or philosophy, or benevolent undertakings. Such associations are too limited in the numbers which belong to them, too narrow and partial in the ends they propose and the means they use, to justify us in calling their biography history. We must find a society which, as nearly as possible, shall comprehend in its members the entire human race, command in its workings all human energies, involve in its consideration all human interests; the biography of such a society we may call history. Such a society we find in the State. And it is because the whole human race is gathered into nations; it is because the State proposes as its true object the highest good of all its citizens; and especially is it because the State as a sovereign power, not only holds the persons and property of its citizens at its disposal, but deals with its citizens and with all mankind as moral beings, and as itself a moral person responsible to God,—being a sovereign only as his minister;—it is because of all this, that we give the name history to the biography of nations rather than to that of any other society. And the idea of history generally accepted is this,—it is a record of the changes which come over the aspect and fortunes of nations, in their self-development and their mutual intercourse.[A]