A serious conflict broke out between England and Greece, and consequently in England itself, in 1850. The cause was Lord Palmerston’s quarrel with the Greek Government, which had failed to protect Don David Pacifico (1784–1854), a Gibraltar Jew and a British subject, from the violence of the Athenian mob. The British fleet, under Admiral Sir William Parker (1817–1866), was ordered to the Piræus and seized a number of Greek ships to enforce compensation. A vote of censure upon this high-handed proceeding was moved and carried by Lord Stanley[¹] (1775–1851) in the House of Lords. The majority against the Government was thirty-seven. In the House of Commons Mr. J. A. Roebuck (1801–1879) moved a counter-resolution, expressing confidence in the Government, and Lord Palmerston defended himself in a speech five hours long. He uttered upon that occasion the celebrated phrase “Civis Romanus sum,” and declared that, wherever a British subject might be, the watching eye and the strong arm of England would protect him.
[¹] Edward (Smith-Stanley), Baron Stanley of Brokestaffe (1832–1851), thirteenth Earl of Derby, K.G. (1834–1851).
Gladstone, on the other side, pointed out the dangers of this policy. “What, sir,” he asked, “was a Roman citizen? He was the member of a privileged class; he belonged to a conquering race, to a nation that held all others bound down by the strong arm of power. For him there was to be an exceptional system of law, for him principles were to be asserted, and by him rights were to be enjoyed that were denied to the rest of the world. Is such the view of the noble lord as to the relation which is to subsist between England and other countries?”
Such, at all events, was the view of the House of Commons, for Mr. Roebuck’s motion was carried by a majority of forty-six. However, on both sides of the controversy, protection was considered as an obligation involving great and far-reaching responsibilities. This conflict gives us an idea of the difficulties with which the question of the protection of the Jews in the Ottoman Empire was beset.
At the conclusion of this memorable debate, which took place on June 24th, 1850, [Sir Robert] Peel [Bart.] (1788–1850), in a brief speech of singular eloquence and wisdom, expressed his “reluctant dissent” from the motion, and uttered his final caution against perverting diplomacy, “the great engine used by civilized society for the purpose of maintaining peace, into a cause of hostility and war.”
Needless to say, the Opposition had no intention whatever of blaming the Government for undertaking the protection of the Jews. There was only a difference of attitude, not one of principle, between the Palmerston Government and the Opposition. The Opposition became alarmed about the dangerous consequences which they thought likely to result from certain steps taken by the Government; the Government, on the other hand, had to consider carefully every new scheme of protection for the Jews, particularly after the conflict with Greece in the Don Pacifico case.
Reviewing the whole period and all the petitions, projects and experiments in connection with the colonization of Palestine by Jews, we see that Great Britain’s protection was considered a “conditio sine qua non” for their success—at least as far as English Jews were interested in the movement. It is the same idea which modern Zionism expressed half a century later in the Basle Programme (1897) by demanding the consent of the Powers in the form of a legal guarantee or public recognition. The formula was different; but the fundamental idea is the same. It means security. The “Civis Romanus” system of Palmerston, a Government which sends a fleet to demand satisfaction for one protected Jew, was justly considered a sufficiently reliable guarantee of security. It is therefore quite clear that when the opponents of modern Zionism half a century later endeavoured to draw a line between the old schemes and efforts on the one hand, and political Zionism on the other, apparently approving of the former and anathematizing the latter, they were merely playing with words, and had no notion of the real facts.
Why did the plans for the Restoration of the Jews to Palestine remain unfulfilled? Was it through political changes, for want of preparation, or through the absence of adequate organization on the part of the Jewish people? It is not our business to criticize the past. Let us deal instead with the further development of the idea, which in fact was never dropped, but, on the contrary, continually gained ground.
In 1844 it was proposed to encourage the settlement of the Jews in Palestine by giving them employment on the land. Lady Montefiore writes in her journal:—
“General satisfaction was expressed at the suggestion of a plan which might enable them to obtain an honourable independence. Energy and talent, they said, existed. Nothing was needed but protection and encouragement.” In another letter, referring to the same subject, she writes:—“Our high-spirited nationality, under a judiciously exercised protectorate, might be assisted to work out, in due time, its own civilization, and to become a flourishing autonomous community with an extending commerce.”[¹]