The book is a careful compilation, skilfully put together and well chosen in every part. Though somewhat florid in certain portions, it is on the whole excellently written. Its style reminds one of that of Abrabanel, with a touch of R. Isaac (1402?–1494) ben Moses Arama. The author often quotes poetical sentences of Solomon (1021?–1058) ben Judah Ibn Gabirol [Abu Ayyub Sulaiman Ibn Yahya Ibn Jabirul], known as Avicebron: R. Jedaiah (1270?–1340?) ben Abraham Bedersi [Bedaresi].[¹] Kalonymos (1286–post 1328) ben Kalonymos ben Meir [Maestro Calo]; Zerahiah (1131?–1186?) ben Isaac Ha’levi Gerondi, and others, and thus shows himself well versed not only in the ancient texts, but also in the beauties of comparatively recent Hebrew poetry.
[¹] He quotes Bedersi also in De Termino Vitae: “Quando aspicis coelum, quod supra te est”—with the Hebrew original (p. 17).
Manasseh’s argument aims at proving that the immortality of the soul is an old Biblical as well as a Talmudical, Rabbinical and Cabbalistic principle. He defines the Nefesh (Soul) as the internal ultimate principle by which man thinks, feels and wills. The term Ruach (Mind) denotes this principle as the subject of man’s conscious state, while Nefesh denotes it as the source of man’s physical activities as well. The question of the reality of the soul and its separate existence apart from the body is for him one of the most important problems of religion, for with it is bound up the doctrine of a future life. He knows Plato (427?–347? b.c.e.), Aristotle (384 –322 b.c.e.) and Philo (20? b.c.e.–post 40 c.e.). It is well known that Mysticism shares to a great extent the ideas of the system of Plato, e.g. in his theory of the world of ideas, of the origin of the world-soul and the human soul. The two standpoints, the cosmological and the epistemological, are found combined in Plato. In the Phædo the chief argument for the immortality of the soul is based on the nature of intellectual knowledge interpreted by the theory of memory; this of course implies the pre-existence of the soul. This doctrine developed into an extreme Transcendentalism. Aristotle, on the other hand, emphasized the intimacy of the union of body and soul. The difficulty in his theory is to determine what degree of distinctness or separateness from the matter of the body is to be conceded to the human soul. He fully recognizes the spiritual element in thought, and describes the “active intellect” as separate, but the precise relation of this “active intellect” to the individual mind was an obscure point in his theory. Philo combined the Platonic theory with the data of the Bible, and taught that every man, by freeing himself from matter and receiving illumination from God, may reach the mystic, ecstatic or prophetic state, where he is absorbed in the Divinity. The Stoics taught that all existence is material, and described the soul as a breath pervading the body. They also called it Divine, a particle of God. Manasseh’s system is a syncretism of the ideas of Plato, Philo and the Stoics, while he rejects the Aristotelian ideas. He endeavours to prove that Moses Maimonides (1135–1204) did not follow the great Peripatetic, and opposes the commentator of Maimonides’ Moreh-Nebuchim Moses (fl. 14th cent.) ben Joshua Narboni [Mestre Vidal], in a somewhat forced dialectical manner.
Accepting on these grounds the pre-existence of the soul, the continuance of the soul in the world to come, and reincarnation, he comes to the Cabbalah, quotes the Zohar, and declares himself a disciple of R. Isaac Luria. According to the Zohar, man is composed of three things: Life, or Nefesh, Spirit, which is Ruach, and Soul, which is Neshamah. By this man becomes a Ruach Chajah (Living Spirit).[¹] Manasseh’s doctrine may be summarized as follows:—
[¹] See p. 157, The Secret Doctrine in Israel, by A. E. Waite, 1913.
(1) The human soul is endowed with special gifts fitting it for an intimate union with the Divinity—the Stoic “particle of God,” corresponding to the Hebrew “Chelek Eloha Mimaal”;
(2) The gifts or graces through which every man is equipped for his perfection form his Life, Spirit and Soul into an organized whole, whose parts are knit together;
(3) Through contemplation and piety the human soul enters into that higher heavenly soul, into the mystical cosmos whose parts are united in divine eternity. This is, to his mind, the meaning of the Biblical teaching that man is made in the image and likeness of God.
The Cabbalistic ideas once accepted, Manasseh accepts also the transmigration of souls, physical resurrection, expelling of demons, and so on. He indulges in theosophical visions and metaphysical speculations. All these seem strange from a modern point of view, but he should be considered in the light of his time. He believed in miracles. Did not the Fathers of the Christian Church believe in them? Origen (185?–253(4)) says that he has seen examples of demons expelled.[¹] St. Athanasius (293–373) writes in the Life of St. Anthony (251(2)–356(7)) from what he himself saw and heard from one who had long been in attendance on the saint. Justin Martyr (100?–163–7), in his second apology to the Roman Senate appeals to miracles wrought in Rome and well attested. Tertullian (155?–222?) challenges the heathen magistrates to work the miracles which the Christians perform[²]; St. Augustine (354–430) gives a long list of extraordinary miracles wrought before his own eyes, mentioning names and particulars. And even in the time of the Reformation, did not Johann von Reuchlin (1455–1522) adhere to Cabbalistic mysticism in his De arte cabalistias and De verbo mirifico? Paradoxical as it may seem at first sight, Manasseh even in his metaphysical beliefs was somewhat of a rationalist, in the sense that he accepted only evidence of trustworthy authority. The Safed authorities, who were supposed to have witnessed the miracles of Luria, of course impressed him in the same way as Montezinos’ reports, because they were in harmony with his theory. At any rate, it is characteristic of his way of thinking that he was anxious to build upon facts and evidence.
[¹] c. Celsum, i. 2.