Bonaparte’s idea was simple and his intentions were sincere. He regarded the Jews—particularly those living in Asia and Africa—as a nation, and as having indisputable historical claims on the Holy Land and Jerusalem. He was sure that they would help him and hail his victory as a happy triumph[¹] if they knew that their national ideal was to be realized and “ancient Jerusalem” to be restored to its “pristine splendour.” Was this not the same policy which he applied in later years in his relations with the small nationalities in Europe?
[¹] In an Order, in which he confirms the prerogatives of the Monks of the Mount Sinai convent, he refers to the Jews.
Au Caire, le 29 frimaire au 7 (19 décembre, 1798).
Bonaparte, général en chef, voulant favoriser le convent du mont Sinai: ... 2º Par respect pour Moise et le nation juive, dont la cosmogonie nous retrace les âgres les plus reculés; ... Bonaparte.
(Correspondance inédite officielle et confidentielle de Napoléon Bonaparte ... Egypte. Tome Deuxième. Paris ... M.DCCC.XIX. p. 179.)
In another Appeal, Bonaparte ordered his troops to treat the natives with tolerance: “Agissez avec eux comme vous avez agi avec les Juifs, les Italiens; ayez des égards pour leur mufti et leurs imams, comme vous en avez eu pour les rabbins et les evêques; ayez pour les cérémonies que prescrit l’Alcoran, pour les mosquées, la même tolérance que vous avez eu pour les convents, pour les synagogues, pour la religion de Moise et de Jésus Christ” (Proclamation of General Bonaparte of the 22nd June, 1798).
Colonel Sebastiani wrote concerning the Jews in his report on his mission to Constantinople in 1802 in a somewhat anti-Semitic spirit: “Les Juifs sont, comme partout ailleurs, indifférents sur tout changement de gouvernement qui ne leur offre pas la matière à de nouvelles spéculations” (Bibliothèque Diplomatique—Recueil des Traités de la Porte Ottomane ... Par le Baron J. de Testa ... Tome Premier France. Paris ... MDCCCLXIV. p. 513).
Jewish opinion in the East was reserved and somewhat pessimistic, not with regard to the purpose, but concerning the opportunity and the means. The Jews were willing to make any sacrifices in order to restore “ancient Jerusalem” in a peaceful way, but not to revolt against the rulers of the country. Moreover, they knew that this campaign was bound to be a failure.
The Turks followed the plan of allowing the inadequate forces of Bonaparte to advance as far as possible from their Egyptian base, while they massed heavy forces in Syria. El-Arish and Gaza in the south-west of Palestine fell into the hands of Bonaparte’s army on the 17th and 25th February, 1799. The Jewish community of Gaza had fled. In Jerusalem the news of victories and atrocities created a general panic. It was rumoured that Bonaparte was about to enter the Holy City. At the command of the deputy Governor the inhabitants began to throw up ramparts, the Jews also taking part in the work. One of the Rabbis, Moses Mordecai Joseph Meyuchas, encouraged and even assisted them in their operations. After these occurrences the success of Bonaparte in Egypt and Syria was arrested, chiefly by the arms of Great Britain, and his schemes in the East were frustrated.
The appearance of Bonaparte in Palestine was like the passing of a meteor, which, after causing much perturbance, disappears. His dream of becoming Emperor of the East faded away quickly. Still the fact remains that the idea of the Restoration of Israel had occupied the mind of this great conqueror in the prime of his youth, at the very beginning of his unexampled career. He and his adherents seemed, even after this failure, to persist in gazing with a wistful eye towards the same quarter, and their ambitious plans evidently involved the future fortunes of those Eastern countries which have so long been the monotonous scenes of isolation and ignorance.
Whatever judgment we may form as to the practical value of Bonaparte’s scheme in those days, the suggestion of restoring Palestine to the Jews remains highly significant. It is obvious that had there not been Jewish aspirations of this kind in France such a suggestion could not have arisen even as a fantastic plan or as a caprice of military headquarters in a distant country. Bonaparte had too much political foresight even in his younger years to run the risk of engaging himself in an undertaking before he had sounded the competent circles in his own country. As a matter of fact these aspirations were expressed, and, imaginary as they were, seem to have been very popular among French Jews. There is, consequently, reason to conclude that Bonaparte’s scheme was, in reality, more serious than it might have seemed at first sight.