Rabbi J. David Sinzheim Rabbi Jacob Meyer
From rare engravings lent by Israel Solomons
Far from being a natural product of internal Jewish development, the Sanhedrin was a governmental affair intended to organize Jewry in the new world-empire. But it remained an episode, because Napoleon’s attitude towards the Jews was, generally speaking, far from consistent. At one time he offered them Jerusalem; at another he was inclined to transport Jerusalem to Paris. Some time before the Sanhedrin assembled, he seemed to be vexed with the Jews—a feeling of a temporary character, which was probably the reflex of disappointment in his far-reaching plans. On other occasions he showed exceptional kindness to Jewish soldiers and other Jews.[¹]
[¹] See Napoléon et les soldats juifs, par Petit de Lagare, p. 29.
All these facts combined lead to the inference that the Jewish problem had often engaged his attention. He seems, like his adherents, to have wavered as to the acceptance of the idea of the Restoration of Israel or of that of Assimilation, but finally embraced the doctrines of the Sanhedrin, which could be applied easily to the small Jewish population in France. The elimination not only of the Jews of Asia and Africa, but also of the Jews in other European countries, from the Jewish problem in France, caused by the failure of great schemes of conquest, necessarily narrowed the scope of the Jewish problem and deprived it of its former grandeur.
CHAPTER XVI.
ENGLISH OPINION ON THE SANHEDRIN
English opinion on the Sanhedrin—F. D. Kirwan—Abraham Furtado—Rev. James Bicheno—The Declaration of the Sanhedrin and English comment—M. Diogène Tama—The Prince de Ligne.
Coming back to English history, we now propose to trace the impression produced in this country by Bonaparte’s Palestine Appeal of 1798 and the Proclamation of a Sanhedrin in 1807.
English opinion on this point was quite clear. No objections were ever raised to the restoration of the Jewish nation to Palestine: this idea had been cherished in England for centuries. But English opinion was opposed to its becoming a strategic or political instrument in the hands of an ambitious conqueror. Moreover, that opinion was not inclined to separate the idea of the Restoration of Israel from that of the emancipation of the Jews. Thus the Sanhedrin was considered merely a tentative preliminary step towards Restoration, and the Declaration made by that body against Jewish national aspirations produced an impression of surprise and bewilderment. This Declaration was not, in fact, intended to be a denial of Jewish nationality in its ethical, historical, cultural or religious aspect: it was rather an avowal of political loyalty. Yet such a Declaration, expressed as it was in exaggerated terms, was calculated to surprise and puzzle the genuine friends of the Jews in England, and give rise to misunderstanding.