The Ninth Zionist Congress at Hamburg, December, 1909, with Wolffsohn and Nordau again as Presidents, was well attended (about four hundred members—and for the first time in the history of the movement, delegates were in attendance from Turkey). The impression driven home with irresistible force was the sustained and unflagging interest of all present in the movement. Among the English delegates were: Dr. Gaster, Dr. Samuel Daiches, Mr. Joseph Cowen, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, Mr. L. J. Greenberg, Mr. Herbert Bentwich, Mr. Norman Bentwich, Dr. Fuchs, the Rev. J. K. Goldbloom, and Mr. Leon Simon.
The Congress found itself confronted with the problem of organization. Several delegates were of the opinion that the task of leadership was too difficult for a Small Actions Committee, consisting of three persons, and that the headquarters should be removed to a larger centre. This view was not influenced by any personal sympathies or antipathies: it was dictated by considerations of an important character. Others were opposed to any change. This was an internal fight which had to be fought out, as in any other democratic movement, with the weapons of reason and conviction, and it was fought out. This Congress could not radically solve the question and it was left to the next one to bring the solution.
Zionism, however, remained as strong as ever. The disputes, far from being symptoms of weakness, were symptoms of growing interest, devotion and enthusiasm for the common cause.
CHAPTER XLIXD.
Turkey, 1910–14—The New Turkish Cabinet of 1912—The Balkan War—The Tenth and Eleventh Congresses—Death of Wolffsohn.
We may as well now cast a glance at the aspect of the general political situation at the period this narrative has reached. Public opinion in England was greatly disappointed when the first enthusiasm for Turkish liberties had passed away. The ship of state in Turkey began to enter very troubled waters, and no one saw safety ahead. The defeat of the Committee of Union and Progress, the displacing of the Said Pasha Cabinet and the downfall of the other leaders of the Young Turkey party of 1908, followed by the amnesty of a number of officials of the Hamidian regime, had naturally led many in Europe to believe that reaction had set in, and that the Young Turks had once more been overthrown and were in danger of being stamped out by the Old Turks or reactionaries. On the other hand, some careful observers asserted that the new Cabinet of 1912 was the best Turkey had had during the past forty years, and that it was in no true sense reactionary, but really constructive and progressive. They maintained also that the Committee of Union and Progress had begun to use old methods and were now hated by a large proportion of their former supporters. But all these allegations were contradicted by rapidly developing events. Hardly at any time within this generation had the political situation in Turkey presented elements of greater uncertainty and danger than in the period 1910–14.
The greatest misfortune was the impossibility of any improvement. Turkey undoubtedly had the desire for progress along those lines which Europe professedly was so anxious to see her follow; but she needed advice, guidance, credit and patience. She required men—advisers, counsellors—to give her practical help in carrying out the necessary reforms. But, unfortunately, such a development was made impossible by the disturbing political events.
The Balkan War broke out. The Balkan peoples took their fate in their own hands. They did not look for liberators from elsewhere, and asked no help in the settlement of their differences. Whenever the Balkans had flared up and gone into war before it had generally been due to the fact that other nations had drawn them into the struggle. The vital difference of this conflict was that, for the first time for centuries, all the peoples concerned thought themselves strong enough to decide their own future by the sword. A fierce struggle began. The outlook for the Turks was most gloomy from the very outset. The Turks were beaten. They were discarded by all those who in Europe had seemed to have supported them, abandoned by the Powers which once valued their friendship. Speculation as to what would happen was on everybody’s lips. One thing was certain: that the East was getting thoroughly aroused, and that the developments led inevitably to a crisis unparalleled in history. Meanwhile, the Zionist Organization continued its work with great energy.
The Tenth Zionist Congress at Basle, August, 1911, with Wolffsohn and Nordau again as Presidents, had an attendance of about four hundred delegates, including a considerable number of English: Dr. Gaster, Mr. H. Bentwich, Mr. Jacob Moser, Dr. Samuel Daiches, Dr. Weizmann, Mr. J. Cowen, Dr. Hochman, Mr. H. Sacher, Dr. Salis Daiches, Mr. S. B. Rubenstein and others. The question left over from the previous Congress was settled at this one. A new Small Actions’ Committee was elected, and David Wolffsohn retained his influential post as President of the Council, and from that time again devoted his energies mainly to Zionist finances.