At the same time I agree with the suggestion that Senator Sanborn raised as to the necessity of protecting the rights of the employes. I do not see how, on the basis of the whole scheme of property rights, we can take away from the employe his right to sue for damages when the injury is due directly and clearly to the negligence of the employer, without a constitutional amendment. But that difficulty can be met by a saving clause that in practice need not interfere very much with the efficiency of the system. That is the plan we adopted in our New York bill, merely putting in a clause to the effect that except where the accident was due to the personal negligence of the employer the compensation bill should apply, leaving it to the courts to decide just how far that would go. A safety clause of that kind in practice, in my opinion, would be largely disregarded. After this system came into operation, the advantage of getting a certain compensation would appeal to a great majority of injured workmen as preferable to the gamble of a law suit. So that from the point of view of the expense to the employer such a provision need not impose a serious additional burden along with the burden of the compensation law.

Mr. Parks (Massachusetts): In our State there is a bill before the Committee on Labor in the Legislature, of which I am a member, prohibiting the employment of minors under eighteen in trades which are dangerous to health. The committee decided to refer the bill to the State Board of Health, and an investigation by the State Board showed that continuous employment in such industries as the manufacture of cuff buttons and collar buttons, and so forth, was deleterious to the health on account of the small pieces of bone and other substances which had an injurious effect upon the health of the operatives. One factory in particular was alluded to at a hearing which we had on the matter, and after we passed the bill, and it became a law, I understand that that factory changed over their whole system, so that that particular industry instead of being as before this act was passed a dangerous industry to health, it became a safe industry to the health of minors. That was one effect of the naming of a particular industry as a dangerous trade, so far as health is concerned.

Prof. Ernst Freund (Illinois): It seems to me there are two things to be sought for in this matter, and that is, first, to find some principle of classification and then to see what portion of that principle we can reasonably hope to cover by legislation. When I look at this section it does not seem to me that the principle is what I could call a sound one, and I mean by that, one that appeals to our sense of justice. It is true that the English act is very comprehensive, but it has never appeared to me that the rule of the English law by which the head of a household is liable to a domestic servant for that domestic servant's carelessness is really a reasonable and just principle of law. Therefore we ought to have some particular reason for putting the liability upon the employer, and that reason might well be some particular element of danger. By calling an employment dangerous, I think, we do not make it dangerous even if now and then accidents occur in it. I think there are certain elements of danger which we could all point out, and that there are some elements of danger which we could all agree upon as making an occupation extremely hazardous.

We should also consider whether it would not be wise for the present to confine the liability to concerns of some magnitude. I know that it is very much questioned whether you can confine this extraordinary liability to large concerns, because it is open to the criticism that you simply make those pay who can afford to guard themselves through liability insurance. However, I think there is a real difference of principle based upon difference of size, because the relation of the small concern to the employe is totally different from that of the large concern, and it is only in the large concerns that these conditions prevail which, under modern conditions, seem to demand a shifting of the responsibility from the employe to the employer.

If you wish to be conservative, and not cover all the industries that have some element of hazard, you have to decide the very difficult question where to draw the line. When I read over the list of employments singled out in the compulsory bill recommended by the New York Commission, I was very much puzzled by the obvious fact that certain obviously hazardous employments were excluded, until I was informed that the principle was that of the non-competitive industry. Now, if you say that these industries are selected because they cannot get away from the law by moving across the state line, the discrimination looks objectionable; if, however, you say they are selected because they are not exposed to competition from industries operating under laws more favorable to the employer, the discrimination looks much more plausible. Even so, it is doubtful whether the principle of selection would approve itself to the Supreme Court of this State.

Dr. W. H. Allport (Illinois): It is evident we have in contemplation here two methods of arriving at a tentative solution of this question. (1) One method suggested by Professor Freund, which looked to me like a modification of the German method; that is, the method by which certain occupations have been gradually selected as being more and more hazardous, and gradually including the less hazardous occupations, until, I believe, in Germany the law covers all occupations and almost all employments. That is, it now covers farm employes, agricultural employes and the employes of our small establishments. (2) The other method suggested by Senator Sanborn, as a tentative law, follows more or less the English method, where the law was made right away to cover practically all employments; that is, the farming industry, domestic industry and other industries.

In considering this first clause of the tentative code, it would seem to me as though it would be possible to arrive at some definite definition. The English law has a section devoted entirely to the matter of definition, and defines employer, employe, dependent, and so forth, and some interesting questions have come up recently as to what are dependents under the English law. But the English law omits altogether to express what are hazardous employments. I will read the first section of Chapter LVIII of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906, which is now the law of England:

"If in any employment personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment is caused to a workman, his employer shall, subject as hereinafter mentioned, be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the first schedule to this act."

That covers all forms of employment, but it does not define any employment as being hazardous or non-hazardous.

I suppose the basis of our effort in this tentative "workers' code" is to arrive at something which will go behind our present courts and bring us in line with the state and federal constitutions, which will give the power to a State to enact a law which under ordinary circumstances it would not have, and so, therefore, the effort is made here to define dangerous employments. It is interesting to note the ingenuity with which that point is reached; i. e., that any employment becomes dangerous after an accident happens. In the Wisconsin law the effort is made directly; there is no definition, so far as I can see, in the Wisconsin law nor in the New York law. There are certain employments which are defined as extra-hazardous and, therefore, subject to state regulation.