The effective conduct of war thus requires that understanding exist (see [pages 9 and 10]) between the civil representatives of the State and the leaders of the armed forces in the coordination of policy with the preparation and the use of power to enforce it. Of the leaders of the armed forces, as a whole or in combinations, such conduct of war demands the expression of the highest of human qualities, coupled with intimate knowledge of fundamentals, an appreciation of the capacities and limitations of the technique, and the ability to fit the practical details into the general plan in their true relation thereto.
The need for these qualities is manifestly not restricted to the hour of supreme test, when the weapon of the State, the armed forces, is wielded with hostile purpose. The forging of the weapon, and its adequate preparation for use, are not matters susceptible of deferment until the crucial hour. The exacting requirements of war are essentially such as to preclude the readiness of the requisite intricate instrument and its skillful use without previous studied effort during peace.
It follows that where the peacetime effort of the armed forces is directed toward the attainment of a war time objective of a specific, rather than of a vaguely general character, and the necessary components of fighting strength are provided accordingly, the readiness of the instrument is more likely to be adequate, and the application of power more likely to be successful. History records, as facts, that certain States have given their armed forces great stimulus by early clear definition of policy while, in other cases, failures and disappointments have resulted from a lack thereof. Military problems are not confined to those presented after war is begun.
Mental power (see [pages 8 and 9]), which includes the ability to solve military problems in peace and in war and to arrive at sound decisions, is a recognized essential component of fighting strength because it is the source of professional judgment. The development of such ability in those who may be charged with the successful conduct of war ([page 4]) may not safely be postponed.
CHAPTER II[ToC]
MENTAL PROCESSES AND HUMAN TENDENCIES
The discussion in Chapter II deals, first, with the natural mental processes employed by the normal mature human being before taking deliberate action.