Goal of Planning. The function of planning (Part II, preceding) is to afford a proper basis for effective execution. Effective action, therefore, is the goal of planning.
Otherwise, planning is aimless, except as a mental exercise. Such mental exercise, though it be with no thought of specific application in the realm of action, has nevertheless the same fundamental aim as if the planning were so intended. The aim of such mental exercise is the inculcation of habits of thought which will provide a sound basis for effective action.
Importance of Execution. Sound planning is, as explained in previous chapters, the best basis for consistently effective action. Yet, important as planning is, the effective outcome of plans depends upon their execution.
While an unsound plan affords no firm basis for successful action, recognition has long been accorded to the companion fact that a perfect plan, poorly executed, may not provide as firm a foundation for success as a reasonably good plan, carried out with resolution.
No plan, moreover, can be confidently expected to anticipate all eventualities. Notwithstanding every effort to foresee all possibilities, unexpected changes are to be regarded as normal. This fact emphasizes the importance of effective supervision of the planned action.
The importance of such supervision reaches its maximum during actual hostilities; then ([page 4]) the necessity for alert supervision creates an accentuated demand for the intelligent application of mental power to the solution of military problems. Professional judgment then assumes supreme importance because vital issues may hinge upon the decisions reached during the development of the action.
Conditions in War. Standards of performance in peacetime exercises cannot be a conclusive guide as to what may be expected under the conditions of war. In the conduct of hostilities against a strong and determined enemy, men and materiel do not always function at their best. Commanders undergo extreme strains. Orders are often misinterpreted or go astray. Men, and the machines which they operate, frequently give less effective service than under the conditions of peace.
In war, mistakes are normal; errors are usual; information is seldom complete, often inaccurate, and frequently misleading. Success is won, not by personnel and materiel in prime condition, but by the debris of an organization worn by the strain of campaign and shaken by the shock of battle. The objective is attained, in war, under conditions which often impose extreme disadvantages. It is in the light of these facts that the commander expects to shape his course during the supervision of the planned action.
The Incentive. During the supervision of the action, problems calling for decision may derive their incentive, as already noted ([page 79]) either from a directive issued by superior authority, or by reason of a Decision which the commander himself has already made, or because of a recognition, by the commander concerned, of an incentive originating from the demands of the situation.
In the event that the incentive appears in the form of a new task assigned by a higher echelon, the commander's problem may become, relatively, simple. In such a case he is relieved of the necessity of recognizing for himself that the time is ripe for a new decision. This fact, however, in no wise alters his fundamental responsibility for taking action, or for abstaining therefrom, in accordance with the actual demands of the situation ([page 15]) in the event that the assigned task requires modification or alteration, or, further, in the event that circumstances even call for a departure from his instructions. Should modification, alteration, or departure be in order, the commander is responsible for recognition of the fact that the demands of the situation have introduced further problems.