A commander will be hampered in maintaining his fighting strength at its maximum unless he has arranged for, and has at his disposal, adequate logistics support. Because of its intimate relationship to mobility and endurance, such support is an essential to freedom of action. Logistics support requires provision for procurement and replenishment of supplies, for evacuation, proper disposition, and replacement of ineffective personnel, and for material maintenance. Freedom of action is restricted beyond those limits to which logistics support can be extended. (See [page 63].)
The initiative is of paramount importance in ensuring freedom of action. If the initiative is seized and maintained with adequate strength, the enemy can only conform; he cannot lead. If initiative is lost, freedom of action is restricted in like measure.
The offensive, properly employed, is a method of seizing the initiative, and of regaining it if lost. Even though there be an actual numerical superiority in fighting strength, an offensive will, however, seldom assume practical form unless founded on an offensive mental attitude, which ever seeks the favorable and suitable opportunity to strike. Completely to abandon the offensive state of mind is to forswear victory.
Whether physically on the defensive or the offensive, the competent commander is always engaged in a mental and moral attack upon the will of the enemy commander (see [page 8]). By effective attack upon the hostile will, the commander disintegrates the enemy's plan, i.e., the enemy's reasoned decision, as well as the detailed procedure on which the enemy relies to carry this decision into effect.
It does not follow that offensive action is possible or even desirable under all circumstances. Even with superior strength the most skillful commander will scarcely be able, always, to apportion forces in such manner as everywhere to permit the assumption of the offensive. Without adequately superior strength, it may be necessary to adopt the defensive for considerable periods. If the offensive mental attitude is retained, together with fixed determination to take offensive measures as soon as appropriate to do so, the calculated and deliberate adoption of the defensive, for the proper length of time, may best promote the ultimate attainment of the objective. It is of the utmost importance, however, that a static defensive be not adopted as a settled procedure (see [page 65]) beyond the time necessary to prepare for an effective offensive.
Both the offensive and the defensive have their places in an operation whose broad character is primarily either defensive or offensive. In operations which involve movement over a considerable distance, a combination of the offensive and the defensive is usually found necessary (see also references to distant operations on [pages 63] and [74]). Though the movement itself be offensive, the ensurance of freedom of action may require both defensive measures and tactically offensive action. The enemy, primarily on the defensive, may be expected to seize every opportunity to employ the offensive.
Thus, a judicious combination of the offensive and the defensive has been found to be sound procedure (see also [page 61]), provided that the general defensive is always viewed as a basis for the inauguration, at the proper moment, of the offensive. The methods employed during the period of the defensive are best calculated to promote freedom of action if they are designed to facilitate a ready assumption of the offensive as soon as conditions favorable to the offensive have been created.
Familiarity with the physical characteristics of the actual and possible theaters of operations, and accurate intelligence of the strength, distribution, and activities of enemy forces likely to be encountered, are of primary importance in the promotion of freedom of action. Additions to this store of knowledge may be made by a continuous interpretation and dissemination of new information collected, analyzed, and evaluated by persistent effort. Of equal importance is the denial of information to the enemy.
In connection with counter-information measures (see [page 127]), the scrutiny of information of a military nature intended for popular consumption demands the exercise of sound professional judgment prior to publication. A resourceful enemy is ever alert to evaluate and turn to his own advantage all available information, including that ostensibly innocuous.
As to all of the foregoing considerations, a fund of professional knowledge, previously acquired through study, or experience, or both, and coupled with a sound concept of war, is the best basis for devising suitable, feasible, and acceptable measures for freedom of action.