“You had better take off your hat,” said a friend to me, as some national troops were marching by on the Avenida Central, in Rio de Janeiro; “if you do not, some one may knock it off,” he continued. Then I noticed that every man and boy respectfully lifted his hat as the flag passed him; and I did the same. Three regiments of infantry passed along, each with its banner fluttering in the breeze, and as many times did we lift our hats in salute to the green and yellow starred emblem of Brazil; and I must confess that the sentiment involved in this tribute to the flag, for which we are supposed to be willing to bleed and die at all times, is commendable, and worthy of emulation.
Brazil is not a military nation in the sense that European nations are such. The proportion of soldiers to the population is greater than in the United States, but far less than in almost any European nation. The total number of men under arms, including the military police, does not exceed fifty thousand men. Of this number more than one-half are state troops. The soldiers are not much in evidence in any part of the republic, except those doing police duty. A compulsory military service does not exist, after the German or French model, although the right of conscription by either state or federal government is a part of the law, and can be resorted to whenever, in the judgment of either government, such a step becomes necessary. Retired or active officers are stationed at nearly all the colleges, by whom instruction in military tactics is given after established systems, much the same as in our own educational institutions. The term of enlistment in the federal army is for three years, with certain privileges in the event that the soldier re-enlists when a term has expired. One of these privileges is the choice of a free grant of land in one of the government colonies, and the gift of an outfit of agricultural implements with which to cultivate it.
Another inducement is in the way of additional remuneration. The entire republic is divided into seven districts, in each of which a barrack is maintained. The federal troops are divided into twenty different regiments, and a number of battalions are made up of the different branches of the service. The arms of all troops are of the latest improved Mauser type, and the artillery is exclusively of German manufacture.
The state troops number a considerable force. They are different in organization from the state militia of the United States, because they are regular troops under arms. The most of them serve in the various cities of the states as military police. They are a good and effective force in preserving order; and yet they have often been the source of serious trouble, for this system has enabled a state ring to defy national authority, because they had right at hand an armed force of their own, which primarily owned allegiance to the state government. The state of São Paulo alone has in its employ a force that exceeds five thousand well-armed and trained troops. Rio Grande do Sul, that turbulent and impetuous southern state, has an almost equal force, and the “Rio Grandenses” have been proven puissant and effective in more than one skirmish with federal troops. Bahia maintains about three thousand soldiers under arms in her barracks, and Minas Geraes comes next with twenty-five hundred. There is not a single state which does not have at least a few hundred men enrolled under its own banner. If all of these state troops would be loyal to the federal government, as they undoubtedly would be at this time, it would give a fairly good fighting force with which to meet any aggression from without.
The revolt of a national navy seems like a very unusual and almost ludicrous proceeding; yet Brazil had such an experience early in the history of the republic. For six months the Brazilian navy under Admirals Mello and Saldanha da Gama openly defied the authority of President Floriano, the second incumbent of that high office. Admiral Mello, who was in command of the navy, sent a short and curt message to the President ordering him to resign the presidency within six hours, or a bombardment of Rio de Janeiro would follow. President Floriano was made of stern stuff and flatly refused to resign. The Admiral then weakened in his threat and did not bombard the capital. Had he carried it out great destruction would undoubtedly have followed. The most of the navy remained in the bay, but a few of the boats escaped and joined the land insurgents in the southern part of the republic. The navy, cut off from supplies of food and fuel, was obliged to yield in the end, and the national government was victorious.
A quarter of a century ago the Brazilian navy was easily the most powerful in the southern hemisphere. At that time no other South American republic could boast of a navy of any considerable strength. Brazil then possessed a number of battleships, cruisers and other boats that were very creditable, and the cost of which had been very great. Since that time both Argentina and Chile have spent large sums of money building up their naval strength, and the discrepancy in sea forces is not so great as formerly. Both of these nations have made great financial sacrifices in order to dispute the supremacy of their bulky neighbour on the water. Ever since the establishment of an independent empire in Brazil more attention had been devoted to building up a formidable sea force than an army, and the same conditions exist to-day. It is perhaps not a bad thing for Brazil to have a strong navy because of its extensive coast line. Furthermore, because of the loose cohesion between the states, this arm of the national government adds greatly to its prestige. Nearly all the most powerful states have an extensive sea coast, and the navy would greatly assist the federal government in the event of any revolt against its authority. Although each state has its own military force, as heretofore described, none of them have any armed vessels to protect their ports. It is quite possible also, that a united interest in a powerful navy may aid in furthering a national and federal spirit which will aid in breaking down the idea of state loyalty as against federal unity, which has been hitherto predominant. If this should be the result, then the money invested in these seemingly useless monsters of the deep may be well spent.
The only instance when the navy has been in actual service was during the conflict with Argentina, and the Paraguayan war, when some engagements took place on the Paraná and Paraguay Rivers, between some of the smaller boats of Brazil and some armed vessels of Paraguay. In these encounters the former were victorious, and the Brazilians are proud of referring to the glorious traditions of the history of their navy.
The principal naval establishment is at Rio de Janeiro, near the landing dock. The naval yards here are quite extensive, and a couple of thousand men are usually employed. Several small cruisers and some river boats have been constructed there, but all the large boats have been built abroad, and the most of them in British yards. At the present time the boats listed in the Brazilian navy number about fifty. This includes every vessel, large and small, many of which are practically useless from the modern view point of practical war values. They could only be used in patrolling inland rivers, where neither armed vessels nor forts would be encountered. This list includes seven vessels that are classed as battleships, eight cruisers, nine torpedo boats, and then the auxiliary fleet, consisting of several small gun boats, dispatch boats, etc.
This list does not embody, however, the new vessels which are now being received from English builders. A couple of years ago contracts were let for three Dreadnaughts, two scout ships, two torpedo boats and ten torpedo boat destroyers. The addition of these boats will again place Brazil in the first rank of naval powers in the southern hemisphere. The three Dreadnaughts are claimed by the Brazilians to be the most powerful of their kind that have yet been constructed. They contain some new modifications in the placing of armour and the equipment of guns.