The plain answer of commerce to these questions is afforded by the statistics of China's foreign trade. Yonder is a vast domain with a population estimated at four hundred and thirty millions—about one-third of the human race—largely dependent for even the simple necessities upon the outside world.
England was the first to batter down the ancient gates of the empire, and she has her reward in that she holds about sixty-four per cent of China's import trade. England's nearest competitor is the United States, with eight per cent, the remaining twenty-eight per cent being divided among the other powers, with Japan at the head of the list. Our own share does not at first glance appear very large, but it should be explained that as a great proportion of our commodities are carried to China in English bottoms and consigned to English houses, it is classified as English business—a part of the sixty-four per cent. The actual discrepancy, therefore, is not so great as the apparent. Moreover, though the beginnings of our trade with China date from the last century, we have not been an appreciable factor in the market until about three years ago, since which time our trade has increased at a rate of speed which has both surprised and alarmed our competitors.[2]
[2] The following account of our exports to China was prepared recently by an intelligent and reliable newspaper correspondent. It is of interest in this connection:
Exports of merchandise to China in the fiscal year about to end will be larger than those of any preceding year in our history. Ten years ago our exports to China were less than $3,000,000, and to China and Hong Kong combined little more than $6,000,000. In the fiscal year ending 1899, our exports to China will be more than $13,000,000, and to Hong Kong more than $6,000,000, making a total of more than $20,000,000, or three times that of a decade earlier. That the bulk of exports to Hong Kong may properly be considered as ultimately destined for consumption in China, is shown by the fact that the official reports of the imports into China show that more than forty-four per cent of these imports are from the port of Hong Kong. The 1899 exports to China and Hong Kong combined will show a gain of nearly or quite twenty-five per cent over those of last year, while the total exports from the United States for the fiscal year 1899 will be little if any in excess of those of last year. This shows a more rapid growth in our exports to this part of the world than elsewhere.
The following table, prepared by the Treasury Bureau of Statistics, shows the value of our exports to China and Hong Kong during the past decade:
| Year ending | |||
| June 30. | China. | Hong Kong. | Total. |
| 1889 | $2,791,128 | $3,686,384 | $6,477,512 |
| 1890 | 2,946,206 | 4,439,153 | 7,385,362 |
| 1891 | 8,701,008 | 4,768,697 | 13,469,705 |
| 1892 | 5,663,497 | 4,894,049 | 10,557,546 |
| 1893 | 3,900,457 | 4,216,602 | 8,117,059 |
| 1894 | 5,862,429 | 4,209,847 | 10,072,273 |
| 1895 | 3,693,840 | 4,253,040 | 7,856,880 |
| 1896 | 6,921,933 | 4,691,201 | 11,613,134 |
| 1897 | 11,924,433 | 6,060,039 | 17,984,472 |
| 1898 | 9,992,894 | 6,265,200 | 16,258,094 |
| 1899 (estimated) | 13,500,000 | 6,500,000 | 20,000,000 |
Significant as these figures are, a full understanding of our trade conditions in the far East, and the importance of that market to our prospects, can hardly be gained without a backward glance over the events of the past three decades.
Up to the collapse of the French at Sedan, or perhaps until 1873, Great Britain stood without a rival in trade and manufactures. That year will long be remembered, in England as in America, as the beginning of the era of low prices. In England agricultural products were the first to suffer, on account of the importation of food products from Australia and the Americas. This movement continued to increase and British farms proportionately to suffer until, by 1879, that property, the backbone of English hereditary wealth, ceased entirely to pay. The sending away of money to buy food, together with the fall in the prices of home products, so affected the home supply of gold that, in order to preserve the equilibrium, the English began to realize on their foreign investments.
The greatest panic in history followed. Previous to 1876 England had always been able to maintain her expanding currency and supply the arts with the gold brought in to pay for her exports. In 1877 the tide turned, and the whole ensuing decade actually showed a net export of gold amounting to $11,000,000, besides what went into the melting-pot. Contraction and the fall of prices continued, and in proportion the sale of foreign securities. By 1890 England had brought back enough gold to restore her balance, but at what a cost to the debtor nations! Argentina and Australia collapsed in turn, the former pulling down the great Baring concern. In 1893 disaster overtook the United States, and it is scarcely exaggeration to say that the Republic was shaken to the center. Then came the demonetization of silver in India and the falling rupee, followed by distress amounting almost to the dissolution of society.
Such, in brief, is the history of the movement which has resulted in the titanic struggle for the few remaining open markets of the world. Falling prices and reduced profits mean increase of production, which in turn require new markets. We in the United States had been careful to secure the home market to ourselves, but in this crisis the home market proved sadly inadequate. Our manufacturers must needs go forth and compete with European wages and standards of living for the markets of the world.