XVI. That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident it become free, can hardly preserve that freedom
XVII. That a corrupt People obtaining freedom can hardly preserve it
XVIII. How a free Government existing in a corrupt City may be preserved, or not existing may be created
XIX. After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: but after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second
XX. That the consecutive reigns of two valiant Princes produce great results: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a succession of valiant Rulers by whom their power and growth are rapidly extended
XXI. That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be without a National Army
XXII. What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and the three Alban Curiatii
XXIII. That we should never hazard our whole fortunes, where we put not forth our entire strength; for which reason to guard a defile is often hurtful
XXIV. That well-ordered States always provide rewards and punishments for their Citizens; and never set off deserts against misdeeds
XXV. That he who would reform the institutions of a free State, must retain at least the semblance of old ways