[CHAPTER II]
Further account of the actions at Chang-chia-tun and Shih-san-li-tai—Preliminary skirmishes round Chin-chou—The battle of Nan Shan, May 26, 1904.
Our regiments went on to Ta-fang-shen, while the enemy’s troops found themselves facing the Nan Shan position, all ready and prepared to meet them with a hail of shell and bullets. However, they did not show themselves as yet, and everything retained its usual aspect. On the night of May 17 it was reported at the advanced posts that the enemy had occupied the pass near the railway bridge and was forcing back our advanced detachments with small bodies of infantry, a cross fire being kept up all that night. Next, a report came in from the left flank to the effect that the enemy was pressing the outpost line on that side; in proof of which a few wounded were brought in. It thus became evident that the Japanese were drawing closer round the Nan Shan position. Reports received in the morning made it clear that the Japanese had occupied all the heights lying in front of the Nan Shan position and were engaged in fortifying themselves on them. We could not, however, see any definite signs of them, as they were careful not to venture out from the shelter of the hills in front, save that towards midday we were able to locate earth-works on the hill near Shih-san-li-tai about 7 versts from our position. On closer examination we discerned certain works somewhat nearer, which were without doubt infantry trenches, and on which our long-range guns immediately opened fire. Our shells did not reach the more distant line, but at once succeeded in stopping work on the nearer trenches. Fire on the enemy’s works was kept up, off and on, all that day.
In view of the fact that one regiment was insufficient to defend the whole position, as well as the ground lying to the front of it, I asked General Fock to send me two infantry scout detachments from the 13th and 14th Regiments. My request being granted, the outpost line, on the following night, consisted of four infantry detachments and one mounted. All this night a cross fire was kept up with the Japanese posts, which pressed our men so hard that I had to strengthen the line on the right flank by a half-company (supplied by No. 2 Company). Our outpost line ran as follows: from the shores of Chin-chou Bay to the town wall of Chin-chou, with patrols out to some distance in advance of the wall, from the town to Nan Shan railway station, and from there to Hand Bay. During the night the Japanese drove us out of the old Chinese fortifications beyond Kerr Bay, inflicting some losses—a few killed and many wounded. Our opponents threw out such a strong screen that our men were not able to penetrate it at any point so as to see what they were doing behind, and, as we were thus left in complete ignorance as to their numbers and dispositions, I had to be guided by the knowledge gained at the time of the action of Chang-chia-tun, which information I cannot do better than give in the words of Lieutenant-Colonel Saifoolin, who commanded a portion of our right flank, and from whom I had the following story of the engagement:
LIEUT.-COLONEL SAIFOOLIN, COMMANDING 2ND BATTALION, 5TH REGIMENT.
p. 34]
“Our companies were disposed in the following order: I, with the 8th Company, occupied a hill near a ruined tower on the left side of the nullah along which runs the road to Godzarlin; the 6th Company occupied the crest on the right side of this nullah; and the 3rd Scout Detachment, under Captain Koudriavtsev, occupied a hill on the extreme right flank of the line and somewhat in front of the 6th Company. The mounted scouts were sent out in front as skirmishers. Hardly had day broken, when our scouts reported that the enemy was moving in considerable force along the road from Godzarlin and nearer; following hard upon this report there came in view, in front of out right flank, dense Japanese lines, with their left flank resting on Mount Sampson, and firing commenced at once at very long range. The enemy did not hurry in his advance, but developed such a terrific rifle fire that a great number of our men were placed hors de combat. Not having any companies in reserve, I sent for help to a battalion of the 14th Regiment, which was formed up in our rear, and one company of this battalion (commanded by Suvorov), posted by itself behind our right flank, started to move up to us, but halted and commenced firing without joining our line. This continued for an hour, during which time the enemy’s troops advanced without check until they were 400 paces, or less, from our scouts and the 6th Company; their strength being about fifteen companies. Meanwhile about forty Japanese companies were turning our left flank. Our losses in the 6th Company and among the scouts were already considerable. In the former the commander was wounded and the sergeant-major and thirty men were killed; while of the latter about one-half were hors de combat, including the commander. Not seeing any sign of reinforcements, we sent to ask what was to be done. At this time the enemy began to turn our right flank also. No one came to our assistance, our companies were melting away, and the enemy was continuing to advance. I gave the order to retire, and, under a terrific fire, we got back almost to the railway bridge, where our artillery covered us, opening such a deadly fire on the enemy’s lines that they came to a standstill and then took cover in the folds of the ground. The order was then given for a general retreat, whereupon we retired behind the town and ultimately to the main position.”
At Shih-san-li-tai, on the left flank, a fearful artillery fight took place with rather disastrous results for us. In Romanovski’s battery all the officers were put out of action, and he himself was wounded, as were also nearly all the men of the gun detachments, so that there was no one to bring up ammunition, and volunteers from the 3rd Company had to be called for. Things reached such a pass that Romanovski himself loaded a gun; the adjutant of the brigade, who had been sent off with an order, was killed by a shell. But the enemy not being strong in infantry on that flank, did not press an advance, so that our losses in the 12th Company were only four men, and in the 3rd but a few more.[21]
There seems to have been some misunderstanding about this retreat. The following day I went to the divisional headquarters with my report, and, while there, General Fock sent for General Nadyein, who commanded the detachment engaged at Shih-san-li-tai.[22]