At 9.30 a.m. the Japanese broke through the wire entanglements and got half-way up the hill, but they were met by fire from the trenches—from the left flank by volleys from the section of the 2nd Infantry Scout Detachment, and from the right by volleys from the sailors under the command of Lieutenant Afanaisev; and, not being able to make any headway, they retired. At 11 a.m. Second-Lieutenant Andreiev was wounded, and the command devolved on Lance-Corporal Kobrintsev. Captain Rotaiski was sent to reinforce, but he did not occupy the trenches, remaining instead behind their left flank.
During the day the enemy began to increase his efforts against Height 426, and in consequence the reserve was sent for, but did not arrive, though two companies of the 4th Reserve Battalion were supposed to have been sent up.
About midday, when the 1st and 2nd sections of the 1st Detachment were annihilated by artillery fire, a half-company of the reserve battalion, under a second-lieutenant of the 27th Regiment, arrived and occupied the right trench, and in the night another half-company, with a sergeant-major, was sent up with orders to occupy the saddle between Headquarter Hill and a small hill to the left of it. Firing went on the whole day, and on the night of August 14–15 the enemy made two attacks, but only succeeded in one case in getting up to the wire entanglement, where more than two-thirds of the attacking party were lost.
The hill was captured at midday on August 15. We retreated from the advanced positions, but were in consequence considerably stronger on Division Hill, Namako Yama, and 174 Metre Hill, on account of the reserves concentrated there.
In view of the anticipated attack on these hills, we had to work hard on them, the more so, as Namako Yama was very weakly fortified. The trenches were small and unfinished, and the ground solid rock.
If only these trenches had been prepared beforehand, it would have been quite a different matter. How many lives would have been saved, and how many attacks beaten back! It is always necessary in a fortress to prepare defensive positions in peace time, and this can be done conveniently as part of the training of the troops in garrison.
The fighting on Headquarter Hill cost us somewhat dearly. The Scout Detachments of the 5th Regiment lost more than half their strength—160 men and one officer (Second-Lieutenant Andreiev); the two naval companies suffered a loss of 30 men each; the remainder, represented by companies of the 13th Regiment and of the 4th Reserve Battalion, were reduced by quite 15 per cent. of their strength. The 11th and 12th Companies at Pan-lung Shan did not have many losses, but three officers were placed hors de combat—Major Katishev being wounded, and Second-Lieutenant Merkoulev and Ensign Moukin killed.