It iz not improbable that Cape Roman, Cape Fear, Cape Hatteras, and Cape Cod, may be formed by similar currents, within the main Gulf Streem. A considerable extent of land on the coast of Carolina and Georgia, appeers to be made by the washing down of sand from the high country, and the washing up of sand by the Atlantic, whoze surges almost incessantly beet the shore. But this alone wil not account for the extension of points of sand, ten, fifteen or twenty leegs into the ocean.
It iz a fact that capes and promontories are more frequently harrassed with tempests, lightning and thunder, than other parts of the shore or continent. This haz been remarked of New York and Cape Hatteras. Can a philosophical reezon be assigned for this phenomenon? Perhaps there may be some attractiv power in land thus situated; and perhaps tempests are generated by the agitation of the air, produced by a flux and reflux of water, or a variety of opposit currents. A storm hangs over Cape Hatteras, every day, for a considerable part of the yeer. I hav been witness to the fact, for a number of days in succession. This circumstance increeses the terror of navigating that coast; otherwize so formidable to seemen for shoals and breakers.[166]
In examining the harbors of North America, we find most of them prezent a channel or entrance neerly at right angles with the shore. The entrance into most of them iz between the points of west and north. The entrance into Newport, iz the safest in America, and this iz almost the only harbor in the united states which can be made with a northwesterly wind. This circumstance iz highly favorable to ships coming upon the coast in winter. This harbor iz capacious enough to admit all the navees in Europe, and, if defensible, may be the proper Portsmouth of America.
No. XXVIII.
The following iz part of an "Essay on the Dets of the United States," written in 1787, but never before published. The question haz been ably discussed in Congress, and the proposition for a discrimination between original and purchasing holders of certificates, which I had started, without the prospect of support, haz been maintained by very powerful arguments in our federal legislature. Az the question now appeers to my mind, I should vote against the proposition, yet merely on the ground that from the manner in which the certificates were issued, it iz impossible to discriminate, without multiplying the instances of hardship and injustice. But I hav no more dout, that legislatures hav a right to interfere, in certain extreme cases, and suspend or counteract the operation of legal principles, than I hav of any reveeled truth or intuitiv proposition; and were it possible to ascertain the original holders of certificates, I conceev our legislators could not hav neglected a provision for their losses, without violating their oaths, the constitution and public faith. The following extract iz published, because I am desirous my opinion on this subject should be known and recorded.
HARTFORD, MARCH, 1790.
On a DISCRIMINATION between the ORIGINAL HOLDERS and the PURCHASERS of the CERTIFICATES of the UNITED STATES.
Objection 1. It iz said that public faith requires the payment of the certificates, according to contract; that iz, to the bearers. Let me ask the men who contend for promise, what they meen by public faith? Did the public ever promise to do rong? The money waz du to men who erned it; the money waz not paid. The full valu expressed on the certificates waz du, and the certificates were worth but a fourth, or perhaps an eighth part of that valu. The public promised the creditors their full demands; but theze promises, at the time of issuing the certificates, were actually worth but a small part of that demand. Ought the creditors to be dismissed with this part of their money, and then compelled to pay the full valu of the certificates to their nabors, who purchased them at their current price? If this iz right, my ideas of justice are rong. Public faith iz suppozed to be founded on justice. The public engaged to do justice to its creditors; but this justice haz not been done; and it appeers to me az plain az the shining of the sun, that if the certificates should be paid to the bearers, justice wil not be done. The creditors at the time of contract, expected to receev gold and silver, or something equivalent; they hav receeved neether the one nor the other. They receeved articles which were worth but a fourth part of their demands; for the remainder of their money, the public iz stil their detor. Public faith therefore requires, that the full valu of the alienated certificates should not be paid to the bearer. It appeers to me that the principles of equity, rather than of law, should decide this important question. It iz the design of the contract, not the words, which should be pursued; for it must be remembered, that the design of the public haz been counteracted. The intention of the public, expressed on the certificates, haz been defeated by the public exigences; and to pursue the words of the engagement, wil now produce an effect which waz not designed, viz. extensiv injustice.
In this situation the public haz an undouted right to call in the evidences of the det, and form a system that shall be effectual in the distribution of justice. If the public suppoze that any arrangement for this purpoze can be made, they certainly hav a right to attempt it; for the object of the attempt would be public justice. The sticklers for paying the det to the present holders, hav the same object in view, national faith; but their ideas of this faith, seem to be derived from the practice of other nations, the situation of whoze dets bears very little analogy to that of ours. They therefore advance an argument against their own cauze; for the faith of the public iz prezerved by fulfilling the intention, rather than the words, of the contract.