The whole argument for Bills of Rights and unalterable Constitutions rests on two suppositions, viz. that the Convention which frames the government, is infallible; and that future Legislatures will be less honest, less wise, and less attentiv to the interest of the State, than a present Convention: The first supposition is always false, and the last is generally so. A declaration of perpetuity, annexed to a form of government, implies a supposition of perfect wisdom and probity in the framers; which is both arrogant and impudent; and it implies a supposed power in them, to abridge the power of a succeeding Convention, and of the future state or body of people. The last supposition is, in every possible instance of legislation, false; and an attempt to exercise such a power, a high handed act of tyranny. But setting aside the argument, grounded on a want of power in one Assembly to abridge the power of another, what occasion have we to be so jealous of future Legislatures? Why should we be so anxious to guard the future rights of a nation? Why should we not distrust the people and the Representativs of the present age, as well as those of future ages, in whose acts we have not the smallest interest? For my part, I believe that the peeple and their Representativs, two or three centuries hence, will be as honest, as wise, as faithful to themselves, and will understand their rights as well, and be as able to defend them, as the people are at this period. The contrary supposition is absurd.
I know it is said, that other nations have lost their liberties by the ambitious designs of their rulers, and we may do the same. The experience of other nations, furnishes the ground of all the arguments used in favor of an unalterable constitution. The advocates seem determined that posterity shall not lose their liberty, even if they should be willing and desirous to surrender it. If a few declarations on parchment, will secure a single blessing to posterity, which they would otherwise lose, I resign the argument, and will receive a thousand declarations. Yet so thoroughly convinced am I of the opposite tendency and effect of such unalterable declarations, that, were it possible to render them valid, I should deem every article an infringement of civil and political liberty. I should consider every article as a restriction which might impose some duty which in time might cease to be useful and necessary, while the obligation of performing it might remain; or which in its operation might prove pernicious, by producing effects which were not expected, and could not be foreseen. There is no one single right, no privilege, which is commonly deemed fundamental, which may not, by an unalterable establishment, preclude some amendment, some improvement in future administration of government. And unless the advocates for unalterable constitutions of government, can prevent all changes in the wants, the inclinations, the habits, and the circumstances of people, they will find it difficult, even with all their declarations of unalterable rights, to prevent changes in government. A paper declaration is a very feeble barrier against the force of national habits, and inclinations.
The loss of liberty, as it is called, in the kingdoms of Europe, has, in several instances, been a mere change of government, effected by a change of habits, and in some instances this change has been favorable to liberty. The government of Denmark, was changed from a mixed form, like that of England, to an absolute monarchy, by a solemn deliberate act of the people or States. Was this a loss of liberty? So far from it, that the change removed the oppressions of faction, restored liberty to the subject and tranquillity to the kingdom. The change was a blessing to the people. It indeed lodged a power in the Prince to dispose of life and property; but at the same time it lodged in him a power to defend both; a power which before was lodged no where; and it is infinitely better that such a power should be vested in a single hand, than that it should not exist at all. The monarchy of France has grown out of a number of petty states and lordships; yet it is a fact, proved by history and experience, that the subjects of that kingdom have acquired liberty, peace and happiness, in proportion to the diminution of the powers of the petty sovereignties, and the extension of the prerogativs of the Monarch. It is said that Spain lost her liberties under the reign of Charles Vth; but I question the truth of the assertion; it is probable that the subject has gained as much by an abridgement of the powers of the nobility, as he lost by an annihilation of the Cortez. The United Netherlands fought with more bravery and perseverance to preserve their rights, than any other people since the days of Leonidas; and yet no sooner established a government, so jealously guarded as to defeat its own designs, and prevent the good effects of government, than they neglected its principles; the freemen resigned the privilege of election, and committed their liberties to a rich aristocracy. There was no compulsion, no external force in producing this revolution; but the form of government, which had been established on paper, and solemnly ratified, was not suited to the genius of the subjects. The burghers had the right of electing their rulers; but they neglected it voluntarily; and a bill of rights, a perpetual constitution on parchment, guaranteeing that right, was a useless form of words, because opposed to the temper of the people. The government assumed a complexion, more correspondent to their habits, and tho in theory no constitution is more cautiously guarded against an infringement of popular privileges, yet in practice it is a real aristocracy.
The progress of government in England has been the reverse: The people have been gaining freedom by intrenching upon the powers of the nobles and the royal prerogativs. These changes in government do not proceed from bills of rights, unalterable forms and perpetual establishments; liberty is never secured by such paper declarations, nor lost for want of them. The truth is, Government originates in necessity, and takes its form and structure from the genius and habits of the people; and if on paper a form is not accommodated to those habits, it will assume a new form, in spite of all the formal sanctions of the supreme authority of a State. Were the monarchy of France to be dissolved, and the wisest system of republican government ever invented, solemnly declared, by the King and his council, to be the constitution of the kingdom; the people with their present habits, would refuse to receive it; and resign their privileges to their beloved sovereign. But so opposite are the habits of the Americans, that an attempt to erect a monarchy or an aristocracy over the United States, would expose the authors to the loss of their heads.[27] The truth is, the people of Europe, since they have become civilized, have, in no kingdom, possessed all the true principles of liberty. They could not therefore lose what they never possessed. There have been, from time immemorial, some rights of government, some prerogativs vested in some man or body of men, independent of the suffrages of the body of the subjects. This circumstance distinguishes the governments of Europe and of all the world, from those of America. There has been in the free nations of Europe an incessant struggle between freedom or national rights, and hereditary prerogativs. The contest has ended variously in different kingdoms; but generally in depressing the power of the nobility; ascertaining and limiting the prerogativs of the crown, and extending the privileges of the people. The Americans have seen the records of their struggles; and without considering that the objects of the contest do not exist in this country; they are laboring to guard rights which there is no party to attack. They are as jealous of their rights, as if there existed here a King's prerogativs, or the powers of nobles, independent of their own will and choice, and ever eager to swallow up their liberties. But there is no man in America, who claims any rights but what are common to every man; there is no man who has an interest in invading popular privileges, because his attempt to curtail another's rights, would expose his own to the same abridgement. The jealousy of people in this country has no proper object against which it can rationally arm them; it is therefore directed against themselves, or against an invasion which they imagine may happen in future ages. The contest for perpetual bills of rights against a future tyranny, resembles Don Quixote's fighting windmills; and I never can reflect on the declamation about an unalterable constitution to guard certain rights, without wishing to add another article, as necessary as those that are generally mentioned, viz. "that no future Convention or Legislature shall cut their own throats, or those of their constituents." While the habits of the Americans remain as they are, the people will choose their Legislature from their own body; that Legislature will have an interest inseparable from that of the people, and therefore an act to restrain their power in any article of legislation, is as unnecessary as an act to prevent them from committing suicide.
Mr. Jefferson, in answer to those who maintain that the form of government in Virginia is unalterable, because it is called a constitution, which, ex vi termini, means an act above the power of the ordinary Legislature, asserts that constitution, statute, law and ordinance, are synonymous terms, and convertible as they are used by writers on government. Constitutio dicitur jus quod a principe conditur. Constitutum, quod ab imperatoribus rescriptum statutumve est. Statutum, idem quod lex.[28] Here the words constitution, statute and law, are defined by each other; they were used as convertible terms by all former writers, whether Roman or British; and before the terms of the civil law were introduced, our Saxon ancestors used the correspondent English words, bid and set.[29] From hence he concludes that no inference can be drawn from the meaning of the word, that a constitution has a higher authority than a law or statute. This conclusion of Mr. Jefferson is just.
He quotes Lord Coke also to prove that any parliament can abridge, suspend or qualify the acts of a preceding Parliament. It is a maxim in their laws, that "Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant." After having fully proved that constitution, statute, law and ordinance, are words of similar import, and that the constitution of Virginia is at any time alterable by the ordinary Legislature, he proceeds to prove the danger to which the rights of the people are exposed, for want of an unalterable form of government. The first proof of this danger he mentions, is, the power which the Assembly exercises of determining its own quorum. The British Parliament fixes its own quorum: The former Assemblies of Virginia did the same. During the war the Legislature determined that forty members should be a quorum to proceed to business, altho not a fourth part of the whole house. The danger of delay, it was judged, would warrant the measure. This precedent, our writer supposes, is subversive of the principles of the government, and dangerous to liberty.
It is a dictate of natural law that a majority should govern; and the principle is universally received and established in all societies, where no other mode has been arbitrarily fixed. This natural right cannot be alienated in perpetuum; for altho a Legislature, or even the body of the people, may resign the powers of government to forty, or to four men, when they please, yet they may likewise resume them at pleasure.
The people may, if they please, create a dictator on an emergency in war, but his creation would not destroy, but merely suspend the natural right of the Lex majoris partis. Thus forty members, a minority of the Legislature of Virginia, were empowered during a dangerous invasion, to legislate for the State; but any subsequent Assembly might have divested them of that power. During the operation of the law, vesting them with this power, their acts were binding upon the State; because their power was derived from the general sense of the State; it was actually derived from a legal majority. But that majority could, at any moment, resume the power and practice on their natural right.
It is a standing law of Connecticut, that forty men shall be a quorum of the House of Representativs, which consists of about 170 members. This law, I am confident, never excited a murmur, or a suspicion that the liberties of the people were in danger; yet this law creates an oligarchy; it is an infringement of natural right; it subjects the State to the possibility, and even the probability of being governed at times by a minority. The acquiescence of the State, in the existence of the law, gives validity, and even the sanction of a majority, to the acts of that minority; but the majority may at any time resume their natural right, and make the assent of more than half of the members, necessary to give validity to their determinations.
The danger therefore arising from a power in the Assembly to determine their own quorum, is merely ideal, for no law can be perpetual; the authority of a majority of the people, or of their Representativs, is always competent to repeal any act that is found unjust or inconvenient. The acquiescence however of the people of the States mentioned, and that in one of them for a long course of years, under an oligarchy; or their submission to the power of a minority, is an incontestible proof of what I have before observed, that theories and forms of government are empty things; that the spirit of a government springs immediately from the temper of the people, and the exercise of it will generally take its tone from their feelings. It proves likewise that a union of interests between the rulers and the people, which union will always coexist with free elections, is not only the best, but the only security for their liberties which they can wish for and demand. The Government of Connecticut is a solid proof of these truths. The Assembly of that State, have always had power to abolish trial by jury, to restrain the liberty of the press, to suspend the habeas corpus act, to maintain a standing army, in short to command every engine of despotism; yet by some means or other, it happens that the rights of the people are not invaded, and the subjects have generally been better satisfied with the laws, than the people of any other State. The reason is, the Legislature is a part of the people, and has the same interest. If a law should prove bad, the Legislature can repeal it; but in the unalterable bills of rights in some of the States, if an article should prove wrong and oppressiv, an ordinary Legislature cannot repeal or amend it; and the State will hardly think of calling a special Convention for so trifling a purpose. There are some articles, in several of the State Constitutions, which are glaring infractions of the first rights of freemen; yet they affect not a majority of the community; and centuries may elapse before the evil can be redressed, and a respectable class of men restored to the enjoyment of their rights.[30]